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Abstract
In recent years, several nations and private associations have introduced Internet voting
as additional means to conduct elections. To date, a variety of voting schemes to conduct
Internet-based elections have been constructed, both from the scientific community and
industry. Because of its fundamental importance to democratic societies, Internet voting
– as any other voting method – is bound to high legal standards, particularly imposing se-
curity requirements on the voting method. However, these legal standards, and resultant
derived security requirements, partially oppose each other. As a consequence, Internet
voting schemes cannot enforce these legally-founded security requirements to their full
extent, but rather build upon specific assumptions. The criticality of these assumptions
depends on the target election setting, particularly the adversary expected within that set-
ting. Given the lack of an election-specific evaluation framework for these assumptions, or
more generally Internet voting schemes, the adequacy of Internet voting schemes for spe-
cific elections cannot readily be determined. Hence, selecting the Internet voting scheme
that satisfies legally-founded security requirements within a specific election setting in the
most appropriate manner, is a challenging task.
To support election officials in the selection process, the first goal of this dissertation is
the construction of a evaluation framework for Internet voting schemes based on legally-
founded security requirements. Therefore, on the foundation of previous interdisciplinary
research, legally-founded security requirements for Internet voting schemes are derived.
To provide election officials with improved decision alternatives, the second goal of this
dissertation is the improvement of two established Internet voting schemes with regard to
legally-founded security requirements, namely the Polyas Internet voting scheme and the
Estonian Internet voting scheme.
Our research results in five (partially opposing) security requirements for Internet voting
schemes. On the basis of these security requirements, we construct a capability-based risk
assessment approach for the security evaluation of Internet voting schemes in specific
election settings. The evaluation of the Polyas scheme reveals the fact that compromised
voting devices can alter votes undetectably. Considering surrounding circumstances, we
eliminate this shortcoming by incorporating out of band codes to acknowledge voters’
votes. It turns out that in the Estonian scheme, four out of five security requirements rely
on the correct behaviour of voting devices. We improve the Estonian scheme in that regard
xii Abstract
by incorporating out of band voting and acknowledgment codes. Thereby, we maintain
four out of five security requirements against adversaries capable of compromising voting
devices.
Zusammenfassung
In den letzten Jahren ist ein allgemeiner Trend in Richtung Internetwahlen zu beobachten.
So hat sich die Stimmabgabe u¨ber das Internet als zusa¨tzlicher Wahlkanal in einigen
Staaten und privaten Vereinigungen etabliert. Bis zum heutigen Tag haben sowohl Wis-
senschaft wie auch Industrie eine Reihe von Internetwahlprotokollen zur Durchfu¨hrung
von Internetwahlen entwickelt. Aufgrund ihrer zentralen Bedeutung fu¨r demokratische
Gesellschaften ist die Internetwahl – wie jede andere Wahlmethode – an hohe rechtliche
Normen gebunden. Insbesondere erlegen diese Normen der Internetwahl Sicherheitsan-
forderungen auf. Es zeigt sich jedoch, dass die rechtlichen Normen sowie die daraus
abgeleiteten Sicherheitsanforderungen miteinander konkurrieren. Eine Konsequenz dieser
Tatsache ist, dass Internetwahlprotokolle die rechtlich begru¨ndeten Sicherheitsanforderun-
gen nur unter bestimmten Annahmen umsetzen ko¨nnen. Die Kritikalita¨t dieser Annahmen
ha¨ngt dabei von der Wahlumgebung ab, insbesondere von dem zu erwartenden Angreifer.
Aufgrund des Fehlens wahlabha¨ngiger Evaluationsmethoden fu¨r diese Annahmen, oder
genereller fu¨r Internetwahlprotokolle, ko¨nnen verschiedene Internetwahlprotokolle nicht
direkt auf ihre Eignung zum Einsatz zur Durchfu¨hrung bestimmter Wahlen untersucht
werden. Folglich fa¨llt Wahlverantwortlichen die Auswahl eines Internetwahlprotokolls,
das die rechtlich begru¨ndeten Sicherheitsanforderungen in einer gegebenen Wahlumge-
bung bestmo¨glich umsetzt, schwer.
Um Wahlverantwortliche bei dieser Auswahl zu unterstu¨tzen, definieren wir die Kon-
struktion einer Evaluationsmethode fu¨r Internetwahlprotokolle bezu¨glich rechtlich begru¨nde-
ter Sicherheitsanforderungen als erstes Ziel dieser Dissertation. Dazu werden auf Grund-
lage interdisziplina¨rer Vorarbeit rechtlich begru¨ndete Sicherheitsanforderungen fu¨r Inter-
netwahlprotokolle abgeleitet. Um Wahlverantwortliche daru¨ber hinaus mit gegebenen-
falls besseren Alternativen zu unterstu¨tzen, ist das zweite Ziel dieser Dissertation die
Verbesserung etablierter Internetwahlprotokolle bezu¨glich rechtlich begru¨ndeter Sicher-
heitsanforderungen. Dazu werden das Polyas Internetwahlprotokoll sowie das Protokoll
des estnischen Internetwahlsystems betrachtet.
Die Forschungsergebnisse dieser Dissertation resultieren in fu¨nf (teilweise konkurri-
erenden) Sicherheitsanforderungen fu¨r Internetwahlprotokolle. Auf Grundlage dieser An-
forderungen konstruieren wir einen fa¨higkeitsbasierten Ansatz zur Risikoabscha¨tzung zur
Sicherheitsevaluation von Internetwahlprotokollen in bestimmten Wahlumgebungen. Die
xiv Zusammenfassung
Evaluation des Polyas Protokolls legt die Tatsache offen, dass kompromittierte Wahl-
Endgera¨te abgegebene Stimmen unbemerkt manipulieren ko¨nnen. In Einklang mit prak-
tischen Gegebenheiten adressieren wir die Schwachstelle durch das Einarbeiten sogenan-
nter Besta¨tigungscodes. Die Evaluation des estnischen Internetwahlprotokolls zeigt, dass
vier der fu¨nf rechtlich begru¨ndeten Sicherheitsanforderungen nur unter der Annahme
gewa¨hrleistet werden ko¨nnen, dass Wahl-Endgera¨te nicht kompromittiert sind. Wir begeg-
nen dieser Schwachstelle mit der Einarbeitung sogenannter Wahl- und Besta¨tigungscodes.
Das Ergebnis dieser Erweiterung ist, dass vier der fu¨nf rechtlichen begru¨ndeten Sicher-
heitsanforderungen nicht durch kompromittierte Endgera¨te gefa¨hrdet werden.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The first chapter provides the reader an introduction into the content of this thesis. We
motivate our research and define the research questions addressed within the thesis. We
subsequently provide an overview about the contributions of the thesis. Finally, we guide
the reader through the remainder of this work.
1.1. Motivation and Research Questions
The history of election dates back to the ancient Greece (508/07 BC) when citizens of
Athens for the first time exercised a direct democracy. However, at that time the electoral
right was very limited. Only citizens of Athens excluding women, metics, and slaves were
allowed to participate in the elections. Today, the role of election for democratic societies
is nearly beyond any doubt. In fact, the right to political participation is anchored in
Universal Declaration of Human Rights [Uni48]. Article 21 of this declaration states:
1. “Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or
through freely chosen representatives.”
2. “Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country.”
3. “The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will
shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and
equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.”
While the Human Rights Declaration captures the three election principles universal,
equal, and free suffrage, other nations extend these principles. Throughout this work, we
focus on Germany. As baseline for our research, we consider Federal elections in Germany.
According to the German Constitution, the principles of the universal, direct, free, equal,
and secret elections established in Art. 38.1 sentence 1 of the German Constitution are of
particular relevance. In addition, the principle of the public nature of elections emerges
from Articles 20.1, 20.2 and 38.1 of the German Constitution.
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The conduct of elections has always been under change, incorporating technical ad-
vances of human development to facilitate or generally improve the voting process. While
in the ancient Greece, citizens deposited shreds or pebbles into distinct accumulation bins
to express their choice, citizens in the ancient Rome used paper ballots to indicate the
name of their preferred candidate. In the year 1856, the Australian government for the
first time issued uniform ballots to their citizens upon which they expressed their choice.
The advance of the industrialization resulted in the next stage of development. In 1892,
for the first time mechanical voting machines (lever voting machines) were used to con-
duct elections in Lockport, New York, USA. With digitalization, the most recent stage
of development has been initiated. Direct-recording electronic (DRE) voting machines
have been in use since the early 1990s [FC05]. Lately, a tendency towards the usage of
Internet-based voting systems can be noticed. Estonia has taken a leading role with the
invention of Internet voting for local government council elections and nation-wide parlia-
mentary elections in 2005 [Kal09]. Following Estonia’s example, other countries started
adopting Internet voting for legally-binding elections, e.g. Canada, Switzerland, India,
and Norway1.
While new (compulsory or optional) voting modes generally address deficiencies with
regard to legal provisions in previous voting modes, those provisions cannot be satis-
fied simultaneously in totality [Fed, Decision: 59, 119 (124):1981]. In its judgment on the
constitutionality of postal voting, the Federal Constitutional Court declared that the prin-
ciples of the free and secret elections were not violated by the postal voting process [Fed,
Decision: 21, 200:1967]: the increase in election participation offered by postal voting,
which translates to an improvement of the principle of the universal elections, is strong
enough to offset the impairment of the secret elections, and thus can be accepted. Before
introducing Internet-based elections, election officials therefore have to gain a profound
understanding to which extent Internet voting systems satisfy legal provisions.
In the context of Internet voting, legal provisions have largely been considered in a
constructive approach, i.e. researchers strove to deduce precise technical goals and viable
assumptions, and tailor their constructions towards these goals under the given assump-
tions. Among other methodologies, e.g. [VH04, BGRR13], a well-established one following
this approach is the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation2
(DIN ISO/IEC 15408). Intuitively, these approaches might either result in technical con-
structions that do or do not comply with technical goals under the given assumptions.
Because election principles cannot be enforced to their full extent within Internet voting
systems, legal latitude is open for the legislator [Dre06, Art. 38, Rn. 62]. Hence, there is
no unique set of technical goals and assumptions. Therefore, it is reasonable to evaluate
Internet voting systems against legally-founded technical requirements, taking the election
environment into account, including the expected adversary. The present thesis supports
1Refer to http://aceproject.org/ace-en/focus/e-voting/countries
2Refer to https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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this evaluation approach. Its focus is thereby restricted to Internet voting schemes as con-
ceptual underpinning of Internet voting systems and to security aspects of these schemes.
Consequently, we pose our first research question:
Research Question 1. How can the satisfaction of legally-founded security requirements
in Internet voting schemes be measured?
To date, numerous Internet voting schemes have been proposed [CGS97, JCJ05, RT13,
ZCC+13] and applied for different types of elections, e.g. Estonian parliamentary elections
[Tre07, Off11, HLV12], Norwegian parliamentary elections [OSC12], University elections
[ADMPQ09], and elections in private associations [OKNV12]. The second research ques-
tion tackles the challenge of evaluating the security of established Internet voting schemes
and potentially improving the security of these schemes. Hence, the following research
question is defined:
Research Question 2. Can established Internet voting schemes be improved with regard
to legally-founded security requirements for Internet voting schemes?
1.2. Research Approaches and Contributions
The thesis contributes to the advancement of Internet voting by addressing the defined re-
search questions. An overview about the respective research approaches and contributions
is provided in the following paragraphs.
Evaluation of Internet Voting Schemes Based on Legally-Founded Security
Requirements
The implementation of Internet-based elections is bound to legal provisions, most generally
expressed in the election principles. Because of their abstract nature, the evaluation of
Internet voting systems against these provisions requires a refinement of legal provisions
into technical requirements.
As a first contribution of this thesis, we pave the way for an evaluation of Internet voting
systems with regard to legal provisions by transforming election principles and further
constitutional rights relevant to Internet voting into security requirements for Internet
voting systems. Therefore, on the foundation of previous research conducted by Bra¨unlich
et al. [BGRR13], we transform legal criteria/technical requirements derived from legal
provisions on security requirements for Internet voting systems.
To measure the extent to which Internet voting schemes as conceptual underpinning
of Internet voting systems satisfy security requirements, as a second contribution of this
thesis, we construct a security evaluation framework for Internet voting schemes. The
framework provides two specification languages on the basis of uniform adversarial capa-
bilities. The language of qualitative security models enables system analysts to specify the
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security of Internet voting schemes in an election-independent manner. To that end, qual-
itative security models serve as first quality criterion for Internet voting schemes, upon
which a notion of dominance can be defined. The language of election settings allows
election officials to specify their election environment in terms of expected adversaries,
number of eligible voters, and number of expected voters. Ultimately, the framework al-
lows the evaluation of given qualitative security models within a given election setting by
the application of a risk-based approach and Monte-Carlo simulations. The quantitative
results serve as second quality criterion for Internet voting schemes.
Security Evaluation and Improvement of Internet Voting Schemes
Because of the lack of appropriate evaluation techniques, the security of Internet voting
schemes and their modifications have not been evaluated against legally-founded security
requirements. We therefore present security evaluations of well-established Internet voting
schemes, namely the Polyas Internet voting scheme and the Estonian Internet voting
scheme.
As a third contribution of this thesis, we qualitatively evaluate the Polyas Internet voting
scheme against the uniform capability set. On the basis of the qualitative evaluation result,
we incorporate a verifiability measure into the Polyas Internet voting scheme to uphold
vote integrity against compromised voting devices. We compare the original and the
extended Polyas scheme both on a qualitative and quantitative level.
Analogously to the Polyas case, as a fourth contribution of this thesis, we qualitatively
evaluate the Estonian Internet voting scheme against the uniform capability set. We subse-
quently construct an extension of the Estonian Internet voting scheme, thereby improving
the scheme with regard to risks caused by compromised voting devices. We compare the
original and the extended Estonian scheme both on a qualitative and quantitative level.
1.3. Structure and Preliminary Considerations
We provide the structure of this thesis and outline preliminary considerations relevant for
the remainder of this work.
Structure. Aligned with its research questions, the content of this thesis is subdivided
in two parts. An overview about the thesis structure is provided in Figure 1.1.
Part I of this thesis is dedicated to the construction of an evaluation framework for Inter-
net voting schemes based on legally-founded security requirements. Therefore, in Chapter
2, we derive security requirements for Internet voting systems on the basis of election prin-
ciples manifested in the German Constitution and further relevant constitutional rights.
The actual construction of a security evaluation framework for Internet voting schemes,
as conceptual underpinning of Internet voting systems, is presented in Chapter 3.
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Part II: Security Evaluation and Improvement of Internet Voting Schemes
Part I: Security Evaluation Framework for Internet Voting Schemes
Legally-Founded Security Requirements for Internet Voting Systems
(Chapter 2)
Construction of a Security Evaluation Framework for Internet Voting Schemes
(Chapter 3)
Conclusion, Limitations, and Future Work
(Chapter 7)
Foundations for the Evaluation and Improvement of Internet Voting Schemes
(Chapter 4)
The Polyas Internet Voting Scheme
(Chapter 5)
The Estonian Internet Voting Scheme
(Chapter 6)
Introduction
(Chapter 1)
Figure 1.1: Structure of this dissertation thesis.
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Part II of this thesis is dedicated to the quantitative security evaluation of established
Internet voting schemes and their potential improvement. Chapter 4 provides the reader
with the foundations for the evaluation and improvement of Internet voting schemes. These
are cryptographic primitives and protocol upon which Internet voting schemes build and
probabilistic adversaries which are used throughout the quantitative security evaluation
of Internet voting schemes. Subsequently, the Polyas Internet voting scheme is evaluated
and improved with regard to vote integrity in Chapter 5. Analogously, we evaluate the
Estonian Internet voting scheme and propose an extension in Chapter 6.
The conclusions, limitations, and directions for future research of the thesis are discussed
in Chapter 7.
Preliminary Considerations. The goal of this work is the evaluation and improvement of
Internet voting schemes with regard to legally-founded security requirements. To achieve
this goal, it is necessary to isolate these schemes from possibly alternative voting methods,
such as postal voting and polling station voting. To draw this line precisely from the
beginning, we consider Internet voting as compulsory voting method in the remainder of
this work.
We disassemble Internet voting into three phases. Within the first phase, namely the
setup phase, election specific data is generated and distributed. In that phase, all provisions
for the actual voting process are made. Within the second phase, namely the voting phase,
voters have the possibility to actively participate in the election by casting their vote.
Within the third phase, namely the tallying phase, all votes cast throughout the voting
phase are tallied and the election result is announced. Depending on the scheme, further
specific election data is published.
All links provided within this thesis have been checked and were working on February
9, 2016.
Part I.
Security Evaluation Framework for
Internet Voting Schemes

Chapter 2
Legally-Founded Security Requirements
for Internet Voting Systems
The goal of this chapter is the derivation of security requirements for Internet voting
systems on the basis of election principles anchored in the German Constitution and
further constitutional rights relevant to Internet voting.
We first review scientific works dedicated to the derivation of security requirements
for Internet voting systems from legal provisions. We conclude that none of these works
provides a satisfactory list of security requirements as foundation for this work. We subse-
quently build upon the interdisciplinary research by Bra¨unlich et al. [BGRR13] on deriving
technical design proposals from legal provisions anchored in the German Constitution. We
derive security requirements for Internet voting systems in the third part of this chapter.
We summarize the content of this chapter in the last section.
An earlier version of this chapter has been published as chapter in the book Design,
Development, and Use of Secure Electronic Voting Systems [21].
2.1. Related Work
Throughout the last decades, many researchers have addressed the challenge of establishing
security requirements for Internet voting systems on the basis of legal provisions. This
section reviews those works and draws the line between efforts made earlier and our own
contribution.
Gritzalis [Gri02] aims at bridging the gap between legal provisions and technical require-
ments. Therefore, Gritzalis first identifies a set of constitutional requirements, namely
generality, freedom, equality, secrecy, directness, and democracy. Subsequently, the au-
thor derives voting system design principles. Applying the Rational Unified Process
[JBR+99, Kru04], the author refines the constitutional requirements and respective de-
sign principles into twelve user requirements. Mitrou et al. [MGK02] address the question
“how an e-vote process should be designed and implemented in order to comply with the
democratic election principles”. The authors focus on the election principles of univer-
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sal, free, equal, secret, and direct voting; additionally, they emphasize the importance of
transparency, verifiability, accountability, security and accuracy. Both works are settled
in an international context, rather than the German context. Given the fact that legal
interpretations of election principles might differ in different contexts (refer for instance to
Grimm et al. [GKM+06]), the goal of our work is the derivation of security requirements
for Internet voting systems in the German context.
A number of scientific works have studied the impact of legal provisions stemming from
the German Constitution on the implementation of electronic voting.
Schryen [Sch04] studies the relation between (technological) security and surrounding
requirements such as legal, economical, ergonomic, and other requirements. As a base-
line of a legal surrounding, Schryen builds upon the election principles of the German
Constitution. The author elaborates concerns that arise with regard to election principles
when introducing electronic voting, and shows how these concerns might be addressed by
technological means. In spite of these insights, the author does not structurally derive
security requirements from legal provisions for Internet voting systems.
Volkamer and Hutter [VH04] provide a technical interpretation of these principles and
investigate how an electronic voting system could be implemented to accommodate these
requirements. Aiming at a general catalogue of security requirements for elections at the
Gesellschaft fu¨r Informatik, Grimm et al. [GKM+06] interpret the legal provisions of the
German Constitution and deduce nine security requirements for Internet voting systems.
These efforts and numerous further works build the basis of Volkamer’s PhD thesis [Vol09].
The goal of her thesis is the establishment of a comprehensive set of system requirements
(including security requirements) for electronic voting systems. Therefore, Volkamer re-
views the Federal Regulation for Voting Machines of the Federal Republic of Germany
(Verordnung u¨ber den Einsatz von Wahlgera¨ten bei Wahlen zum Deutschen Bundestag und
der Abgeordneten des Europa¨ischen Parlaments aus der Bundesrepublik Deutschland), the
guidelines about the usage of the digital voting pen system of the Free and Hanseatic
City of Hamburg (Richtlinien fu¨r den Einsatz des Digitalen Wahlstift-Systems bei Wahlen
zur Hamburgischen Bu¨rgerschaft und Wahlen zu den Bezirksversammlungen), the Voting
System Standard of the Federal Election Commission of the United States of America
[Fed01], Voluntary Voting System Guidelines [Com07], the IEEE P1583 Standards for
Voting Equipment, the CoE Recommendation Rec(2004)11 [Cou04], the Catalogue of Re-
quirements for Online Voting Systems for Non-parliamentary Elections [Phy04] by the
Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt (PTB), the requirements catalogue for Internet-
based election in private associations [Ges05] by the Gesellschaft fu¨r Informatik, the Swiss
Election Law, the Austrian Federal Law about the representation of the students (Bundes-
gesetz u¨ber die Vertretung der Studierenden (Hochschu¨lerinnen- und Hochschu¨lerschafts-
gesetz 1998 - HSG 1998)), the Network Voting System Standards (NVSS) [Vot02]. Addi-
tionally, Volkamer considers scientific works aiming at the derivation of technical require-
ments for electronic voting systems, namely Shamos Commandments [Sha93], Mercuri’s
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PhD thesis [Mer01], McGaley’s PhD thesis [McG08] and the voting system requirements
in the CyberVote project [FTLB01]. Her research results in 21 security requirements for
Internet voting systems. In spite of the enormous ambition to include both legal provi-
sions and technically-driven requirements, the requirements derived by Volkamer prove
to be inadequate for this work. The derived security requirements show redundancy and
are too closely related to technical solutions. Consider for instance the requirements
O.T.ElecSecrecyNet, O.T.ProofGen, and O.T.ElectionSecrecy. The purpose of these three
requirements is the same, namely preventing adversaries from learning the link between
a voter and her vote. Consider furthermore the requirement O.T.IneligVoter. It requires
voting systems to “unambiguously identify and authenticate the voter before storing his
vote in the e-ballot box”. Yet, there exist approaches which enforce the equality of voters
by means of anonymous credentials, e.g. linkable group signatures [LWW04] and dis-
tributed credentials [JCJ05].
Given the lack of an adequate list of security requirements structurally derived from
legal provisions captured in the German Constitution, we address this challenge in the
following sections.
2.2. Preliminary Work – Refinement of Constitutional Rights
To the best of our knowledge, Bra¨unlich et al. [BGRR13] present the first interdisciplinary
collaboration structurally refining election principles and further relevant rights anchored
in the German Constitution into technical design design proposals. We first present the
election principles anchored in the German Constitution and further constitutional rights
related to the Internet voting process. Subsequently, we outline the refinement process
and result of the interdisciplinary research conducted by Bra¨unlich et al. We identify
shortcomings of their approach in reference to our research goal. For the sake of clarity,
we cite excerpts of their work. Those excerpts have been translated from German to
English and printed in italic font between quotation marks.
2.2.1. Election Principles and Further Constitutional Rights
The election of the representatives is regulated in Article 38 of the German Constitution.
Correspondingly, the principles of the universal, direct, free, equal, and secret elections
established in Article 38.1 sentence 1 are of particular relevance. In addition to these
principles, another election principle emerging from Article 20.1, 20.2 and 38.1 of the Ger-
man Constitution has been emphasized by the Federal Constitutional Court in 2009 [Fed,
Decision: 123, 39:2009], namely the principle of the public nature of elections.
Universal Elections. The principle of universal elections concerns the eligibility to vote
without applying to personal qualities or political, financial or social aspects [Fed, Decision:
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15, 165 (166f):1962. Decision: 36, 139 (141):1973].
Equal Elections. The principle of equal elections addresses the impact of every valid vote
on the election result. That is, every voter needs to have the same number of votes and
must be able to cast his or her vote in the same way as any other one [Sch09, § 1, Rn. 43].
Furthermore, all candidates need to be presented equally, so all of them have the same
chance to win the election [Sch09, § 1, Rn. 48f].
Direct Elections. The principle of direct elections forbids the integration of electoral
delegates [Fed, Decision: 7, 63 (68):1957. Decision: 47, 253 (279):1978] and requires that
the representatives get elected through voters only by casting their vote personally [Dre06,
Art. 38, Rn. 75][MD13, Art. 38, Rn. 101].
Secret Elections. The principle of secret elections claims that the voting decision remains
secret during and after the election process [vMK12, Art. 38, Rn. 67]. It needs to remain
secret whether voters split their votes or cast them based on a single preferred party,
whether they spoiled their vote or abstained from voting at all [Sch09, § 1, Rn. 95].
Free Elections. The principle of free elections covers the process of opinion making prior
to the election as well as the process of vote casting within the election. In formal aspects
it ensures the right to choose whether one wants to casts a vote or not. In material regards
it provides the freedom to cast a vote for the preferred candidate or party [Sch09, § 1, Rn.
21].
Public Nature of Elections. The so called public nature of elections requires that all
essential steps in the elections are subject to public examinability unless other constitu-
tional interests justify an exception.
In addition to the election principles anchored in the German Constitution, Bra¨unlich
et al. identify two further constitutional rights relevant to the implementation of Internet
voting. These are the following:
Informational Self-determination. The informational self-determination goes back to the
“Census Judgment” by the German Constitutional Court [Fed, Decision: 65, 1:1983] and
is deduced by the Art. 1(1) and Art. 2(1) of the German Constitution. In that judgment,
the informational self-determination is established as Basic Right. The informational self-
determination concedes anybody the right to have control about disclosure and use of
personal data.
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Secrecy of Telecommunications. The secrecy of telecommunications in anchored in Art.
10 of the German Constitution. Referring to Decision [Fed, Decision: 67, 157 (172):1984],
Bra¨unlich et al. note that the secrecy of telecommunications protects the confidentiality
of individual communication transmitted by means of telecommunications against state
intervention.
2.2.2. The Method KORA and the Derivation of Legal Criteria and Technical
Design Goals
The development of legally-compliant technology poses a challenge which is to be ad-
dressed in an interdisciplinary collaboration. On the one side legal expertise contributes
to the understanding of legal provisions while technical expertise supports the enforce-
ment of these provisions by technical constructions. On a scientific level, efforts have
been undertaken to conceptualize the development of legally-compliant technology. One
result of these efforts is the method KORA (Konkretisierung Rechtlicher Anforderungen,
engl.: Concretization of Legal Requirements) [HPR93]. KORA is a four-step method for
acquiring technical design proposals based on legal provisions.
1. In the first step, application-specific legal requirements are identified from the rel-
evant parts of the constitution, relevant constitutional court decisions, and the op-
portunities and risks of the technology under investigation.
2. In the second step, legal requirements are made more concrete to so-called legal
criteria by considering simple law regulations and decisions from other courts.
3. In the third step, a language shift between the legal and technical language happens
and technical expertise enters the process. Legal criteria are made more concrete to
so-called technical design goals in an interdisciplinary dialogue.
4. In the fourth step, a technical design proposal is deduced from the design goals.
Due to the systematic deduction, this proposal is supposed to be constitutionally
compliant.
While the first two steps are driven by legal experts, a language shift happens between
KORA step 2 and KORA step 3. The latter steps are consequently driven by technical
experts. The method has proven its significance and its value in several applications, e.g.
the development of mobile devices [HJHL11], the usage of multimedia documents for the
approval of new plants according to the Federal Immission Control Act [IL00], and the
usage of digital signatures [PR94]. Bra¨unlich et al. [BGRR13] applied the method to
derive technical design goals for constitutionally-compliant Internet voting. As a result of
their work, Bra¨unlich et al. derived 5 legal requirements, 13 legal criteria, and 30 technical
design goals. The complete list of legal requirements, legal criteria, and technical design
goals compiled by Bra¨unlich et al. is provided in Appendix A.
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It shall be emphasized that the purpose of KORA is to support the interdisciplinary
development of legally-compliant technology, rather than the evaluation of technical pro-
posals against legally-founded requirements. Bra¨unlich et al. emphasize this aim by the
following statement:
“As opposed to the a posteriori, digital legal evaluation in terms of legally-
compliant or legally-incompliant, [...], KORA strives for optimizing technical
solutions with regard to legal requirements.”
Often, such an ideal development scenario is not given and technology is ahead of legal
provisions. Consequently, having a variety of technical solutions at hand, what shall be
done is to evaluate technology against technical requirements.
Referring to Bra¨unlich et al.’s work, it turns out that neither legal criteria nor technical
design goals might serve as legally-founded evaluation criteria for Internet voting systems.
Both legal criteria and technical design goals capture technical requirements, refinements of
requirements, and technical measures supporting the enforcement of requirements. Conse-
quently, evaluating Internet voting systems against these criteria or technical design goals
might give certain legal provisions unintentionally more weight than others.
Consider for instance the following technical design goals (TDG) determined by Bra¨un-
lich et al.:
TDG 22: “Third parties must not be capable of linking a vote to the voter who cast the
respective vote.”
TDG 23: “The voter must not be capable of proving her vote to any third party.”
Technical design goal TDG 22 cannot be enforced without the enforcement of technical
design goal TDG 23. If a voter would be capable of proving her vote to a third party,
that third party would immediately be capable of linking the vote to the voter who cast
it. Consequently, while the technical design goal 22 essentially corresponds to a technical
requirement, technical design goal 23 corresponds to a refinement of technical design goal
22.
Having the interdisciplinary research results by Bra¨unlich et al., one question arises:
Can the results of KORA be transformed into technical requirements?
2.3. Determination of Security Requirements
On the basis of legal criteria and technical design goals derived by Bra¨unlich et al.
[BGRR13], we derive security requirements for Internet voting systems. Here, particu-
lar attention is given to the legal criterion assurance, as it conceptually differs from other
legal criteria. In his dissertation [Ric12], Richter explicates on the assurance criterion:
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“Assurance is an instrumental criterion, which ensures the enforcement of all
other criteria even in the presence of attacks and failures.”
In the remainder of this chapter, the assurance criterion forms the basis for the separation
between security and non-security requirements.
2.3.1. Research Approach
We present our research approach to determine security requirements from legal criteria
and technical design goals derived by Bra¨unlich et al.. The approach is clarified by pro-
viding an accompanying example, namely the legal criterion unknowableness.
Identification of Core Criteria. We disassemble legal criteria into core criteria for In-
ternet voting systems, descriptive refinements of these core criteria, and measures sup-
porting the enforcement of core criteria. By doing so, we make sure that each part of a
legal criterion is considered in the identification of core criteria. As a result, we obtain
at least one core criterion for each legal criterion. This first step allows one to narrow
down comprehensive legal criteria into their essential content; the foundation for technical
requirements.
The unknowableness criterion captures one single core criterion:
“The content of the cast binding vote must be protected throughout the entire
voting phase. [. . .] It must not be possible to anybody except the voter to read
or obtain the voter’s cast intention by any other means before the end of the
voting phase.”
The core criterion is supported by the following descriptive refinement:
“Throughout the tallying phase, the content of cast votes has to be processed.
However, prior to vote tallying, the content of cast votes must not be revealed
certainly to anybody except the voter who cast that vote. [...] The content of a
vote cast in a private, professional, or public context must be protected against
being spied out by third parties; being it either by shoulder-surfing, having read
access on the voting device, or capturing the communication. There must be
effective measures implemented to protect secrecy of the vote in the private
sphere. Unknowableness simultaneously protects against undue influence in
the moment of vote casting, as well as against the calculation of intermediate
results.”
Ultimately, the legal criterion proposes measures for the enforcement of the core criterion:
“For that purpose, in polling station voting, cast ballots remain inaccessible
throughout the voting phase.”
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Relating Core Criteria and Technical Design Goals. We assign the technical design
goals derived by Bra¨unlich et al. from legal criteria to the respective core criteria. We
therefore determine whether all technical design goals resulting from legal criteria can be
related to the identified core criteria. This step serves two purposes: First, the step serves
as cross-check for the identification of core criteria, i.e. it enables one to see whether all
aspects of the technical design goals can be related to core criteria. Second, the step builds
the foundation for the next process step, namely the identification of security-related core
criteria.
For unknowableness, only one core criterion has been identified. Bra¨unlich et al. derived
the following technical design goals from the unknowableness criterion:
TDG 10: “The calculation of intermediate results must not be possible.”
TDG 23: “The voter must not be capable of proving her vote to any third
party.”
Technical design goal 10 closely resembles a technical requirement defined for the iden-
tified core criterion. Technical design goal 23 represents a refined requirement which
supports the enforcement of the identified core criterion. In conclusion, both technical
design goals relate to the identified core criterion.
Identification of Security Security-Related Core Criteria. We identify core criteria core
criteria that relate to at least one technical design goal that Bra¨unlich et al. derive
from the instrumental legal criterion assurance. This step supports the identification of
security-related core criteria, the basis for technical security requirements.
Both, technical design goals 10 and 23 are derived from the assurance criterion. Conse-
quently, the determined core criterion is a security-related core criterion.
Determination of Technical Requirements. KORA foresees the definition of legal crite-
ria in legal jargon. Given the fact that core criteria are an extract of legal criteria, those
core criteria are generally a solid foundation for the specification of technical require-
ments. The last step of this process consequently transforms core criteria into technical
requirements.
The core criterion derived from the legal criterion unknowableness is transformed into
the following technical requirement.
Fairness (Security Requirement): The voting system does not provide evidence
about any eligible voter’s intention before the end of the voting phase.
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2.3.2. Execution and Results
We present the execution of our research method and the final result of the execution. A
summary of the derivation process and the results is provided in Figure 2.1.
Legal Criterion: Usability
The legal criterion usability is refined into three core criteria.
Core Criterion: “The self-determined vote can only be guaranteed if the voter can use
the system according to her intention. [. . .] Furthermore system usage must either be self-
explanatory or has to be introduced to the voter by adequate means throughout the voting
phase.”
Technical Design Goals: The following technical design goals can be related to the deter-
mined core criterion.
• TDG 5: “The ballot must be neutral.” (No relation to Assurance)
• TDG 14: “The essential steps of the vote casting process must be understandable to
any voter.” (No relation to Assurance)
• TDG 16: “All voters must obtain the same result with equal usage.” (No relation to
Assurance)
• TDG 18: “The vote may only be cast and stored after a confirmation by the voter.”
(No relation to Assurance)
• TDG 20: “All voters must receive a message regarding the (non-)success of her voting
process.” (No relation to Assurance)
No technical design goal relates to the assurance criterion. Hence, we define the following
non-security requirement.
System Usability (Non-Security Requirement): The voting system is usable to all eli-
gible voters.
Core Criterion: “For the sake of implementing the voter’s self-realization, each voter
must have the possibility to vote according to her intention, to abstain from the election,
or to cast an invalid vote.”
Technical Design Goals: The following technical design goals can be related to the deter-
mined core criterion.
• TDG 11: “The calculation of the election result must be started after the official
voting phase by members of the election committee.” (Relation to Assurance)
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• TDG 19: “It must be ensured that the vote is correctly transmitted.” (Relation to
Assurance)
• TDG 21: “A voting note must only be taken after a binding vote has been cast.”
(Relation to Assurance)
• TDG 24: “It must not be possible to manipulate the stored binding votes.” (Relation
to Assurance)
• TDG 25: “The system must compute the correct result.” (Relation to Assurance)
• TDG 26: “It must not be possible to manipulate the election result.” (Relation to
Assurance)
All technical design goals relate to the assurance criterion. We consequently establish
the following security requirement.
Vote Integrity (Security Requirement): The voting system ensures that each vote is
correctly included in the election result.
Core Criterion: “The personal vote casting must be largely guaranteed also to handicapped
voters.”
Technical Design Goals: The following technical design goals can be related to the deter-
mined core criterion.
• TDG 15: “All voters must be able to conduct the vote casting process.” (No relation
to Assurance)
The technical design goal does not relate to the assurance criterion. We consequently
establish the following non-security requirement.
System Accessibility (Non-Security Requirement): The voting system is accessible to
all eligible voters.
Legal Criterion: Availability
The legal criterion availability is refined into three core criteria.
Core Criterion: “All relevant election data, such as authentication data, the electoral
register, and the list of candidates, must be available and up to date throughout the en-
tire election, such that eligible voters can participate in the election self-determined and
equally.”
Technical Design Goals: The following technical design goals can be related to the deter-
mined core criterion.
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• TDG 1: “Unauthorized parties must not have the possibility to view voter data.”
(Relation to Assurance)
• TDG 2: “Unauthorized parties must not have the possibility to manipulate voter
data.” (Relation to Assurance)
• TDG 7: “The election committee must start the election at the predetermined time.”
(Relation to Assurance)
• TDG 9: “The election committee must stop the election at the predetermined time.”
(Relation to Assurance)
• TDG 11: “The calculation of the election result must be started after the official
voting phase by members of the election committee.” (Relation to Assurance)
• TDG 12: “Only eligible voters may access successfully the Internet voting system.”
(Relation to Assurance)
• TDG 21: “A voting note must only be taken after a binding vote has been cast.”
(Relation to Assurance)
All technical design goals relate to the assurance criterion. We consequently establish
the following security requirement.
Voter Availability (Security Requirement): The voting system does not exclude eligible
voters from casting their intention.
Core Criterion: “The voting system itself has to be available throughout the entire election
phase without major failures, such that votes can be processed.”
Technical Design Goals: The following technical design goals can be related to the deter-
mined core criterion.
• TDG 8: “After a system failure, it must be possible to resume the election.” (Relation
to Assurance)
The technical design goal does relate to the assurance criterion. We consequently establish
the following security requirement.
System Availability (Security Requirement): The voting system is available to all eli-
gible voters at any point in time.
Core Criterion: “For an obligatory Internet election, all eligible voters must have physical
access to the voting system.”
Technical Design Goals: The following technical design goal can be related to the deter-
mined core criterion.
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• TDG 17: “Eligible voters must have the possibility to cast votes at any time of the
voting phase.” (No relation to Assurance)
The technical design goal does not relate to the assurance criterion. We consequently
establish the following non-security requirement.
System Reachibility (Non-Security Requirement): The Internet voting system is phys-
ically accessible to all eligible voters.
Legal Criterion: Equality of Votes
The legal criterion equality of votes is refined into one core criterion.
Core Criterion: “The voting system has consequently to be set up such that it only accepts
votes of eligible voters and only accepts these votes once and with equal weight.”
Technical Design Goals: The following technical design goals can be related to the deter-
mined core criterion.
• TDG 13: “Eligible voters may cast only and exactly one binding vote.” (Relation to
Assurance)
• TDG 19: “It must be ensured that the vote is correctly transmitted.” (Relation to
Assurance)
• TDG 25: “The system must compute the correct result.” (Relation to Assurance)
All technical design goals relate to the assurance criterion. We consequently establish the
following security requirement.
Eligibility (Security Requirement): The voting system ensures that only eligible voters’
votes are included once in the election result.
Legal Criterion: Neutrality
The legal criterion neutrality is refined into one core criterion.
Core Criterion: “A content-related influence of voters because of the Internet voting
system must be prevented.”
Technical Design Goals: The following technical design goals can be related to the deter-
mined core criterion.
• TDG 5: “The ballot must be neutral.” (No relation to Assurance)
• TDG 6: “Unauthorized parties must not have the possibility to change the ballot
data.” (Relation to Assurance)
At least one of both technical design goals relates to the assurance criterion, such that
the following security requirement is established.
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System Neutrality (Security Requirement): The voting system does not influence the
eligible voter’s intention.
Legal Criterion: Unknowableness
The legal criterion unknowableness is refined into one core criterion.
Core Criterion: “The content of the cast binding vote must be protected throughout the
entire voting phase.[. . .] It must not be possible to anybody except the voter to read or
obtain the voter’s cast intention by any other means before the end of the voting phase.”
Technical Design Goals: The following technical design goals can be related to the deter-
mined core criterion.
• TDG 10: “The calculation of intermediate results must not be possible.” (Relation
to Assurance)
• TDG 23: “The voter must not be capable of proving her vote to any third party.”
(Relation to Assurance)
All technical design goals relate to the assurance criterion. We consequently establish
the following security requirement.
Fairness (Security Requirement): The voting system does not provide evidence about
any eligible voter’s intention before the end of the voting phase.
Legal Criterion: Unlinkability
The legal criterion unlinkability is refined into one core criterion.
Core Criterion: “At no point in time, it must be possible to link the content of cast binding
votes to the real identity of the voter who cast that vote.”
Technical Design Goals: The following technical design goals can be related to the deter-
mined core criterion.
• TDG 22: “Third parties must not be capable of linking a vote to the voter who cast
the respective vote.”
• TDG 23: “The voter must not be capable of proving her vote to any third party.”
(Relation to Assurance)
All technical design goals relate to the assurance criterion. We consequently establish the
following security requirement.
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Vote Secrecy (Security Requirement): The voting system does not provide more evi-
dence about a specific eligible voter’s intention than the election result does.
Legal Criterion: Individual Control
The legal criterion individual control is refined into one core criterion.
Core Criterion: “Each voter must be able to control that the system stores and tallies the
vote with the voter’s intention.”
Technical Design Goals: The following technical design goals can be related to the deter-
mined core criterion.
• TDG 4: “Any voter must have the possibility to view and influence both extent and
purpose of stored her personal data.” (No relation to Assurance)
• TDG 27: “Any voter must be able to verify that her vote has been included in the
election result.” (No relation to Assurance)
• TDG 29: “The election must be logged.” (Relation to Assurance)
• TDG 30: “The election data must be archived in a traceable and evidence-proven
manner.” (Relation to Assurance)
Technical design goals 29 and 30 are not directly in place to deploy the core criterion 11.
Rather, these goals ensure that generated election logs and election archives are protected
from malicious access. As such core criterion 11 is not considered a security requirement.
Individual Verifiability (Non-Security Requirement): The voting system offers each el-
igible voter the possibility to verify that her intention has been correctly included in the
election result.
Legal Criterion: Public Control
The legal criterion public control is refined into one core criterion.
Core Criterion: “Any citizen must be able to control the constitutionally-compliant process
of any vote casting, in other words to control the enforcement of the principles universal,
direct, equal, free, and secret elections.”
Technical Design Goals: The following technical design goals can be related to the deter-
mined core criterion.
• TDG 28: “The public must be able to verify that the election result has been derived
correctly.” (No relation to Assurance)
• TDG 29: “The election must be logged.” (Relation to Assurance)
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• TDG 30: “The election data must be archived in a traceable and evidence-proven
manner.” (Relation to Assurance)
Technical design goals 29 and 30 are not directly in place to deploy the core criterion
12 and as such core criterion 12 is not considered a security requirement.
Public Controllability (Non-Security Requirement): The voting system offers any ob-
server the possibility to control that all technical requirements resulting from the principles
universal, direct, equal, free, and secret elections are enforced.
Legal Criterion: Data Economy
The legal criterion data economy is refined into one core criterion.
Core Criterion: “The voting system shall only request and store the personal data without
which the system does not operate correctly.”
Technical Design Goals: The following technical design goal can be related to the deter-
mined core criterion.
• TDG 3: “Only data required shall be stored.” (No relation to Assurance)
The technical design goal does not relate to the assurance criterion. We consequently
establish the following non-security requirement.
Data Minimization (Non-Security Requirement): The voting system shall only request
and store the personal data without which the system does not operate correctly.
Legal Criterion: Data Transparency
The legal criterion data transparency is refined into one core criterion.
Core Criterion: “The voting system shall offer the voter a possibility to view the personal
data about herself stored and processed by the system.”
Technical Design Goals: The following technical design goal can be related to the deter-
mined core criterion.
• TDG 4: “Any voter must have the possibility to view and influence both extent and
purpose of stored her personal data.” (No relation to Assurance)
Technical design goal 4 does not relate to the assurance criterion. We consequently define
the following non-security requirement.
Data Inspection (Non-Security Requirement): The voting system shall offer the voter
a possibility to view the personal data about herself stored and processed by the system.
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Legal Criterion: Appropriation
The legal criterion appropriation is refined into one core criterion.
Core Criterion: “The voting system shall only process personal data without which the
system does not operate correctly.”
Technical Design Goals: The following technical design goal can be related to the deter-
mined core criterion.
• TDG 1: “Unauthorized parties must not have the possibility to view voter data.”
(Relation to Assurance)
• TDG 3: “Only data required shall be stored.” (No relation to Assurance)
Technical design goal 1 relates to the assurance criterion. We consequently define the
following security requirement.
Data Access Protection (Security Requirement): The voting system shall prevent
unauthorized parties from viewing voter data.
In the remainder of this work, voter data are data that can be directly related to a voter
identity.
Legal Criterion: Data Controllability
The legal criterion data controllability is refined into one core criterion.
Core Criterion: “The Internet voting system shall shall offer the voter a possibility to
execute [cancellation, rectification, and blocking] rights.”
Technical Design Goals: The following technical design goal can be related to the deter-
mined core criterion.
• TDG 4: “Any voter must have the possibility to view and influence both extent and
purpose of stored her personal data.” (No relation to Assurance)
Technical design goal 4 does not relate to the assurance criterion. We consequently
define the following non-security requirement.
Data Adaptation (Non-Security Requirement): The voting system shall offer the voter
the possibility to adapt her personal data.
2.4.
S
u
m
m
a
ry
25
Usability Equality of Votes
Unknowable-
ness
Individual
Control
TDG 2 TDG 4 TDG 6 TDG 8 TDG 10
TDG 
14
TDG 
18
TDG 
20
TDG 
22
TDG 
24
TDG 
26
TDG 
28
TDG 
30
TDG 
12
TDG 
16
Data Economy
Availability Neutrality Unlinkability PublicControl
Assurance
TDG 1 TDG 3 TDG 5 TDG 15
TDG 
17
TDG 
19
System
Accessibility
System 
Availability Eligibility
Individual 
Verifiability
Voter
Availability
System
Reachibility
System 
Usability
Vote Integrity
L
e
g
a
l
 
C
r
i
t
e
r
i
a
(
B
r
ä
u
n
l
i
c
h
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
)
T
e
c
h
n
i
c
a
l
 
D
e
s
i
g
n
 
G
o
a
l
s
(
B
r
ä
u
n
l
i
c
h
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
)
T
e
c
h
n
i
c
a
l
 
R
e
q
u
i
r
e
m
e
n
t
s
 
d
e
r
i
v
e
d
 
i
n
 
t
h
i
s
 
w
o
r
k
Fairness
Data 
Transparency
Appropriation
TDG 
21
TDG 
23
TDG 
25
TDG 
27
TDG 
29
Data 
Minimization
Data 
Controllability
Data Access 
Protection
TDG 9 TDG 11
TDG 
13
System
Neutrality
Vote
Secrecy
Data 
Inspection
Data 
Adaptation
TDG 7
Public 
Controllability
Figure 2.1: On the basis of Bra¨unlich et al.’s [BGRR13] legal criteria and technical design goals, 16 technical requirements have been
derived. Stemming from the legal criterion assurance, security requirements are highlighted in red. The complete list of legal requirements,
legal criteria, and technical design goals compiled by Bra¨unlich et al. is provided in Appendix A.
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2.4. Summary
On the basis of preliminary research conducted by Bra¨unlich et al. [BGRR13], technical
requirements for Internet voting systems were determined. In the remainder of this work,
we restrict our focus to security aspects. We therefore present the resulting list of security
requirements for Internet voting systems in alphabetical order:
• Data Access Protection: The voting system shall prevent unauthorized parties from
viewing voter data.
• Eligibility: The voting system ensures that only eligible voters’ votes are included
once in the election result.
• Fairness: The voting system does not provide evidence about any eligible voter’s
intention before the end of the voting phase.
• System Availability: At any point in time, the voting system is available to all
eligible voters.
• System Neutrality: The voting system does not influence the eligible voter’s inten-
tion.
• Vote Integrity: The voting system ensures that each vote is correctly included in the
election result.
• Vote Secrecy: The voting system does not provide more evidence about a specific
eligible voter’s intention than the election result does.
• Voter Availability: The voting system does not exclude eligible voters from casting
their intention.
When constructing Internet voting systems, developers should take these requirements
into account and tailor systems towards them. However, Internet voting systems –as any
other voting method– cannot enforce simultaneously all security requirements to their full
extent. Improving one voting system with regard to specific security requirements often
comes at the cost of reducing the enforcement of other security requirements. From the
legal point of view, the legal latitude allows the legislator to constrain the satisfaction of
certain constitutional principles in favor of others [Fed, Decision: 59, 119 (124):1981].
Bearing the determined security requirements for Internet voting systems and the legal
latitude in mind, the goal of the following chapter is the construction of a security eval-
uation framework for Internet voting schemes, the conceptual underpinning of Internet
voting systems. On the one side, an evaluation framework shall incorporate the impact
caused by conducting specific attacks with regard to specific security requirements3. On
3The maximum impact depends on the security requirement under investigation: for instance, vote secrecy
can only be violated for voters who cast their binding vote, while an adversary might illegitimately access
voter data of all eligible voters (violation of data access protection).
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the other side, given that Internet voting schemes enforce security requirements by build-
ing upon assumptions about their environment, it is reasonable to evaluate Internet voting
schemes not only with regard to the assumptions but furthermore also with regard to the
criticality of the assumptions within the target election setting. This idea will be the
guideline for the construction of a security framework presented in the following chapter.

Chapter 3
Construction of a Security Evaluation
Framework for Internet Voting Schemes
The legally-founded security requirements for Internet voting systems have been deter-
mined in the previous chapter. On the basis of these requirements, the goal of this chap-
ter is the construction of a security evaluation framework for Internet voting schemes, the
conceptual underpinning of Internet voting systems.
In the first part of this chapter, we specify Internet voting schemes as core of Internet
voting systems and adapt the derived security requirements for Internet voting systems
accordingly. In the second part, we review related work and contrast them to our contri-
bution. We subsequently provide the foundations of the security evaluation framework.
The fourth part of this chapter is dedicated to the actual construction in terms of build-
ing blocks and and processes. Thereafter, we provide short guidelines for the deduction
of qualitative security models and for the determination of election settings. We subse-
quently evaluate the framework with regard to four properties borrowed from the field of
measure theory. A summary of this chapter is given in the last section.
Parts of this chapter have been published in the journal Datenschutz und Datensicherheit
[2] and in the journal Annals of Telecommunications [22].
3.1. Internet Voting Schemes and their Security Requirements
We first specify the target of our evaluation framework, namely Internet voting schemes,
the core of Internet voting systems. Subsequently, the security requirements established
in Section 2 are revised and tailored towards Internet voting schemes.
3.1.1. Internet Voting Schemes
From a legal perspective, elections in their entirety have to be conducted in a legally-
compliant way. The conduct of Internet-based elections incorporates several dimensions
such as cryptographic protocols, the hard-/ and software implementing and running the
protocols, and authorities in charge of administrating hard-/ and software components.
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Throughout this thesis, we restrict our focus to Internet voting schemes. To obtain a
precise understanding about the specification of an Internet voting scheme, we delineate
Internet voting schemes from the remaining parts of the Internet voting system.
Several works propose reference frameworks for electronic voting systems [Lun10, Sch04].
Because of the fact that Schryen’s framework directly refers to Internet voting systems, we
select that framework as foundation for our specification. An overview of the framework is
provided in Figure 3.1. The core of an Internet voting system is the organization dimen-
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Figure 3.1: Reference framework for electronic voting systems according to Schryen [Sch04]. The
core of an Internet voting system is the organization dimension including the protocol and the
infrastructure of the system.
sion. This dimension captures the fundamental protocol of the Internet voting system,
which prescribes how data is processed and exchanged by different components involved in
the voting process. Additionally, the organization dimension covers infrastructural aspects
in terms of how many servers are available to conduct the election.
According to the reference framework, there are four dimensions surrounding the orga-
nization dimension. These are the data dimension, the hardware and software dimension,
the functions dimension, and the authorities dimension: The data dimension captures con-
tents such as the ballots to be used throughout the election, certificates to establish trust
between the components involved in the election, the votes, vote receipts, and optionally
biometric authentication data. The functions dimension captures the way cryptographic
components are implemented, i.e. which cryptographic algorithms are in place. The di-
mension might for instance prescribe what what type of encryption scheme and what type
of cryptographic hash functions are used. The hardware and software dimension captures
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which type of hardware and software is used at both the voter side and the server side.
This dimension might for instance prescribe that only certified hardware and/or software
is used. The authorities dimension determines which authorities are involved in the In-
ternet based elections, i.e. which authorities take which protocol role, and provide and
manage which kind of infrastructure.
In line with the reference framework, we consider the organization dimension as the
core of Internet voting systems. We consequently define an Internet voting scheme as the
organization dimension of an Internet voting system. This means that Internet voting
schemes capture the components involved in the voting process and their respective roles
in generating, exchanging and processing election data. Such components might be central
voting providers and voters’ voting devices.
By its specification, the organization dimension closely relates to the data dimension. In
fact, it turns out that the feasibility and security of different Internet voting schemes might
depend on the data dimension. For instance, specific voting protocols can only be applied
when the ballot complexity is low [CPP13, Joa14]. Throughout the scheme evaluation,
we therefore consider the organization dimension together with the data dimension, i.e.
Internet voting schemes are evaluated as applied for one specific election.
With the advance and practical application of Internet voting, the interdependence
of the organization dimension and the voter interacting with the voting protocol and
infrastructure has become more and more apparent. In accordance to legal provisions,
e.g. Bra¨unlich et al. [BGRR13], and Madise and Vinkel [MV11], recent research tends to
consider the voter as part of the voting protocol, see for instance the work by Carlos et al.
[CMPC13]. Following this tendency, in addition to voting providers and voting devices,
we consider the voters as part of an Internet voting scheme.
A reference Internet voting scheme is provided in Figure 3.2. An Internet voting scheme
is composed of several components and channels between these components. According to
Schryen’s reference framework, components build the infrastructure, which take specific
roles of the protocol, e.g. the voter, the voting device, or central voting servers.
Figure 3.2: Reference Internet voting scheme: Each voting scheme prescribes different roles
between which the election is conducted. In addition to the interaction between central voting
servers and voter-side systems, the voter directly interacts with voter-side systems.
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3.1.2. Security Requirements of Internet Voting Schemes
The security requirement system availability requires that the hardware and software com-
ponents involved in the election process are able to provide their service throughout the
entire election. Ensuring the availability of these components does, however, depend on
the hard-/software dimension, i.e. the hardware and software in place. We therefore do
not consider system availability throughout the evaluation of Internet voting schemes.
We make the general assumption that anybody –including voters and the public– ver-
ify everything that they can verify and raise a complaint in case verification fails4. We
additionally make the assumption that ballots are published in advance to the election
and voters shape their vote intention prior to the actual voting process. Consequently,
if voters get presented an altered ballot throughout the voting phase, they detect this
discrepancy and raise a complaint to the election officials. We therefore do not consider
system neutrality throughout the evaluation of Internet voting schemes.
Analogously to the case of system neutrality, if the system does illegitimately exclude
voters from casting their intention, the voter raises a complaint, thereby triggering further
investigation. We therefore do not consider voter availability throughout the evaluation
of Internet voting schemes.
3.2. Related Work
We review related works on the security evaluation of Internet voting schemes and Internet
voting systems. We subdivide these works into qualitative approaches, namely the Com-
mon Criteria for IT-security evaluation and resilience term evaluation, and quantitative
approaches, namely threat tree evaluation and quantitative evaluation, and quantification
approaches for qualitative evaluations.
Common Criteria for IT-Security Evaluation
The Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation are an interna-
tional standard for information security. The development of the Common Criteria is
advanced by the states Australia / New Zealand, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the
Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America. Version 1.0
of the Common Criteria has been released in 1996. Subsequently, the Common Criteria
have been captured within the ISO standard 15408 in 1999. The most recent version of
the Common Criteria is version 3.1 release 4. The Common Criteria incorporate the con-
cept of Protection Profiles. Protection Profiles capture security requirements for generic
end products. Protection Profiles are deliberately abstract and independent of concrete
products. As such, Protection Profiles generally address product groups. Consequently,
4For research on the voter motivation and usable verifiability, we refer the reader to the works by Olembo
et al. [ORBV14] and Budurushi et al. [BWV14]
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Protection Profiles are created in representation of the end users. Protection Profiles al-
low developers to fall back on established security requirements. As such, the evaluation
and certification according to Protection Profiles is a valuable and confidence-building
measure for developers. Numerous Protection Profiles have been developed for a diver-
sity of security-critical products; among them there are Protection Profiles for secure
signature-creation devices [KLP+01], sovereign documents [Bun09], and health-care prod-
ucts [KGK09]. Several Protection Profiles have been developed specifically for electronic
voting technologies, e.g. PP-CIVIS [Sec06], IEEE P1583 [IEE05], Karokola et al. [KKY12]
and Lee et al. [LLWK10]. Furthermore, one Protection Profile for Internet voting systems
has been developed [VV08].
In spite of their longstanding history, the Common Criteria turn out to be inappropriate
as evaluation framework for this work. Given the partial opposing nature of legally-founded
security requirements, those requirements can only be enforced under certain assumptions
about the environment. The Common Criteria opens the possibility to specify assump-
tions. However, first, the enforcement and evaluation of security assumptions within the
operational environment is not part of the Common Criteria. Hence, those assumptions
might be unreasonably high. In that case, the evaluation (and potential certification) of
Internet voting systems according to the Protection Profile might be questionable. Second,
according to the legal latitude (see Section 1.1), there is not one specific set of assump-
tions about the operational environment. Rather, systems might be considered compliant
if legal provisions or refined security requirements are enforced in a balanced way tailored
towards the election setting. Consequently, single Protection Profiles do not sufficiently
incorporate the concept of legal latitude; hence, legal provisions cannot be adequately
represented within Protection Profiles.
Resilience Term Evaluation
Volkamer and Grimm [VG09] were motivated by the fact that established evaluation frame-
works for Internet voting systems remain abstract and do not adequately consider trust
distribution concepts, such as separation of duties and multiplicity of functions. To ad-
dress this shortcoming, the authors developed the concept of resilience terms. These
terms allow one to capture complex trust distributions and to express which entities have
to be trusted - in particular not to collaborate maliciously - in order to fulfill security
requirements. Resilience terms are specified as follows:
• A system is called k-resilient with regard to a security requirement if at least k
entities out of the set of all entities must be trusted not to collaborate maliciously
in order to violate the respective security requirement.
• A system is called k-out-of-N -resilient if at least k entities out of the set of entities
N must be trusted not to collaborate maliciously in order to violate the respective
security requirement.
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• A system is called (k1 + · · ·+ km)-out-of-(N1, . . . , Nm)-resilient if at least k1 entities
out of the set of entities N1 and . . . and at least km entities out of the set of entities
Nm must be trusted not to collaborate maliciously in order to violate the respective
security requirement.
• A system is called (k11 + · · · + km1)-out-of-(N11, . . . , Nm1), . . . , (k1n + · · · + kmn)-
out-of-(N1n, . . . , Nmn)-resilient if at least k11 entities out of the set of entities N11
and . . . and at least km1 entities out of the set of entities Nm1 or . . . or at least k1n
entities out of the set of entities N1n and . . . and at least kmn entities out of the set
of entities Nmn must be trusted not to collaborate maliciously in order to violate
the respective security requirement.
Because of their formal structure, resilience terms build a precise specification language
for assumptions upon which Internet voting systems are based. Hence, resilience terms
build the foundation for the evaluation of assumptions as part of the evaluation of Internet
voting schemes.
While the concept of resilience terms overcomes one shortcoming of the Common Cri-
teria, it falls short for the following concerns: Resilience terms evaluate and express the
security of Internet voting systems with regard to trust distributions, i.e. which entities
need to be trusted not to collaborate maliciously in order to enforce security requirements.
These trust distributions do, however, not incorporate the election setting into the security
evaluation and expression. Given the potential complexity of resilience terms, the identi-
fication of an adequate Internet voting system for their election setting easily overwhelms
the election official. Furthermore, resilience terms remain abstract in the following sense:
The concept of resilience terms is tailored towards a possibilistic interpretation of security,
as it only captures collaborations by central entities of the system. The security evalu-
ation and expression of Internet voting system with regard to central entities might be
too restrictive, because adversaries might consider other attack targets to violate security
requirements, for instance targets on the voter side, such as voting devices or influencing
voters throughout the vote casting process.
Threat Trees and Quantitative Evaluation
Several works have addressed the assessment of risks for electronic voting systems [PYL10,
BC07, PLY11, Lau04, NK06, KN08, BM07] by deriving threats trees for these systems.
Comprehensive threat trees for electronic voting (or Internet voting) systems are of great
value for the deduction of adversaries violating security requirements. Yet, the fine-grained
threats considered in these works require decision makers to assign probabilities to specific
threats. Reviewing threat trees for Internet voting systems poses a significant burden on
election officials, e.g. [EAC09] provides a 18-page threat tree for Internet voting. Addition-
ally, given the unstructured nature of threats, estimating the severity of threats generally
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exceeds the expertise of election officials. Pardue et al. [PLY10] support the interpreta-
tion of complex threat trees by incorporating Monte-Carlo simulations. To evaluate an
Internet voting system, a system analyst estimates (with uncertainty) the probability with
which an adversary exercises specific attacks and the impact caused by those attacks. In
a second step, the previous estimates are adjusted by (uncertain) estimates regarding the
attacker’s motivation to exercise specific attacks and the complexity of specific attacks.
While this approach facilitates the interpretation of large and complex threat trees, the
approach is tailored towards system analysts. Hence, the approach does not foresee the
incorporation of election settings by election officials. Ouchani et al. [OJM11] quantify at-
tack patterns of the Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification catalogue5.
Luna et al. [LSK12] develop a quantitative threat modeling with particular focus on
privacy-by-design requirement. Their approach derives from the Microsoft threat model-
ing approach STRIDE and threat-risk ranking approach DREAD as well as established
privacy protection goals. Given the fine granularity of attack patterns (Ouchani et al.)
and threats (Luna et al.), their quantification might easily overwhelm election officials
when identifying the most appropriate Internet voting system for their election setting.
Vejacˇka [Vej13] quantitatively evaluates the Estonian, the Washington D.C., and the Ed-
monton Internet voting systems with regard to 14 requirements. Fundamental idea of
the quantification approach are the importance weighting of the established requirements
and the qualitative evaluation of the schemes. Both the weighting of requirements and
the qualitative evaluation of Internet voting schemes remain abstract such that presented
approach cannot be transferred to other contexts. Li et al. [LKZ14] develop a taxonomy
for Internet voting schemes. To achieve their goal, the authors evaluate 14 Internet voting
schemes with regard to 12 technical requirements. The evaluation remains abstract, as
it only provides short arguments about whether the different schemes satisfy or do not
satisfy the target requirements. Jonker et al. [JMP09] propose a framework for the quan-
tification of voter privacy in the presence of conspiring voters. On the foundation of formal
methods, their approach measures to what extent voters are capable of cooperating with
the voter in order to leak knowledge (not necessarily the entire knowledge) about their
voting decision. On the foundation of legally-founded security requirements, we consider
any knowledge beyond publicly available knowledge about a specific voter’s vote a secrecy
violation.
Ku¨sters et al. [KTV11, KTV12] provide a formal framework for measuring the level
of verifiability, privacy, coercion-resistance, and accountability of voting protocols. The
framework measures (by means of a so called δ) the adversary’s chance of achieving her
goal, e.g. making a verifier accept an incorrect election result (verifiability) or distinguish-
ing between the fact whether an observed voter casts a vote for one candidate or another
candidate (privacy). The measurement depends on a number of factors, such as the set
of honest authorities, the number of honest voters, the number of voting options, and
5Refer to https://capec.mitre.org
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probability distributions for these voting options. In other words, the framework precisely
measures to what extent specific adversarial capabilities (given in terms of dishonest au-
thorities and voters) suffice to cause specific impact on a specific requirement. In spite of
its contribution, the framework does not provide an interface to election officials and does
not incorporate election settings (e.g. by means of probabilistic adversaries). Hence, the
framework does not directly support election officials in evaluating a scheme’s adequacy
within concrete election settings. To that end, both works turn out to have complementary
goals. Despite this difference, both works address quantitative security from different di-
rections and can therefore benefit from each other. We consequently foresee an integration
of both approaches as future work.
Quantification of Qualitative Security Evaluations
On the foundation of resilience terms [VG09], Schryen et al. [SVRH11] develop a quan-
titative trust metric upon propositional logic. As foundation for their quantification, the
authors determine resilience terms for security requirements in distributed systems. There-
after, they compute the probability that security requirements might be violated on the
basis of failure probabilities of individual entities. The quantification builds on standard
probability theory. While the quantification of resilience terms is a reasonable approach,
the approach inherits one essential shortcoming of the resilience term evaluation, namely
the fact that the evaluation focuses on central entities of the voting system. Furthermore,
the quantification process falls short because of the fact that the authors remain unclear
about how election settings are to be incorporated into the quantification process, e.g.
how uncertainty is exactly handled. Similar to Schryen et al, Lazarus et al. [LDEH11]
construct a quantitative threat evaluation by means of the metric attack team size. The
metric measures how many entities are knowingly involved in attacks targeting at different
types of security requirements. In spite of its clarity, the attack team size metric might
oversimplify in that regard that it considers the vulnerability of entities to be equally
weighted or equally weighted between insider and outsider attackers. Consequently, the
approach might not consider the election setting adequately and consequently not evaluate
security adequately within specific settings.
The gained insights reveal the lack for a security evaluation framework that on the side
side precisely captures conceptual shortcomings of Internet voting schemes with regard to
legally-founded security requirements, and on the other side evaluates these shortcomings
within specific election settings.
3.3. Foundations of the Security Evaluation Framework
Before diving into the details of its construction, we provide the necessary foundations of
the security evaluation framework. In the first part of this section, we determine properties
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that the security evaluation framework shall possess. We subsequently introduce the
reader into the basics of measurement theory. Afterwards, we present the technique of
Monte-Carlo simulations, an approach to numerically evaluate complex stochastic models.
Thereafter, we introduce the concept of Pareto dominance.
3.3.1. Properties of the Security Evaluation Framework
Given the fact that no voting method enforces the deployment of legal provisions to their
full extent, an Internet voting scheme’s benefits and drawbacks within specific election
settings must be measurable. Measuring the enforcement of legally-founded security re-
quirements within specific election settings lays the foundation for comparing the legally-
founded security of different Internet voting schemes. Before providing the actual con-
struction, we have to determine properties that the intended security evaluation frame-
work shall possess. By its very nature, the framework closely relates to the mathematical
concept of a measure (refer for instance to Salamon [Sal16]). We therefore base the prop-
erties for the construction upon the properties of a measure and adapt them to our context.
The first property a measure must possess is that it must assign the empty set of the
σ-algebra in the measure space, the measure 0. Transferring this property to the context
of security evaluation, we derive two properties: First, the construction must return the
quantitive security evaluation result 1, if the adversary has no capabilities. We refer to
this property as no capabilities – perfect security.
No Capabilities – Perfect Security. If the Internet voting scheme under investiga-
tion faces an adversary that has no capabilities, then the quantitative security evaluation
result must be 1, unless the security requirement can be violated without any adversarial
capabilities6.
The second property we derive requires that an adversary with specific capabilities can-
not cause harm to the Internet voting scheme, if the scheme is resistant against those
capabilities. We refer to this property as capability resistance.
Capability Resistance. If the Internet voting scheme under investigation proves to be
resistant against specific adversarial capabilities, then for any two adversaries that differ
only with regard to that capability, the quantitative security evaluation results must be
equal against both adversaries.
The second property a measure must possess is continuity. In measure theory, the
property of continuity is defined by stating that 1) the measure of the infinite union of
6This holds for instance true if vote secrecy is not required and the Internet voting scheme under inves-
tigation publishes the relation between a voter and her vote.
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a sequence of increasing sets (En)n∈N converging towards a set E from the σ-algebra is
equal to the measure of E, and 2) the measure of the infinite intersection of a sequence
of decreasing sets (En)n∈N converging towards a set E from the σ-algebra is equal to the
measure of E. Transferring this property to the context of security evaluation, the prop-
erty requires that two adversaries can always be found of which one is stronger than the
other, such that their quantitative security evaluation results get arbitrarily close to each
other. Analogously to measure theory, we refer to this property as continuity.
Continuity. If the Internet voting scheme under investigation faces two adversaries
that differ arbitrarily little in their capabilities, then also the quantitative security evalu-
ation results must differ arbitrarily little.
The third property a measure must possess is monotonicity. In terms of measure theory,
the property requires that the measure of a subset of another set from the σ-algebra should
be smaller than the measure of the set. The fourth property a measure shall must possess
is σ-additivity. In terms of measure theory, the property requires that the measure of a
union of disjoint subsets of the σ-algebra equals the sum of the measure of the disjoint
subsets. Both properties are transferred to the context of security evaluation for Internet
voting schemes. The resulting property requires that for any two adversaries of which
one is stronger than the other, the quantitative security evaluation result of the stronger
adversary must be smaller than the quantitative security evaluation result of the other.
We refer to the property as monotonicity.
Monotonicity. If the Internet voting scheme under investigation faces two adversaries,
of which one is stronger than the other, then the quantitive security evaluation results of
the scheme must be larger when facing the weaker adversary.
3.3.2. Scales of Measurement
In his seminal work, Stevens [Ste46] determines four types of measurement scales, namely
nominal, ordinal, interval, and ratio scales. The differences between these scales types are
relevant to the herein constructed security evaluation framework. We therefore describe
the measurement scales and highlight differences between them.
Nominal scale. Nominal scales provide categories that do not relate to each other. Such
categories might be numbers, attributes, or any other kind of (not necessarily unique)
identifier. Categories do not relate to each other such that neither an order of categories,
nor any kind of differences or ratio can be defined. The only valid operation on variables
that map on nominal scales is to check whether two variables are equal. For instance, eye
colors are a nominal scale. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that humans have only
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the eye colors blue and brown. While it can be determined whether two random humans
have the same or a different eye color, there is no eye color that is larger or smaller than
the other one, nor any additive or multiplicative relation between both eye colors.
Ordinal scale. Ordinal scales provide categories that can be related by their order. In
the case of ordinal scales, in addition to the equality check for categories, categories can be
ranked. However, there is no meaning for the additive or multiplicative relation between
two categories. While two students might either have the same grade or one student has
a better grade than the other one, there is no additive or multiplicative meaning between
two different grades.
Interval scale. As opposed to nominal and ordinal scales, variables that map on interval
scales are continuous variables. Consequently, in addition to equality tests and a full
ordering of variables, also additive differences between variables have a meaning, i.e. the
interval size on the interval scale has a meaning. Consider for instance temperature as an
instantiation of an interval scale. The difference between 10 ◦C and 20 ◦C is equal to the
difference between 20 ◦C and 30 ◦C. On the other side, there is no multiplicative relation
between items mapping on the interval scale, e.g. one cannot say 20 ◦C is twice as warm
as 10 ◦C as the example of the temperatures −1 ◦C and 2 ◦C clarifies.
Ratio scale. Ratio scales extend the expressiveness of interval scales by a meaning of
the multiplicative relation between variables mapping on these scales. Ratio scales have a
precisely defined value zero, on the basis of which multiplicative relation can be expressed.
For instance, height represents a ratio scale, with zero value 0. Starting from 0, it makes
sense to say two inches are twice as high as one inch.
If the security of Internet voting schemes could be compared with regard to one single
requirement, ordinal scales would be sufficient. However, in many cases, comparing two
schemes with regard to several requirements requires to compare and balance differences in
the schemes’ enforcement of the requirements. To tailor the security evaluation framework
for the comparison of schemes’ enforcement of different security requirements, we require
the security evaluation framework to map Internet voting schemes on interval scales.
3.3.3. Monte-Carlo Simulations
We introduce the concept of Monte-Carlo simulations to handle uncertainties in the spec-
ification of election settings. Consider a mathematical M model that processes several
input variables to produce a certain output. If the input variables are not fixed in advance
but are rather uncertain, then the mathematical model has to be evaluated in a preferably
comprehensive manner with regard to the uncertain variables. If the number of input
variables is small, the evaluation might be conducted combinatorially in a deterministic
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manner. With an increasing number of uncertain input variables, the evaluation faces the
“curse of dimensionality”. Hence, the evaluation can no longer be addressed by determin-
istic means, but rather stochastic approaches are needed. Among the most established
approaches, there are Monte-Carlo simulations [MU49]. We provide the fundamentals of
Monte-Carlo simulations in the following paragraphs. The description of Monte-Carlo
simulations is based upon Raychaudhuri’s work [Ray08], and the work by Driels and Shin
[DS04].
Determining Input Distributions. In the most general case, data points according to a
certain probability distribution are given, while their statistical distribution is unknown.
A survey on approaches which allow one to determine the probability distribution from a
set of data points is provided by Myers [Mye90]. Among the most prevalent approaches,
there is the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) (refer for instance to [Myu03]) which
is briefly summarized. Let independent data points x1, . . . , xn be drawn according to
an unknown probability distribution. Let f be the joint probability density function of
x1, . . . , xn under a probability density function given in terms of parameters p. Then, the
likelihood function lik captures the probability that the data points are drawn according
to the density function parameters p. Formally, this can be written as:
lik(p) = f(x1, . . . , xn|p)
From the domain of possible parameters, the parameter pmax is determined that maxi-
mizes the logarithmic likelihood function, i.e.
pmax = max
p
(ln(lik(p))) = max
p
n∑
i=1
ln(f(xi|p))
Eventually, finding the most fitting density function parameters can be done by opti-
mization techniques [MBT14].
If no data points are given in advance to the model simulation, the simulation has to
be built upon reasonable distribution estimations. Such estimations might be based upon
expert knowledge of similar problems. Typical distributions for input variables might be
Gaussian, Normal, or Student’s t-distribution.
Generating Random Data. Let the random variable X to be sampled be defined by
the probability density function f . Let F be the invertible cumulative probability den-
sity function of f , and F−1 be the inverse of F . We assume a sampler for the uniform
distribution U[0, 1]. Then, the random variable X can be sampled as follows:
1. Determine z by sampling U[0, 1]
2. Compute x by evaluating F−1(z)
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Simulating the Model. Once the probability distributions of input variables have been
determined, the main part of Monte-Carlo simulations is initiated. Let P1, . . . ,Pk be the
probability distributions of k insecure input variables. Let n vectors be given:
v1, . . . , vn
Each vector vj captures one sample for all input variables
vj = (i1, . . . , ik) with i1 ← P1, . . . , ik ← Pk
The model M is evaluated n times, once for each vector of input variable samples. As
a result, a data set of n evaluations of the model is obtained:
x1 = M(v1), . . . , xn = M(vn)
Interpreting the Output. To obtain a final result of the model simulations, the output of
the model simulations can be analyzed by statistics, such as the sample mean, the sample
standard deviation, or further analysis techniques. The sample mean is defined as follows:
xn =
1
n
n∑
i=1
xi
The sample variance is defined as follows:
s2n =
1
n− 1
n∑
i=1
(xi − x)2
Determining the Number of Monte-Carlo Simulations. When applying Monte-Carlo
simulations to numerically address complex stochastic problems, one natural question
arises: How many independent Monte-Carlo simulations should be executed? The answer
to this question depends on several things as the following reasoning shows.
Let x1, . . . , xn be a sequence of samples of X, where X follows a distribution with
statistical mean µX and statistical variance σ
2. Let xn =
1
n
∑n
i=1 xi be a sample mean of
X and s2n =
1
n−1
∑n
i=1(xi − xn)2 be the sample variance of X.
Assume a number of independent Monte-Carlo simulations (each with n runs) of the
model are run. We obtain a random variable X for the distribution of the sample means
of the model. It can be shown [DS04] that the statistical mean µX of X corresponds to
the statistical mean µX of X. Furthermore, the statistical variance of X relates to the
statistical variance of X as σ2
X
=
σ2X
n .
By the application of the Law of Large Numbers and the Central Limit Theorem, from
the number of independent random variables n, a sample mean xn, and a sample variance
s2n, the following confidence interval can be computed:[
xn − z sn√
n
, xn + z
sn√
n
]
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Confidence level 99.75% 99% 95.5% 95% 90% 68% 50%
z-score 3 2.58 2 1.96 1.65 1 0.67
Table 3.1: Relation between confidence levels of normal distributions and z-scores.
In the confidence interval, the value z is referred to as z-score and indicates the target
confidence level. Given the confidence interval, one can conclude that the statistical mean
of X, respectively X, lies within the resulting confidence interval with a certain confi-
dence level (expressed as z-score), e.g. a z-score of 2 indicates that the statistical means
lies within the given confidence interval with a confidence of 95.5%. A relation between
confidence levels and z-scores is provided in Table 3.1.
It can be concluded that the required number of independent Monte-Carlo simulations
depends on the confidence (in terms of confidence level and confidence interval size) that
one tries to achieve when approximating the statistical mean of a random variable by a
sample mean of that random variable.
The application of Monte-Carlo simulations for risk estimations in the security context
is not new. Noel et al. [NJWS10] introduce model building upon attack graphs with uncer-
tain input variables. On the foundation of Monte-Carlo simulation, the model is evaluated
to determine the probability of successful attacks against computer networks. While being
general in description, the fundamental idea of their work builds the foundation for our
contribution.
3.3.4. Pareto Dominance
In many disciplines it is necessary to select the most appropriate solution from a set of
competing alternative solutions considering a set of (conflicting) decision criteria; these
problems are generally referred to as multi-criteria decision analysis [Che06].
Let a finite set of possible solutions X = {x1, . . . , xm} and a set of decision criteria
{c1, . . . , cn} be given. Let a set of objective functions f1 : X → Sc1 , . . . , fn : X → Scn be
given with Sc1 , . . . , Scn being the performance scales of decision criteria c1, . . . , cn. Given
the fact that generally there is no solution that outperforms all other solutions with regard
to all decision criteria, the decision process can be supported by identifying and discarding
solutions that are dominated by other solutions. Pareto dominance, named after the Italian
economist Vilfredo Pareto, denotes the fact that a solution performs worse than another
solution with regard to all decision criteria. Formally, this can be defined as follows:
Definition 1 (Pareto Dominance). A solution x ∈ X is Pareto dominated with regard
to objective functions f1(x), . . . , fn(x) iff there is another solution x
′ ∈ X, such that
fi(x
′) ≥ fi(x) for all i with 1 ≤ i ≤ n and fj(x′) > fj(x) for at least one j with 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
All solutions that are not Pareto dominated are Pareto optimal. The set of Pareto
optimal points is called the Pareto front.
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3.4. Building Blocks and Processes of the Framework
After the preliminaries of the security evaluation framework have been presented, this sec-
tion is dedicated to its actual construction. Recall that the framework shall allow the elec-
tion official to quantitatively measure the satisfaction degrees of Internet voting schemes
with regard to legally-founded security requirements in an election-specific manner. An
overview about the envisioned quantitative security evaluation is provided in Figure 3.3.
In the first part of this section, a simple Internet voting scheme is presented (Section 3.4.1).
The scheme serves to explicate the conceptual underpinnings of the security evaluation
framework. After the legally-founded security requirements have been determined (refer
to Sections 2.4 and 3.1.2), the block Specification Languages Foundation (Section 3.4.2) is
dedicated to determining uniform adversarial capabilities. The block Qualitative Security
Models (Section 3.4.3) provides a specification language to system analysts which they use
to capture the qualitative security of Internet voting schemes. The resulting qualitative
security models indicate which type of adversary can cause which impact to the different
security requirements. The block Election Setting (Section 3.4.4) provides a specification
language to election officials which they use to capture the expected adversary, among
others. The block Satisfaction Degree Determination Algorithm (Section 3.4.5) defines
an algorithm that evaluates the qualitative security models of an Internet voting scheme
within the specified election setting. The output of this algorithm are satisfaction degrees
for all security requirements.
Internet	Vo)ng	Scheme	
Sa)sfac)on	Degrees	
Sa)sfac)on	Degree		
Determina)on	Algorithm	System Analyst Election Official 
Qualitative 
Security Models Election Setting 
Speciﬁca)on	Languages	Founda)on	
Adversarial	Capabili)es	
Security	Requirements	
Figure 3.3: The security evaluation framework and its building blocks.
3.4.1. Exemplary Internet Voting Scheme
We introduce a simple Internet voting scheme to explain the concepts of the constructed
security evaluation framework.
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Components
We outline the components involved in the election and their respective roles.
Registration Server (RS). The registration server in collaboration with the validation
server conducts eligibility checks and provides voters with voting tokens.
Validation Server (VS). The validation server in collaboration with the registration
server conducts eligibility checks, generates voting tokens, and provides voters with voting
tokens.
Ballot Box Server (BBS). The ballot box server provides eligible voters with the digital
ballot, stores their filled ballots, and eventually calculates the election result.
Voting Device (VD). Each voter has a voting device at her disposal, which she uses to
fill and cast her digital ballot.
Protocol Description
We describe the protocol underlying the example Internet voting scheme. The sequence
diagram of the toy example is provided in Figure 3.4. We will provide cryptographic
foundations of Internet voting schemes in Chapter 4 of this work. For the sake of clarity,
within the example scheme, we assume that channels between the voting device and service
providers and between service providers are authentic and confidential. In addition to that,
no cryptographic techniques are in place, i.e. data is not encrypted.
Setup Phase. In advance to the election, credentials for all eligible voters are generated.
These credentials are subsequently embedded into RS and VS. Furthermore, the digital
ballot is embedded into BBS.
Voting Phase. To initiate the voting process on her voting device, a voter establishes
a connection towards RS and authenticates herself towards RS. RS verifies the voter’s
eligibility and additionally consults VS. VS verifies the voter’s eligibility one more time
and generates a credential upon successful eligibility check. VS forwards that credential
to BBS and RS, which in turn forwards the credential to the voter. In order to cast her
vote, the voter consults the election website, hosted by BBS. She subsequently casts her
vote together with her credential. BBS verifies the validity of the cast vote by checking
whether the credential has been generated by VS and has not yet been used to cast a
vote. Upon success, BBS stores the vote for the later vote tallying.
Tallying Phase. After all votes have been cast, BBS sums up all received votes and
announces the election result.
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Voter Voting Device Registration Server Validation Server Ballot Box Server
auth(i)
auth(i)
auth(i)
Verifiy eligibility
cred(i)
cred(i)
cred(i), ballot
ballot
cand(i)
cred(i), cand(i)
Collect votes
throughout the
voting phase
Tally votes
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election result
Figure 3.4: Sequence diagram of the example scheme.
3.4.2. Adversarial Capabilities and Specification of Qualitative Adversary
Models
The foundation of the security evaluation is the specification of adversaries. While this
specification must on the one side precisely describe successful adversaries against security
requirements within Internet voting schemes, they must at the same time be sufficiently
abstract to serve election officials to specify their election settings. We start by determining
adversarial capabilities and show how they are composed to adversary models.
Adversarial Capabilities
We specify adversaries by a capability-based approach. In the capability-based approach, a
mapping between security requirements and assumptions (exclusion of adversaries) under
which those requirements can be ensured, is established.
We thereby follow the approaches by Langer [Lan10] and Carlos et al. [CMPC13].
Langer builds upon the well-established Dolev-Yao adversary model [DY83]. Langer ad-
justs the model with regard to a number of capabilities. A further extension of the Dolev-
Yao adversary model has been proposed by Carlos et al. [CMPC13]. Starting from the
concept of security ceremonies [Ell07] as extension of security protocols by human peers,
Carlos et al. propose the ceremony- and context-dependent propagation of Dolev-Yao ca-
pabilities to human-human and human-device channels. Carlos et al.’s model has recently
been applied to analyze the Helios voting scheme [MdSO+15].
As composition of previous research results, we classify adversarial capabilities in three
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sub-classes, namely corruption capabilities, channel capabilities, and computational capa-
bilities. Note that in the following paragraphs, variables are indicated by [*X*].
Corruption Capabilities. The security of Internet voting might be threatened by corrupt
service providers carrying the election duties, be it either in terms of administrators, hard-
ware, or software components. We distinguish between service providers that are not in
direct contact with voters (oﬄine service providers) and those that are in direct contact
with voters (online service providers). It shall be emphasized that oﬄine service providers
are not necessarily disconnected from the Internet. We propose this distinction because of
the difference in attack strategies required to compromise these service providers. While
online service providers are generally threatened by external entities, such as malicious
voters or hackers, the compromise of oﬄine service providers in the most general case
requires the collaboration of malicious insiders.
OFSP : The adversary can corrupt a [*offline service provider*].
ONSP : The adversary can corrupt an [*online service provider*].
On the voter-side, another crucial component is the device used to cast a vote. This
device might be under adversarial control. Because of the fact that voters’ device are
generally used for a variety of purposes, controlling the voting device allows an adversary
to learn the voter’s identity.
VD : The adversary can corrupt a [*voting device*].
The security of the voting schemes does, however, not only depend on the trustworthi-
ness of certain service providers or devices. Rather, these schemes’ security relies on the
human-computer interaction. Voters might be interested in or coerced into deviating from
their original voting intention. We distinguish between the capabilities that the adversary
might receive objects or data from voters (voter output), e.g. vote receipts, and that the
adversary might provide voters with objects or data (voter input), e.g. instructions to
cast a vote in a unique and identifiable manner.
VO : The adversary can receive objects/data from a [*voter*].
VI : The adversary can send objects/data to a [*voter*].
Channel Capabilities. We define one capability which indicates whether the adversary
is capable of controlling the communication between voting devices and service providers
or the communication between service providers.
CCH : The adversary can control a [*communication channel*] between a voting de-
vice and a service provider or between two service providers.
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Possessing the capability CCH does not allow an adversary to determine the identity of
message senders. We make the assumption that anonymization networks, e.g. TOR, are
widely deployed and used by voters7. Carlos et al. [CMPC13] propose a refined Dolev-Yao
model incorporating human-device communication channels, addressing so-called security
ceremonies. However, Carlos et al. argue that assuming these new communication chan-
nels to be completely public might be too pessimistic. We follow that argumentation and
define one adversarial capability indicating that the channel between a voter and her de-
vice(s) might be controlled by the adversary.
HCH : The adversary can control a [*communication channel*] between a voter and
her voting device(s).
Computational Capabilities. A number or scientific works consider adversaries capable
of obtaining (practically) unlimited computational resources, e.g. [MN06]. This is cap-
tured by the following capability.
CR: The adversary is computationally unrestricted.
In the remainder of this work, we will refer to the set
C = {OFSP,ONSP, V O, V I, V D,CCH,HCH,CR}
as abstract capabilities and to the (possibly infinite) set
CA = {OFSP1, . . . , OFSPn1 , . . . ,HCH1, . . . ,HCHn7 , CR}
as instantiated capabilities of scheme A if A captures n1 oﬄine service providers, . . . , and
n7 voters.
Specification of Qualitative Adversary Models
The foundation of adversaries against Internet voting schemes are adversarial capabilities.
However, adversaries must generally possess a number of these capabilities to violate
security requirements, e.g. several service providers must be compromised. We define a
qualitative adversary model as follows:
Definition 2 (Qualitative Adversary Model). Let an Internet voting scheme A with the
set of instantiated capabilities CA be given. A qualitative adversary model AAi , or simply
adversary, against scheme A is defined by a subset of instantiated capabilities CA, i.e.
AAi ⊆ CA.
7It shall be emphasized that anonymization networks do generally have exit nodes that are capable of
eavesdropping the communication. Consequently, in spite of the application of anonymization networks,
the confidentiality of the communication must be ensured by other means.
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In the remainder of this work, we consider a static adversary model, i.e. an adversary
either does or does not possess capabilities throughout the entire election.
Example Scheme. For the sake of clarity, consider for the moment only the capabilities
ONSP and OFSP . Because RS and BBS are accessible by anybody, these components
are online service providers. VS, in contrast, is not accessible to anybody and is therefore
an oﬄine service provider. To compromise RS and BBS, the adversary consequently needs
the capabilities ONSPRS and ONSPBBS . To compromise VS, the adversary needs the
capabilityOFSPV S . Hence, within the given Internet voting scheme, any set of capabilities
AAi such that AAi ⊆ {ONSPRS , ONSPBBS , OFSPV S} is a qualitative adversary model
against the given scheme A.
3.4.3. Language for the Specification of Qualitative Security Models
In analogy to the definition of qualitative adversary models, we define qualitative security
models within this subsection. Therefore, we first introduce the minimal cut sets notation.
Thereafter, we discuss the impact that adversaries can cause on security requirements and
ultimately define qualitative security models of Internet voting schemes.
Minimal Cut Sets
To specify qualitative security models, we pick up the concept of minimal cut sets [LGTL85].
Cut sets are a standard concept in reliability and availability theory [Ave85, IW89, ABdO76].
Fuqua [Fuq87] precisely describes cut sets as ”[...] any basic event or combination of basic
events whose occurrence will cause the top event to occur.” A cut set is minimal, if none
of its subsets is a cut set. A violation of a security requirement (refer to Section 3.1.2) is
the top event, while the possession of instantiated adversarial capabilities (refer to Section
3.4.2) corresponds to basic events. We call an adversary successful if the targeted security
requirement can be violated with that adversary’s capabilities.
Example Scheme. We stick to the restriction and consider only the capabilities ONSP
and OFSP . Throughout the voting phase, RS and VS learn the relation between the
voter’s identity and her voting credential. Furthermore, BBS learns the relation between
voting credentials and the votes cast with those credentials. Hence, the malicious collabo-
ration between RS and BBS or between VS and BBS results in a violation of vote secrecy.
None of these servers might, however, violate vote secrecy individually. Consequently, the
sets
{ONSPRS ,ONSPBBS}, {OFSPV S ,ONSPBBS}, {ONSPRS ,OFSPV S ,ONSPBBS}
are cut sets. However, only the sets
{ONSPRS ,ONSPBBS}, {OFSPV S ,ONSPBBS}
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are minimal as both sets are a subset of the cut set
{ONSPRS ,OFSPV S ,ONSPBBS}.
Notational Conventions. For the sake of better readability, we introduce two notational
conventions: First, as part of the scheme description, we make clear which capability is
needed to compromise/control/influence which part of the scheme. Therefore, we omit
the capability, but rather provide the component. For instance, instead of ONSPRS and
OFSPBBS , we simply write RS and BBS. Second, we rewrite lists of minimal cut sets in
disjunctive normal form. Hence, rather than writing
{RS,BBS}, {VS,BBS},
we write
(RS ∧ BBS) ∨ (VS ∧ BBS).
Adversarial Impact on Security Requirements
The violation of security requirements cannot be related to the presence of a unique adver-
sary, but in fact different adversaries might cause different impact to security requirements.
Consider for instance the security requirement vote integrity. Rather than assigning one
precise successful adversary to that requirement, it is intuitive to indicate which adversaries
might undetectably alter one, two, . . . , or all cast votes. For example, an adversary con-
trolling one voting device can manipulate one voter’s vote, while an adversary controlling
ten voting devices can manipulate ten voters’ votes; an adversary controlling the ballot
box server can even be in possession of an attack strategy manipulating all cast votes.
Furthermore, there might be attacks that work up to a certain impact level, but could not
cause the maximum impact. One typical attack of this form is a clash attack [KTV12],
because clash attacks can only target two votes that are equal while their equality cannot
be known in advance8.
Hence, for each specific impact level, a qualitative security model is specified. Note that
the number of impact levels depends on the number of eligible voters nel and the number
of expected voters nex and can therefore not be known throughout the determination of
qualitative security models. Hence, qualitative security models are specified in a generic
manner. Generally, attack strategies are successful up to a certain extent. For instance, the
corruption of central servers would often result in the violation of a security requirement
for all expected voters. In that case, the respective attack strategies are incorporated
into all instantiated security models up to impact level nex. The corruption of one voting
device might generally only violate a security requirement for one voter. Hence, once the
numbers nel and nex are known, the impact levels can be instantiated and so can the
abstract qualitative security models.
8Knowing in advance to the election which voters will cast identical votes is at least very hard.
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With regard to different security requirements, the impact on these requirements slightly
differs. Vote secrecy, vote integrity, and fairness are only defined for voters that actually
cast a vote. Hence the maximum impact of these requirements is nex. Eligibility relates to
those voters that abstain from the election. Hence, an adversary causes maximum impact
on eligibility if he is able to cast illegitimate votes for all nel − nex abstaining voters.
Ultimately, with regard to data access protection, an adversary might be interested in
obtaining voter data of all eligible voters. Hence, an adversary causes maximum impact
on data access protection if he is able to obtain voter data for all nel eligible voters. In the
remainder of this work, we denote the maximum impact generically by n, an abstraction
of nex, nel − nex, and nel respectively.
Definition of Qualitative Security Models
After the definition of qualitative adversary models and the discussion of adversarial im-
pact of security requirements, we are able to define qualitative security models.
Definition 3 (Qualitative Security Model). Let an Internet voting scheme A with the set
of instantiated capabilities CA be given. We say that
MA,r,i = (αA,r,i1 ∨ · · · ∨ αA,r,iξA,r,i)
with αA,r,ij = (c
A,r,i
j,1 ∧ · · · ∧ cA,r,ij,λA,r,ij ) and c
A,r,i
j,k ∈ CA
is a qualitative security model of A with regard to security requirement r and impact
level i if there exists a set of adversaries S = {A1, . . . ,AξA,r,i} where Aj is specified by
capabilities {cA,r,ij,1 , . . . , cA,r,ij,λA,r,ij }, such that
1. The capabilities of all adversaries A ∈ S suffice to cause impact i on r, and
2. For all adversaries A ∈ S, there is no adversary A′ ⊂ A such that the capabilities
of A′ suffice to cause impact i on r, and
3. For all adversaries A′, of which the capabilities suffice to cause impact i on r, there
is an adversary A ∈ S, such that A ⊆ A′.
Intuitively speaking, a qualitative security model encodes a number of successful attack
strategies (disjunctions), where each attack strategy requires the adversary to possess
a number of instantiated capabilities (conjunctions). Here, it shall be emphasized that
different attack strategies might overlap, i.e. different minimal cut sets αA,r,ij and α
A,r,i
x
might contain identical instantiated capabilities. Hence, two capabilities cA,r,ij,k and c
A,r,i
x,y
with j 6= x might be identical.
Definition 4 (Resistance Against Abstract Capability). Let an Internet voting scheme A
with the set of instantiated capabilities CA and the qualitative security modelsMA,r,1, . . . ,MA,r,n
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be given. We say that the scheme A is resistant against capability Co ∈ C with regard to
requirement r, if for all impact levels i, it holds that for all cA,r,ij,k in all α
A,r,i
j , c
A,r,i
j,k is no
instantiation of Co.
Example Scheme: We relax the previous restriction and, in addition to the capabilities
OFSP and ONSP , consider that an adversary might gain the capability V D (corruption
of voting devices). Hence, to cause impact 1 the adversary might either compromise any
single voting device, or any two voting devices, or . . . or all voting devices. Furthermore
the adversary might compromise either the registration server and the ballot box server
or the validation server and the ballot box server. To cause impact 2, the adversary might
either compromise any two voting devices, or any three voting devices, or . . . or all voting
devices. Furthermore the adversary might compromise either the registration server and
the ballot box server or the validation server and the ballot box server. Generically, to
cause impact i, the adversary might either compromise any i voting devices, or any i+ 1
voting devices, or . . . or all voting devices. Furthermore, the adversary might compromise
either the registration server and the ballot box server or the validation server and the
ballot box server. The resulting qualitative security models of the example scheme are
provided in Table 3.2.
Requirement Qualitative Security Models Impact
Vote Secrecy (V D1 ∨ V D2 ∨ · · · ∨ V Dn)∨
((V D1 ∧ V D2) ∨ (V D1 ∧ V D3) ∨ · · · ∨ (V Dn−1 ∧ V Dn))∨
(RS ∧ BBS) ∨ (VS ∧ BBS) 1
. . . . . .∨
I⊆{1,...,n},|I|≥l(
∧
i∈I V Di) ∨ (RS ∧ BBS) ∨ (VS ∧ BBS) 1 ≤ l ≤ n
Table 3.2: Qualitative security models of the example scheme for vote secrecy.
Pareto Dominance of Internet Voting Schemes
Internet voting schemes can be partially ordered over qualitative security models. This is
for instance of relevance when system developers target at improving an Internet voting
scheme in one dimension, while not negatively affecting the scheme in any other dimension
or when security analysts want to discard Internet voting schemes from further consider-
ation without negatively affecting the quality of any election officials’ decision.
Recall the definitions of qualitative adversary models (Definition 2) and qualitative
security models (Definition 3). We propose the following definitions:
Definition 5 (Mapping of Scheme Capabilities). Let two Internet voting schemes A and
B, and their respective instantiated capabilities CA and CB be given. We say that φ :
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CA → CB is a mapping of scheme capabilities iff φ is a bijection and for all c ∈ CA,
capabilities c and φ(c) are instantiations of the same abstract capability.
Definition 6 (Equality/Dominance of Qualitative Security Models). Let two Internet
voting schemes A and B, and their respective qualitative security modelsMA,r,l andMB,r,l
for all security requirements r ∈ R and all impacts levels l be given. Furthermore assume
a mapping φ of scheme capabilities of both schemes is given. We say that scheme A equals
(=-relation) / dominates (>-relation) scheme B with regard to requirement r, impact level
l, and mapping φ, if the following holds:
1. For each adversary AAi ⊆ CA that satisfiesMA,r,l, the adversary φ(AAi ) also satisfies
MB,r,l, and
2. a) for each adversary ABj ⊆ CB that satisfies MB,r,l, the adversary φ−1(ABj ) also
satisfies MA,r,l. (=-relation)
b) not for each adversary ABj ⊆ CB that satisfies MB,r,l, the adversary φ−1(ABj )
also satisfies MA,r,l. (>-relation)
Definition 7 (Pareto Dominance of Internet Voting Schemes). Let two Internet voting
schemes A and B, and their respective qualitative security models MA,r,l and MB,r,l for
all security requirements r ∈ R and all impacts levels l be given. We say that scheme A
Pareto dominates scheme B with regard R if there is a mapping φ of capabilities of both
schemes such that:
1. for each requirement r ∈ R and each impact level l, scheme A equals or dominates
scheme B with regard to requirement r impact level l, and mapping φ, and
2. there is at least one requirement r ∈ R and impact level l such that scheme A
dominates scheme B with regard to requirement r impact level l, and mapping φ.
The fundamental idea of this dominance is the following: If a scheme A Pareto dominates
a scheme B with regard to all security requirements for Internet voting schemes (refer to
Section 3.1.2), then the quantitative security evaluation results of scheme A shall be equal
or better than the quantitative security evaluation results of scheme B with regard to all
security requirements. Hence, from a security perspective, quantitative security evaluation
becomes obsolete when determining the most appropriate scheme from these two schemes.
Therefore, the notion of Pareto dominance serves system developers to improve Internet
voting schemes in an election-independent manner.
3.4.4. Language for the Specification of Election Settings
If Internet voting schemes cannot be ordered in the sense of Definition 7, then quantitative
election-specific security evaluation of the schemes is necessary. Adversarial capabilities
are not only the underpinning of qualitative security models, but furthermore they form
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the basis for the specification of election settings. The goal of this section is the definition
of a specification language for election officials.
The quantitative evaluation of qualitative security models could be conducted in a
simple manner if election officials could precisely assign probabilities to the presence of
adversarial capabilities (refer to Section 3.4.2). However, election officials might provide
these probabilities with some uncertainty due to the lack of available knowledge regard-
ing capabilities. Furthermore, because of the potential complexity of qualitative security
models, their quantitative evaluation might be significantly impacted by minor changes in
capability probabilities. We take account of this and incorporate Monte-Carlo simulations
into the quantification process. Rather than precise capability probabilities, we require
the election official to provide probability distributions for abstract adversarial capability
probabilities.
Additionally, the election official specifies the number of eligible voters nel and estimates
the number of expected voters nex. These numbers are needed to instantiate all possible
impact levels. Eventually, election settings are defined as follows:
Definition 8 (Election Setting). Given the set of abstract capabilities C, the number of
eligible voters nel, the number of expected voters nex, and probability distributions PCo for
all capabilities Co ∈ C, we say that the tuple
E = (PC1 , . . . ,PC|C| , nel, nex)
is an election setting.
Example Election Setting. We consider the following election setting, where U [a, b] de-
notes the uniform distribution with support (a, b):
E = (POFSP = U [0.0001, 0.0005]; Distribution for capability OFSP
PONSP = U [0.001, 0.005]; Distribution for capability ONSP
PV O = U [0.01, 0.05]; Distribution for capability VO
PV I = U [0.01, 0.05]; Distribution for capability VI
PV D = U [0.01, 0.05]; Distribution for capability VD
PCCH = U [1, 1]; Distribution for capability CCH
PHCH = U [0.01, 0.05]; Distribution for capability HCH
PCR = U [0, 0]; Distribution for capability CR
nel = 2, 000; Number of eligible voters
nex = 1, 000) Number of expected voters
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3.4.5. Determination of Satisfaction Degrees in Election Settings
The core of the framework is the algorithm for the quantitative evaluation of qualitative
security models within specific election settings. Therefore, it is first shown how the proba-
bility of an adversary violating a qualitative security model can be calculated. Thereafter,
it is outlined how satisfaction degrees can be calculated with given fixed probabilities
for adversarial capabilities. Eventually, we show how Monte-Carlo simulations [MU49] are
adapted for the quantitative evaluation of qualitative security models against probabilistic
adversaries.
We abbreviate the probability of the event that the adversary A satisfies a security
model X or possesses a specific (abstract or instantiated) capability, i.e. PA(X = 1), by
P (X).
Transforming Qualitative Security Models into Probability Formulas
The probability distribution PCo : [0, 1] → [0, 1] for an abstract capability Co ∈ C has
as events probabilities P (Co). Suppose now that for each Co ∈ C there is such an event
P (Co) given. All instantiated capabilities of Co inherit the probabilities P (Co) and are
independent from each other. Hence, for any two instantiations cA,r,ij,k and c
A,r,i
x,y of the same
abstract capability Co, it holds P (c
A,r,i
j,k ) = P (c
A,r,i
x,y ) = P (Co). Then one can compute the
probability that an adversary satisfies αA,r,ij as:
P (αA,r,ij ) = P (c
A,r,i
j,1 ) · P (cA,r,ij,2 ) · · · · · P (cA,r,ij,λA,r,ij )
Ultimately, we are interested in the probability that an adversary might cause impact i on
requirement r in scheme A, i.e. the probability P (
∨ξA,r,i
j=1 α
A,r,i
j ). The inclusion-exclusion
principle [KLS96, Vau98] provides a means to calculate the probability that at least one of
several (possibly overlapping) events happens. Consequently, to calculate the probability
P (
∨ξA,r,i
j=1 α
A,r,i
j ), the application of the inclusion-exclusion principle leads to the following
probability:
P (
ξA,r,i∨
j=1
αA,r,ij ) =
ξA,r,i∑
j=1
(−1)j−1 ∑
J⊂{1,...,ξA,r,i},|J |=j
P (
∧
b∈J
αA,r,ib )
 (3.1)
If none of the minimal cut sets overlap, then one can apply De Morgan’s Law. Hence,
the resulting probability formulas for non-overlapping minimal cut sets is:
P (
ξA,r,i∨
j=1
αA,r,ij ) = 1− ((1− P (αA,r,i1 )) · (1− P (αA,r,i2 )) · · · · · (1− P (αA,r,iξA,r,i)))
In addition to the inclusion-exclusion principle, to calculate the probability of an adversary
satisfying a minimal cut set of the form ”at least x events”, instances of the same abstract
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capability (e.g. in the case of voting device corruption), the cumulative binomial probability
computation is applied. Finally, the resulting probability formulas build the foundation
for quantitative security evaluation. Note that system analysts might provide probability
formulas directly rather than qualitative security models. However, the transformation of
qualitative security models would require the system analyst to consider the overlappings
of different attack strategies and the mathematical modelling of those overlappings. To
lower the system analyst’s burden, the transformation is incorporated into the framework’s
quantification process.
Example Scheme. We first consider the probability of the event that either the regis-
tration server and the ballot box server or the validation server and the ballot box server
are compromised (event A). Therefore, we apply the inclusion-exclusion principle:
P (A) = P (RS) · P (BBS) + P (V S) · P (BBS)− P (RS) · P (V S) · P (BBS)
Furthermore, we consider the probability of the event that at least l voting devices are
compromised (event B):
P (B) = 1−
(
l−1∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
P (V D)i · (1− P (V D)n−i)
)
Given the independence of events A and B (no overlappings), we can compute the prob-
ability that vote secrecy of at least l votes is violated as follows:
P (A ∪B) = 1− ((1− P (A)) · (1− P (B)))
Determination of Satisfaction Degrees with Given Probabilities
The evaluation of qualitative security models within election settings is built upon standard
risk theory (refer for instance to [SGF02]). To determine the satisfaction degree of an
Internet voting scheme A with qualitative security modelsMA,r,i under given probabilities
P (Co) for all Co ∈ C and under n impact levels (the instantiation of impact levels will
be explained in the following paragraph), the following function f(P (C1), . . . , P (C|C|)) is
defined:
1. For each instantiated impact level 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the probability formula of the qualita-
tive security model is evaluated based on the given probabilities.
2. For each instantiated impact level 1 ≤ i ≤ n, a risk value is calculated by multiplying
the normalized impact in with the evaluated probability formula of the respective
qualitative security model.
3. The largest risk value is identified.
4. The satisfaction degree estimator is the inverse of the largest risk value.
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Extension towards Probabilistic Adversaries
Recall that election officials assign probability distributions rather than precise probabil-
ities to adversarial capabilities. Following the Monte-Carlo approach, the given distribu-
tions (refer to Section 3.4.4) are sampled and the qualitative security models are evaluated
with those random samples. To determine the satisfaction degree of an Internet voting
scheme A with qualitative security models MA,r,i with regard to a security requirement
r ∈ R (refer to Section 2) within a specified election setting E = (POFSP , PONSP , PV O,
PV I , PV D, PCCH , PHCH , PCR, nel, nex) (refer to Section 3.4.4), the following process is
defined:
Instantiation of Impact Levels. Based on the number of eligible voters nel and the
number of expected voters nex (refer to Section 3.4.4), the number of impact levels is
instantiated and probability formulas of qualitative security models accordingly. Conse-
quently, n (depending on the security requirement under investigation either nex, nel−nex,
or nel) impact levels are assigned to n probability formulas. The probability formula for
causing impact i against vote secrecy within the example scheme is given in Section 3.4.5.
Generation of Monte-Carlo based Satisfaction Degree Estimators. The following steps
are conducted m times (number Monte-Carlo iterations). The process steps are shown for
the j-th Monte-Carlo iteration.
1. For each abstract adversarial capability Co ∈ C (refer to Section 3.4.2), an esti-
mator of the probability P (Co) is sampled according to the probability distribu-
tion PCo in E (refer to Section 3.4.4). For the example election setting this could
lead to the following probability samples: P 1(OFSP ) = 0.000232, P 1(ONSP ) =
0.004283, P 1(V O) = 0.02482, P 1(V I) = 0.03993, P 1(V D) = 0.04832, P 1(CCH) =
1, P 1(HCH) = 0.04813, P 1(CR) = 0.
2. For the vector of probability samples, the deterministic satisfaction degree calculator
f is called. The process steps are outlined in the following:
a) For each instantiated impact level 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the probability formula of the
qualitative security model is evaluated based on the samples generated in step
1. We provide an excerpt of this step for the example scheme:
b) For each instantiated impact level 1 ≤ i ≤ n, a risk value is calculated by
multiplying the normalized impact in with the evaluated probability formula of
the respective qualitative security model (result of step 2.a). We provide an
excerpt of this step for the example scheme:
c) The largest risk value (result of step 2.b) is identified. In the example scheme,
the largest risk value appears at impact level 39 and equals 0.03534598941.
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Impact Probability (Qualitative Security Models)
1 1
...
...
39 0.9063074207
...
...
1000 0.00001933348919
Impact Probability (Qualitative Security Models) Risk
1 1 0.001
...
...
...
39 0.9063074207 0.03534598941
...
...
...
1000 0.00001933348919 0.00001933348919
d) The satisfaction degree estimator is the inverse of the largest risk value (result
of step 2.c). The value is denoted by satisfaction degree estimator ej in the
j-th Monte-Carlo simulation. For the example scheme, the satisfaction degree
estimator is 0.96465401059.
Conducting these two steps with random variables P (C1), . . . , P (C|C|) yields samples of
the following random variable:
M := f(P (C1), P (C2), . . . , P (C|C|))
Processing of Satisfaction Degree Estimators. We define the statistical satisfaction
degree of scheme A with regard to requirement r and election setting E as the expected
value of random variable M , i.e. E(M).
1. To approximate E(M) by the m generated satisfaction degree estimators, namely
e1, . . . , em, the average of these estimators is calculated. Hence, the empirical sat-
isfaction degree Mm (in the remainder simply referred to as satisfaction degree) of
scheme A with regard to requirement r and election setting E is defined as:
Mm :=
1
m
(e1 + · · ·+ em) = 1
m
m∑
k=1
f(P k(C1), P
k(C2), . . . , P
k(C|C|))
By the weak law of large numbers, it holds that the empirical satisfaction degree
weakly converges towards the statistical satisfaction degree,
Mm
m→∞−→ E[M ].
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The satisfaction degree of the example scheme after 10, 000 Monte-Carlo simulations
equals 0.9786.
2. To evaluate the quality of the empirical satisfaction degree with regard to the sta-
tistical satisfaction degree, a confidence interval is calculated. Mathematically, the
confidence interval surrounding the empirical satisfaction degree contains the statis-
tical satisfaction degree with a certain confidence and is calculated as follows:
CI =
[
Mm − z sm√
m
,Mm + z
sm√
m
]
The value z is referred to as confidence value and indicates the confidence with
which the statistical satisfaction degree is within the calculated confidence interval.
An overview of confidence values and the resulting confidence in percentage is for
instance provided by Driels and Shin [DS04]. The value sm denotes the standard
deviation.
For the evaluation of the example scheme, we set the confidence value to z = 2,
thereby obtaining a certainty of ≈ 95.5% that the statistical mean lies within the
confidence interval generated around the empirical mean. The confidence interval of
the example scheme after 10, 000 Monte-Carlo simulations is:
[0.9783, 0.9787]
In the following security evaluation, we make sure that confidence intervals of com-
pared Internet voting schemes do not overlap unless both schemes build upon the
same capabilities. As a consequence thereof, we omit confidence intervals in the
remainder of this work.
It shall be emphasized that the herein presented construction composes risk values
assigned to different impact levels in a restrictive way, i.e. the largest identified
risk value serves as indicator for the computation of the satisfaction degree (see step
2.d). We justify this decision by the fact that adversaries have profound knowledge
about the Internet voting scheme in use and will choose the most effective strategy
to achieve their goals. This decision is, however, by no means set in stone. The
construction might easily be adapted to incorporate a less restrictive model, e.g.
averaging over all identified risks.
A Note on Monte-Carlo Simulations
As rule of thumb, one can say that the larger the number of Monte-Carlo iterations m and
the smaller the confidence value z, the smaller the resulting confidence interval, and hence
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the higher the robustness of the empirical satisfaction degree estimation. Consequently, for
the application of Monte-Carlo simulations, the planned number of Monte-Carlo iterations
m and the confidence value z, have to be specified. With regard to the number of Monte-
Carlo simulations, we follow the recommendations by Mundform et al. [MSK+11] and set
m = 10, 000. Additionally, we set the confidence value to z = 2.
3.5. Deduction of Qualitative Security Models and
Determination of Election Settings
After the security evaluation framework has been constructed, we provide brief guidelines
about how system analysts might deduce qualitative security models for Internet voting
schemes and how election officials might determine their election setting.
Deduction of Qualitative Security Models. The system analyst has a number of tech-
niques at disposal to determine qualitative security models, such as symbolic protocol
analysis, e.g. [BPM02], cryptographic proof techniques, e.g. [BR93], and threat analysis,
e.g. [PYL10]. In fact, there is a recent tendency towards automating the deduction of
adversarial capabilities upon which a protocol builds. So far, these approaches do, how-
ever, either consider a very limited class of cryptographic protocols [BC14] or are tailored
towards specific security requirements [NV12]. Given the difference in their rigor, the used
technique might correlate to the reliability of the output. We consequently recommend
to provide qualitative security models together with the approach used to deduce these
models.
Determination of Election Settings. Given the facts that election officials might be
overwhelmed with assigning precise probabilities to adversarial capabilities and that the
quantitative evaluation of qualitative security models might result in major changes under
minor probability changes, the constructed framework allows election officials to assign
probability distributions to adversarial capabilities.
There exist estimations regarding different adversarial capabilities. For instance, Pan-
daLabs security provides quarterly security reports which contain infection rates of general-
purpose machines. For instance, according to the July-September 2015 report [Pan15],
China has an infection rate of ≈ 45%, Germany a rate of ≈ 25%, and Norway a rate of
≈ 20%. These values might be serve as indicator for infection rates of voter’s devices9. Ad-
ditionally, election officials might build their estimations upon past experience as proposed
by Schryen et al. [SVRH11].
Depending on the available information, election settings might be defined in three
ways: If information about specific adversarial capabilities is rare or the certainty about
9It should however be noted that only a fraction of infected voting devices would provide an adversary
sufficient control to influence the election.
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precise information is low, then probability distributions have a larger variance. If, on the
other side, election officials have precise and certain information regarding the expected
adversary, than probability distributions have a smaller variance. In fact, if available in-
formation regarding the election setting is very rare, then election official might determine
the most appropriate scheme depending on a variety of (pre-defined) election settings.
3.6. Properties of the Security Evaluation Framework
After its construction, the security evaluation framework is evaluated with regard to the
requirements determined in Section 3.3.1. The following proofs build upon the weak law of
large numbers and hold therefore for a sufficiently large number of Monte-Carlo iterations.
3.6.1. No Capabilities – Perfect Security
The first requirement that the security evaluation framework shall possess is that the sat-
isfaction degree of all schemes must be 1 with regard to all security requirements, if the
adversary has no capabilities, unless the security requirement can be violated without any
adversarial capabilities. This void of capabilities is equivalent to the absence of random-
ness as the adversary’s capability is determined. Hence the probability distributions that
are passed by the election official, degenerate to deterministic functions. Within a prob-
abilistic framework, such deterministic functions are called constant random variables.
Their distribution function is the Dirac delta function δx, where x ∈ R denotes the point
of mass [Haz01]. In particular, it holds U(a, a + 1/n)
n→∞−−−→ δa. Hence, for each Co ∈ C
the Dirac delta function δo is passed, as there is only one probability that can be assigned
to the event that an adversary has capability Co, namely zero.
Theorem 3.1. Let δo be the distribution function for all abstract capabilities Co ∈ C.
The satisfaction degree of scheme A is 1 for all security requirements r, unless the security
requirement can be violated without any adversarial capabilities.
Proof. If the probability of having an abstract capability Co ∈ C is 0 for all Co ∈ C, then
all instantiated capabilities cA,r,ij,k , with 1 ≤ l ≤ λA,r,ij for the impact level i have probability
0, i.e. P (cA,r,ij,k ) = 0. This leads to P (α
A,r,i
j ) = 0 and thus
P (
ξA,r,i∨
j=1
αA,r,ij ) ≤
ξA,r,i∑
j=1
P (αA,r,ij ) = 0.
As this holds true for all impact levels, the maximum risk of all impact levels equals
0. Consequently, the satisfaction degree estimator results in 1. Given the fact that the
random variables for capability probabilities have their entire density at 0, each Monte-
Carlo iteration assigns the value 0 to all capability probabilities. Hence, the resulting
random variable M has its entire density on the value 1, such that E(M) = 1.
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3.6.2. Capability Resistance
The second requirement refers to the resistance of Internet voting schemes against specific
abstract adversarial capabilities.
Theorem 3.2. Let Internet voting scheme A be resistant against abstract capability Co
with regard to requirement r. Let P (C1), . . . , P (Co), . . . , P (C|C|) denote random variables
for the probabilities of adversarial capabilities C1, . . . Co, . . . C|C|. If random variable P (Co)
is replaced by a differently distributed random variable P (Co)
′, then the resulting satisfac-
tion degrees of scheme A with regard to requirement r do not differ.
Proof. For the random variables P (C1), . . . , P (Co)
′, . . . , P (C|C|), we denote the random
variable generated by the Monte-Carlo simulations by:
M ′ := f(P (C1), . . . , P (Co)′, . . . , P (C|C|))
Due to A’s resistance, it holds for all cA,r,ij,k in all α
A,r,i
j that c
A,r,i
j,k is no instantiation of
Co. Consequently, function f is neither affected by random variable P (Co) nor by P (Co)
′.
As a consequence, it holds
M = f(P (C1), . . . , P (Co), . . . , P (C|C|))
= f(P (C1), . . . , P (Co)
′, . . . , P (C|C|)) = M ′,
and hence E(M) = E(M ′).
3.6.3. Continuity
Election officials provide uniform probability distributions for capability probabilities, e.g.
distributions P (Ci) ∼ U [ai, bi], i = 1, 2, . . . , |C|. To prove continuity of the framework
with regard to the expected adversary, we study the framework’s result under sequences
of random variables (P (Ci,n))n∈N where P (Ci,n) ∼ U [ai, bi + 1/n] for i = 1, 2, . . . , |C|.
We say that continuity is given if the framework’s results are identical under the random
variables P (Ci) ∼ U [ai, bi] and P (Ci,n) ∼ U [ai, bi + 1/n] for n converging to infinity.
Formally, this is expressed as follows:
E(Mn) = E( f(P (C1,n), P (C2,n), . . . , P (C|C|,n)) )
n→∞−→ E( f(P (C1), P (C2), . . . , P (C|C|)) ) = E(M)
Before proving the main theorem, we define and prove three lemmata.
Lemma 3.3. The probability that an adversary causes impact i on requirement r in scheme
A is continuous with regard to a sample probability P (Co) for any Co ∈ C.
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Proof. The probability of P (αA,r,ix ∧ αA,r,iy ) can be calculated by multiplying once the
probabilities P (cj) for which cj appears in either α
A,r,i
x or α
A,r,i
y .
Suppose w.l.o.g. that the instantiated capabilities cA,r,i
x,λA,r,ix
and cA,r,i
y,λA,r,iy
are equal, hence
αA,r,ix and α
A,r,i
y overlap. Then, the probability of P (α
A,r,i
x ∧ αA,r,iy ) is calculated as:
P (αA,r,ix ∧ αA,r,iy ) = P (cA,r,ix,1 ) · · · · · P (cA,r,ix,λA,r,ix ) · P (c
A,r,i
y,1 ) · · · · · P (cA,r,iy,(λA,r,iy −1))
On the other side, if αA,r,ix and α
A,r,i
y do not overlap, the probability of P (α
A,r,i
x ∧αA,r,iy )
is calculated as:
P (αA,r,ix ∧ αA,r,iy ) = P (cA,r,ix,1 ) · · · · · P (cA,r,ix,λA,r,ix ) · P (c
A,r,i
y,1 ) · · · · · P (cA,r,iy,λA,r,iy )
Consequently, for any intersection of (possibly overlapping) minimal cut sets αA,r,ix and
αA,r,iy , the probability of the intersection is given by a product of probabilities P (c
A,r,i
a,b ).
Given the fact that the product of continuous functions is again continuous [GJ13], the
value P (αA,r,ix ∧ αA,r,iy ) is continuous with regard to the probabilities P (Co) for Co ∈ C.
Consider the event that at least one of several minimal cut sets (causing impact i on
requirement r in scheme A) is satisfied by the adversary. The probability of the event that
at least one of several minimal cut sets (causing impact i on requirement r in scheme A)
is satisfied by the adversary, is given by Formula 3.1. The calculation of this probability
builds upon the addition and subtraction of products; namely the products defined by
P (
∧
j∈J α
A,r,i
j ). Given the facts that the addition and subtraction of continuous functions
is again continuous [GJ13] and that the products P (
∧
j∈J α
A,r,i
j ) are continuous functions,
the value
P (
ξA,r,i∨
j=1
αA,r,ij )
is continuous with regard to the probabilities P (Co) for Co ∈ C.
Lemma 3.4. The satisfaction degree estimator for requirement r in scheme A is contin-
uous with regard to a sample probability P (Co) for any Co ∈ C.
Proof. According to the security evaluation framework, the risk of requirement r in scheme
A and impact level i can be calculated by:
P (
ξA,r,i∨
j=1
αA,r,ij ) ·
i
n
Given the fact that the product of continuous functions is again continuous [GJ13] and
Lemma 3.3, the risk is continuous with regard to the probabilities P (Co) for Co ∈ C.
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Subsequently, the security evaluation framework determines the maximum of the n (all
impact levels) computed risks with regard to requirement r as direct indicator for the
satisfaction degree of the scheme with regard to r. It can be shown that the maximum of
continuous functions is again continuous [Str00].
Ultimately, given the fact that the subtraction of continuous functions is again contin-
uous [GJ13], the satisfaction degree estimator is continuous.
Definition 9. A sequence of random variables (Xn)n∈N weakly converges to a random
variable X, if for every continuous function f , it holds
limn→∞
∫
Xn
f(x)dPXn =
∫
X
f(x)dPX ,
where PXn denotes the probability distribution of Xn and PX the probability distribution
of X, shortly
Xn
d−→ X.
Lemma 3.5. Let X ∼ U [a, b] be a uniformly distributed random variable and let (Xn)n∈N ∼
U(a, b+ 1/n) be a sequence of random variables. Then it holds
Xn
d→ X.
Proof. We have for any continuous function f :
limn→∞
∫ b+1/n
a
1
b+ 1/n− af(x)dx = limn→∞
1
b+ 1/n− a
∫ b+1/n
a
f(x)dx
= limn→∞
1
b+ 1/n− alimn→∞
∫ b+1/n
a
f(x)dx
=
1
b− a
∫ b
a
f(x)dx
=
∫ b
a
1
b− af(x)dx
Theorem 3.6. Let P (Ci) ∼ U [ai, bi], i = 1, 2, . . . , |C| denote uniformly distributed random
variables for the probabilities of adversarial capabilities Ci. The satisfaction degree of A
with regard to requirement r is continuous with regard to any weakly convergent sequence
of random variables (P (Ci,n))n∈N where P (Ci,n) ∼ U [ai, bi + 1/n] for i = 1, 2, . . . , |C|.
Proof. For the random variables P (C1,n), P (C2,n), . . . , P (C|C|,n), we denote the resulting
random variable generated by f as:
Mn := f(P (C1,n), P (C2,n), ..., P (C|C|,n))
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We define analogously the satisfaction degree calculated by the framework as:
Mmn =
1
m
m∑
k=1
f(P k(C1,n), P
k(C2,n), ..., P
k(C|C|,n))
By the law of large numbers, it holds:
Mmn
m→∞−→ E[Mn]
Given the weak convergence of P (Ci,n)
n→∞−→ P (Ci) (refer to Lemma 3.5) and the fact
that the satisfaction degree estimator is continuous (refer to Lemma 3.4), it holds:
Mn = f(P (C1,n), P (C2,n), . . . , P (C|C|,n))
n→∞−→ f(P (C1), P (C2), . . . , P (C|C|)) = M
For the sequence of expected values (E[Mn])n∈N, it consequently holds:
|E[Mn]− E[M ]| = |E[Mn −M ]| n→∞−→ 0
3.6.4. Monotonicity
We study the framework’s result under the random variables P (Ci) ∼ U [ai, bi], i =
1, 2, . . . , o, . . . |C|, when P (Co) is exchanged by a random variable P (Co)′ ∼ U [a′o, b′o] with
a′o ≥ ao and b′o ≥ bo. We say that monotonicity is given if the framework’s result is larger
under P (Ci) ∼ U [ai, bi], i = 1, . . . , |C| than under the same set of random variables where
P (Co) is substituted by a random variable P (Co)
′. Formally, this is expressed as follows:
E(M ′) = E( f(P (C1), P (C2), . . . , P (Co)′, . . . , P (C|C|)) )
≤ E( f(P (C1), P (C2), . . . , P (Co), . . . , P (C|C|)) ) = E(M)
Before proving the main theorem, we define and prove three lemmata.
Lemma 3.7. The probability that an adversary causes impact i on requirement r in scheme
A is non-decreasing with regard to a sample probability P (Co) for any Co ∈ C.
Proof. Let the set of instantiated capabilities CA of A be indexed. Let Hj denote the
indices of instantiated capabilities appearing in αA,r,ij . Suppose w.l.og. that raising the
probability P (Co) affects the instantiated capability c
A
h . Let
I = {j |cAh ∈ αA,r,ij }, J = {j |cAh /∈ αA,r,ij }
be the indices of minimal cut sets that contain cAh (I) and do not contain c
A
h (J). For
j ∈ I, let
αA,r,ij =
∧
k∈Hj\h
cAk .
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denote the minimal cut set αA,r,ij without capability c
A
h . Then the following holds, as
similarly shown in [Mat16]:
ξA,r,i∨
j=1
αA,r,ij =
∨
j∈I
αA,r,ij ∨
∨
j∈J
αA,r,ij
=
cAh ∧∨
j∈I
αA,r,ij
 ∨ ∨
j∈J
αA,r,ij
=
cAh ∧
∨
j∈I
αA,r,ij \
∨
j∈J
αA,r,ij
 unionsq ∨
j∈J
αA,r,ij ,
where XunionsqY denotes the disjoint logical disjunction of X and Y . The capability cAh does
neither appear in
∨
j∈I α
A,r,i
j nor in
∨
j∈J α
A,r,i
j . Hence, the probability P (
∨ξA,r,i
j=1 α
A,r,i
j )
can be calculated as:
P
ξA,r,i∨
j=1
αA,r,ij
 = P (cAh ) · P
∨
j∈I
αA,r,ij \
∨
j∈J
αA,r,ij
+ P
∨
j∈J
αA,r,ij

Because neither P
(∨
j∈I α
A,r,i
j \
∨
j∈J α
A,r,i
j
)
nor P
(∨
j∈J α
A,r,i
j
)
are affected by P (cAh ),
it can be concluded that P
(∨ξA,r,i
j=1 α
A,r,i
j
)
is non-decreasing.
Lemma 3.8. The satisfaction degree estimator for requirement r in scheme A is non-
increasing with regard to a sample probability P (Co) for any Co ∈ C.
Proof. According to the security evaluation framework, the risk of requirement r in scheme
A and impact level i can be calculated by:
P (
ξA,r,i∨
j=1
αij) ·
i
n
The probability P (
∨ξA,r,i
j=1 α
i
j) is continuous with regard to the probability P (Co) (refer
to Lemma 3.3), non-decreasing in probability P (Co) (refer to Lemma 3.7) and is non-
negative. The function in does not depend on the probability of P (Co).
By the following simple argument, it can be shown that the product of two continuous,
non-negative and non-decreasing functions f and g, is again a continuous, non-negative,
and non-decreasing function h. Because of the monotonicity of f and g, for any x1 ≤ x2,
66 3. Construction of a Security Evaluation Framework
it holds that f(x1) ≤ f(x2) and g(x1) ≤ g(x2). Furthermore, we know that f(x) ≥ 0 and
g(x) ≥ 0 for all x. Hence, it holds:
h(x1) = f(x1) · g(x1) ≤ f(x2) · g(x1) ≤ f(x2) · g(x2) = h(x2)
As a result of this inequality, the risk of requirement r in Scheme A is non-decreasing with
regard to the probability P (Co).
Subsequently, from the n computed risk values, the maximum risk is determined. It
holds that the maximum of two non-decreasing functions is again non-decreasing [CL12].
By subtracting the maximum risk value from 1, the monotonicity is inverted. Hence, the
satisfaction degree estimator is non-increasing.
Lemma 3.9. Let two random variables X ∼ U [a, b] and Y ∼ U [c, d] with c ≥ a and d ≥ b
be given. For any non-decreasing function f , it holds:
E[f(X)] ≤ E[f(Y )]
Proof. Let Z be a random variable defined as follows:
Z = c+ (d− c) · X − a
b− a
It can be seen that Z ∼ U(c, d), and hence particularly Z is equally distributed to Y .
Consider the following function:
g(x) = c+ (d− c) · x− a
b− a − x
It holds that g(a) = c − a ≥ 0 and g(b) = d − b ≥ 0. Because g is linear, it holds that
g(x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ [a, b]. Hence, we can conclude that X ≤ Z. Given the fact that f is
non-decreasing, it holds f(X) ≤ f(Z) almost surely. From this, we are able to conclude
that
E[f(X)] ≤ E[f(Z)] = E[f(Y )].
Theorem 3.10. Let P (Ci) ∼ U [ai, bi], i = 1, 2, . . . , |C| denote uniformly distributed ran-
dom variables for the probabilities of adversarial capabilities Ci. The satisfaction degree
of A with regard to requirement r is non-increasing with when random variable P (Co) is
exchanged by P (Co)
′ ∼ U [a′o, b′o], with a′o ≥ ao and b′o ≥ bo.
Proof. For P (C1), . . . , P (Co)
′, . . . , P (C|C|), we denote the resulting random variable gen-
erated by f by M ′, and the respective expected value by E[M ′].
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By Lemma 3.9 and the fact that the satisfaction degree estimator is non-increasing (refer
to Lemma 3.8), we are able to conclude that
E(M ′) = E( f(P (C1), P (C2), . . . , P (Co)′, . . . , P (C|C|)) )
≤ E( f(P (C1), P (C2), . . . , P (Co), . . . , P (C|C|)) ) = E(M).
In fact, the proven monotonicity can be strengthened to strict monotonicity. To prove
strict monotonicity of the construction with regard to scheme A and requirement r, the
following assumptions are made:
• For each capability Co ∈ C with probability distribution PCo , it holds that PCo ∼
U [a, b] with b > 0.
• For each impact level i and each capability Co ∈ C, there is at least one instantiation
cA,r,ij,k of Co.
• We say that the probability distribution PCo ∼ U [a, b] increases to P ′Co ∼ U [c, d], if
c > a and d > b.
Informally, the first assumption ensures that strict monotonicity cannot be violated by
a capability that is needed for all attack strategies, of which the probability is constantly
zero. The second assumption ensures that the maximum risk value is influenced by all ca-
pabilities. This assumption is needed to ensure that it cannot happen that the probability
distribution of a capability is increased that does not influence the satisfaction degree.
Lemma 3.11. The probability that an adversary causes impact i on requirement r in
scheme A is increasing with regard to a sample probability P (Co) for any Co ∈ C.
Proof. To prove this lemma, we follow the proof of lemma 3.7 up to the following formula:
P
ξA,r,i∨
j=1
αA,r,ij
 = P (cAh ) · P
∨
j∈I
αA,r,ij \
∨
j∈J
αA,r,ij
+ P
∨
j∈J
αA,r,ij

To prove the strict monotonicity of the right-hand term with regard to P (cAh ), we have
to prove that P
(∨
j∈I α
A,r,i
j \
∨
j∈J α
A,r,i
j
)
> 0. Now suppose this inequality would not
hold. This could happen in two cases:
First, this could happen if
∨
j∈J α
A,r,i
j would completely cover
∨
j∈I α
A,r,i
j . If this would
hold, then none of the cut sets in
(
cAh ∧
∨
j∈I α
A,r,i
j
)
would be minimal, because they
would be completely covered by the cut sets in
∨
j∈J α
A,r,i
j .
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Second, if the probability of one capability cA,r,ix in
∨
j∈I α
A,r,i
j \
∨
j∈J α
A,r,i
j equals 0, it
could happen that the term P
(∨
j∈I α
A,r,i
j \
∨
j∈J α
A,r,i
j
)
= 0. This contradicts, however,
the first assumption made for the monotonicity.
Given the fact that P
(∨
j∈I α
A,r,i
j \
∨
j∈J α
A,r,i
j
)
> 0, we can consequently conclude
that P (cAh ) · P
(∨
j∈I α
A,r,i
j \
∨
j∈J α
A,r,i
j
)
+ P
(∨
j∈J α
A,r,i
j
)
strictly increases, and so also
P
ξA,r,i∨
j=1
αA,r,ij
 = P (cAh ) · P
∨
j∈I
αA,r,ij \
∨
j∈J
αA,r,ij
+ P
∨
j∈J
αA,r,ij

strictly increases with regard to the probabilities P (ec) for c ∈ C.
Lemma 3.12. The satisfaction degree estimator for requirement r in scheme A is de-
creasing with regard to a sample probability P (Co) for any Co ∈ C.
Proof. According to the security evaluation framework, the risk of requirement r in scheme
A and impact level i can be calculated by:
P (
ξA,r,i∨
j=1
αij) ·
i
n
The probability P (
∨ξA,r,i
j=1 α
i
j) is continuous in the probability P (Co) (refer to Lemma
3.3), increasing in probability P (Co) (refer to Lemma 3.11) and is non-negative. The
function in does not depend on the probability of P (Co).
By the following simple argument, it can be shown that the product of a continuous,
non-negative and increasing function f and continuous, non-negative and non-decreasing
function g, is again a continuous, non-negative, and increasing function h.
For any x1 ≤ x2, because of the monotonicity of f and g, it holds that f(x1) ≤ f(x2)
and g(x1) ≤ g(x2). Furthermore, we know that f(x) ≥ 0 and g(x) ≥ 0 for all x. Hence, it
holds:
h(x1) = f(x1) · g(x1) < f(x2) · g(x1) ≤ f(x2) · g(x2) = h(x2)
Because of this inequality, it can be concluded that the risk value
P (
ξA,r,i∨
j=1
αij) ·
i
n
is increasing with regard to the probability P (Co).
Because of the second assumption made for the strict monotonicity, the risk of each
impact level is increasing, and so is the maximum risk. By subtracting the maximum risk
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value from 1, the monotonicity is inverted. Hence, the satisfaction degree estimator is
decreasing.
Lemma 3.13. Let two random variables X ∼ U [a, b] and Y ∼ U [c, d] with c > a and
d > b be given. For any non-decreasing function f , it holds:
E[f(X)] < E[f(Y )]
Proof. Let Z be a random variable defined as follows:
Z = c+ (d− c) · X − a
b− a
It can be seen that Z ∼ U(c, d), and hence particularly Z is equally distributed to Y .
Consider the following function:
g(x) = c+ (d− c) · x− a
b− a − x
It holds that g(a) = c − a > 0 and g(b) = d − b > 0. Because g is linear, it holds that
g(x) > 0 for all x ∈ [a, b]. Hence, we can conclude that X < Z. Given the fact that f is
increasing, it holds f(X) < f(Z) almost surely. From this, we are able to conclude that
E[f(X)] < E[f(Z)] = E[f(Y )].
Theorem 3.14. Let P (Ci) ∼ U [ai, bi], i = 1, 2, . . . , |C| denote uniformly distributed ran-
dom variables for the probabilities of adversarial capabilities Ci. The satisfaction degree of
A with regard to requirement r is decreasing when the random variable P (Co) is replaced
by P (Co)
′ ∼ U [a′o, b′o], with a′o ≥ ao and b′o ≥ bo.
Proof. For P (C1), . . . , P (Co)
′, . . . , P (C|C|), we denote the resulting random variable gen-
erated by f by M ′, and the respective expected value by E[M ′].
By Lemma 3.13 and the fact that the satisfaction degree estimator is decreasing (refer
to Lemma 3.12), we are able to conclude that
E(M ′) = E( f(P (C1), P (C2), . . . , P (Co)′, . . . , P (C|C|)) )
< E( f(P (C1), P (C2), . . . , P (Co), . . . , P (C|C|)) ) = E(M).
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3.7. Summary
Investigating legal provisions for Internet voting systems revealed the lack of a security
evaluation framework for Internet voting schemes that quantitatively measures the enforce-
ment of security requirements in specific election settings. To fill this gap, we constructed
a security evaluation framework for Internet voting schemes that incorporates the election
setting into the evaluation process.
The framework captures a set of legally-founded security requirements for Internet vot-
ing schemes and a set of adversarial capabilities. On the one side, the security requirements
and the adversarial capabilities serve system analysts to analyze Internet voting schemes
qualitatively with regard to their security in an election-independent manner. Further-
more, qualitative security models serve as quality criterion for election-independent im-
provements of Internet voting schemes. On the other side, the adversarial capabilities
allow election officials to specify their election setting in terms of expected adversaries.
On the foundation of qualitative security models of an Internet voting scheme and an elec-
tion setting specification, the framework determines to what extent the scheme enforces
the legally-founded security requirements in the specific election setting.
To substantiate the reasonableness and consequently the value of the constructed secu-
rity evaluation framework, we showed that the framework satisfies a variety of properties
borrowed from the context of mathematical measures. In the absence of adversaries, which
translates to a probability of 0 assigned to all adversarial capabilities, the framework re-
turns the maximum satisfaction degree for all legally-founded security requirements. It
was shown that the satisfaction degree of an Internet voting scheme resistant against
specific adversarial capabilities does not change if the adversary changes with regard to
those capabilities. Furthermore, the framework proves to be continuous and monotone
with regard to adversaries, i.e. small increases (respectively decreases) in the adversarial
capabilities result in small decreases (respectively increases) of the calculated satisfaction
degrees.
Throughout the second part of this thesis, the constructed security evaluation framework
will be used to evaluate two established Internet voting schemes, and to propose and
evaluate improvements of both schemes.
Part II.
Security Evaluation and Improvement
of Internet Voting Schemes

Chapter 4
Foundations for the Evaluation and
Improvement of Internet Voting
Schemes
Part II of this thesis evaluates the security of two established Internet voting schemes and
proposes improvements for both schemes. Both schemes and their respective improvements
build upon cryptographic approaches to enforce legally-founded security requirements.
Throughout this chapter, we first provide the cryptographic foundations for the remainder
of this work. Subsequently, we introduce probabilistic adversaries as basis of the election
settings considered in the later evaluations.
The content of this chapter has been published partially as survey in the book Design,
Development, and Use of Secure Electronic Voting Systems [12] and partially in the journal
Datenschutz und Datensicherheit [23].
4.1. Cryptographic Primitives and Protocols
We provide the reader with cryptographic primitives and protocols underlying the follow-
ing Internet voting schemes and their improvements.
Secret Sharing
Secret sharing allows splitting a secret apart such that individual shares do not allow
conclusions about the secret but a set of shares allows one to reconstruct the secret.
Specification. A secret sharing scheme is a tuple of algorithms (S,R), where S is the
sharing algorithm and R the reconstruction algorithm.
A simple secret sharing scheme can be implemented by the XOR (⊕) operator. Assume
a dealer wants to share secret s among n participants. Then the dealer randomly draws
s1, . . . , sn−1 and computes sn, such that the following equation holds:
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s = s1 ⊕ . . .⊕ sn−1 ⊕ sn
The dealer provides shareholder i with si. If all shareholders release their shares, they
can reconstruct s according to the above definition. One drawback of this technique is
that all shares are needed to reconstruct the shared secret. Hence, the loss of a single
share would prevent the secret from being computed.
Shamir / Feldman Secret Sharing. In contrast to the simplest form of secret sharing, a
(t, n) threshold secret sharing allows reconstructing the secret having t < n shares. Shamir
[Sha79] presents a protocol in which the dealer randomly draws values r1, . . . , rt−1 and
generates a polynom of degree t of the following form
f (x) = s+ r1x+ r2x
2 + . . .+ rt−1xt−1
The dealer computes key shares f (1) , . . . , f (n) and provides each participant i with
her share (i, f(i)) for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. According to the fundamental theorem of algebra,
for an arbitrary t-set of shares (i, f(i)), the polynom f(x) can be reconstructed by the
Lagrange interpolation:
f (x) =
t−1∑
i=0
f(i) ·
∏
j 6=i
x− xj
xi − xj
The secret s is given by the equation s = f(0).
Shamir’s scheme relies on a trusted dealer that has to split the secret properly; otherwise
corrupt shares cannot be identified and composing distinct sets of t shares would result
in distinct reconstructed values. In verifiable secret sharing schemes, the dealer has to
provide proofs that the issued secret shares allow to reconstruct the secret afterwards.
One technique to extend Shamir’s scheme has been proposed by Feldman [Fel87]. Assume
two large primes q, p are given such that q|(p − 1) and a generator g of order q. The
dealer, after generating polynom f(x), commits on this polynom by publishing
gs mod p, gr1 mod p, . . . , grt−1 mod p.
Whenever the dealer issues a share to a shareholder i, this shareholder can verify that
her share was created in the correct way by checking the
gf(i) = gs · gr1·i · gr2·i2 · . . . · grt−1·it−1 mod p.
To reconstruct the secret, each shareholder forwards the proof of the dealer such that
only correct generated shares are used to reconstruct the secret.
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Encryption Schemes
The motivation behind encryption schemes is to encode confidential messages in a way that
the code can be transmitted over insecure channels to the intended reader of the message
such that this person afterwards can decode the received code to obtain the confidential
message.
Specification. Formally, an encryption scheme is a triple of algorithms (G,E,D), where
G is a key generation algorithm, E is the encryption algorithm, and D the correspond-
ing decryption algorithm. Encryption schemes can be asymmetric and symmetric: In
the symmetric case, encryption key e and decryption key d are equal and therefore not
known to the public, while for asymmetric encryption schemes e 6= d and e is known to
the public. Asymmetric encryption schemes can be further classified into deterministic
and probabilistic asymmetric encryption schemes: deterministic schemes map identical
messages to identical ciphertexts, as opposed to probabilistic encryption schemes that in-
tegrate randomness into the encryption procedure such that two encryptions of identical
messages lead to distinct ciphertexts.
There exist a large number of encryption schemes, among which the most important
symmetric schemes are DES (Data Encryption Standard) and AES (Advanced Encryption
Standard). The first asymmetric and one of the most influential deterministic asymmetric
encryption schemes is RSA [RSA78], and well-established probabilistic encryption asym-
metric schemes are ElGamal [Gam85] and Paillier [Pai99].
ElGamal Encryption Scheme. The ElGamal encryption scheme [Gam85] turns out to be
of great value for Internet voting schemes due to its important homomorphic properties.
Homomorphic cryptosystems allow specific functional operations on plaintexts that result
in different functional operations on the corresponding ciphertext. Given two algebraic
groups (P, ⊕) and (C,⊗), then φ is a homomorphic mapping between groups (P,⊕) and
(C,⊗) if for all p1, p2 ∈ P , it follows that
φ (p1 ⊕ p2) = φ (p1)⊗ φ (p2) .
As outlined in the following, the homomorphic character of the ElGamal cryptosystems
allow to implement a number of operations, such as the re-encryption of ciphertexts.
Key Generation. The key generation algorithm outputs a large prime p and a generator
g for the multiplicative group Z∗p . Furthermore, the algorithm outputs a random number
x← {2, . . . , p− 2} as secret key and (g, p, y = gx (mod p)) as public key.
Joint Feldman Distributed Key Generation. We present an adaptation by Gennaro et al.
[GJKR07] of the distributed key generation scheme introduced by Feldman [Fel87]. Goal of
this key generation algorithm is to establish a joint public key such that the corresponding
secret key is not known to anybody.
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1. Participant i generates a polynomial of degree t over Zq,
pi (x) = ai,0 + ai,1x+ . . .+ ai,tx
t,
where ai,0 denotes the shared secret. For each participant j, participant i then
computes xi,j = pi (j) and provides j with that value. Furthermore, i commits on
the generated polynomial pi by publishing the values Xi,k = g
ai,k for all 0 ≤ k ≤ t.
2. Each participant j verifies the shares obtained from all other participants by checking
whether the following equation holds:
gxi,j =
t∏
k=0
Xjki,k mod p
3. The public value is computed by y = ga ·∏ni=1 Xi,0 mod p, while the secret value
can be computed as x = a+
∑n
i=1 xi,0 mod p.
Encryption. Given a public key (g, p, y), a message m ← {0, . . . , p − 1} is encrypted
with randomness r ← {2, . . . , p− 2} in the following way:
(c1, c2) = (g
r, m · yr) mod p
Decryption. Given a ciphertext (c1, c2) encrypted under public key (g, p, y), message m
is reconstructed as follows:
m = c2 · c−x1
Homomorphic Property. The ElGamal encryption scheme provides an important property
for Internet voting schemes, namely it is homomorphic. Given two ElGamal ciphertexts
ci = (g
r,m1 · yr) and cj = (gs,m2 · ys) for messages m1,m2, it holds that ci · cj is a valid
ciphertext of message m1 ·m2 as shown below.
c = ci · cj = (gr,m1 · yr) · (gs,m2 · ys) =
(
gr+s,m1 ·m2 · yr+s
)
mod p
For Internet voting, it might be more useful to add messages rather than multiplying
them. Therefore, the ElGamal encryption scheme has been extended towards additive
homomorphism. The resulting scheme is called Exponential ElGamal [CGS97] and ci-
phertexts consequently have the following form:
(c1, c2) = (g
r, gm · yr) mod p
It can easily be seen that the multiplication of individual ciphertexts results in the
addition of the underlying plaintexts.
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c = ci · cj = (gr, gm1 · yr) · (gs, gm2 · ys) =
(
gr+s, gm1+m2 · yr+s) mod p
It should be noted that decryption of this ciphertext does not immediately result in m,
but rather in gm. Finally, the discrete logarithm of gm1+m2 must be computed, which is
only feasible for small exponents.
Re-encryption. Given a ciphertext (c1, c2) = (g
r, m · yr) mod p encrypted under public
key (p, g, y), this ciphertext can be re-encrypted using randomness s← {2, . . . , p− 2}
in the following way:
(
c′1, c
′
2
)
= (gr · gs, m · yr · ys) mod p
The concept of re-encryption is extended to a set of ciphertexts encrypted under the
same public key in a straight-forward manner.
Distributed Decryption. So far, the concept of distributed key generation has been ab-
stract. The concept proves, however, to be of great importance to distributed decryption.
In distributed decryption, a ciphertext is partially decrypted by participants such that the
partial decryption can be used to reconstruct the plaintext based on the Lagrange inter-
polation. Let an ElGamal ciphertext c = (c1, c2) be given. Throughout the decryption
phase, participant i applies her secret key share xi and computes her partial decryption
c1 (i) = c
xi
1
and publishes a proof showing that
c1 (i) = xi = yi.
If the participant’s proof does not convince the majority of participants, they decide to
reconstruct her secret key share in a distributed way relying on the Lagrange interpolation
of the committed shares of the secret key shares of participant i. The honest participants
are capable of reconstructing xi and hence c1 (i) = c
xi
1 .
Once, all participants’ partial decryptions c1 (i) are available, the plaintext is recon-
structed as:
m =
c2∏n
i=1 c1 (i)
Digital Signatures
The goal of signature schemes is to ensure the integrity and authenticity of messages with
respect to the sender as well as non-repudiation.
Specification. A signature scheme is a triple of algorithms (G,S, V ), where G is a key
generation algorithm, S is the signing algorithm, and V the verification algorithm.
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RSA Signature. The key generation, signing, and verification processes of the RSA sig-
nature scheme are described.
Key Generation. Given two large primes p, q, two values n = p · q and ϕ (n) = (p− 1) ·
(q − 1) are computed. A value e with 1 < e < ϕ(n) co-prime to ϕ (n) is randomly chosen
and d is determined such that
e · d ≡ 1 mod ϕ (n) .
The verification key is (e, n), the signing key is d.
Signing. Given the signing key d, a message m < n is signed according to the following
equation:
s = md mod n
Verification. Given a verification key (e, n), signature s on message m is valid if the
following equation holds:
se = m mod n
Zero-Knowledge Proof Systems
Zero-knowledge (ZK) proof systems are the cryptographic tool to prove the validity of
statements without revealing anything beyond the validity of this statement.
Specification. A ZK proof system is given by a tuple of algorithms (P, V ), where P is
the prover of statements and V is the verifier of these statements. A ZK proof system
for given language L satisfies three properties: 1) each valid statement can be proven
(completeness), 2) no invalid statements can be proven (soundness), a malicious verifier
does not learn anything beyond the validity of the statement (zero-knowledge). In the
context of Internet voting, there exist numerous specific ZK proofs, e.g. designated-verifier
proofs, proof of equality of discrete logarithms, 1-out-of-L encryption proofs, disjunctive
proof of equality between discrete logarithms. We refer the interested reader to Smith
[Smi05] for detailed information.
Proof of Knowledge of Discrete Logarithm. Schnorr [Sch90] invented a protocol to
prove the knowledge of discrete logarithm. Given basis g ← Zp, value y ← Zp, the prover
wants prove that she knows l such that y = gl where g and y are publicly known. The
protocol is summarized as follows:
1. The prover randomly draws r ← Zp and outputs a = gr
2. The verifier randomly draws c← Zp and outputs c
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3. The prover computes z = r + l · c and outputs z
4. The verifier checks if gz = a · yc
Homomorphic Tallying
One typical application of homomorphic encryption schemes are Internet voting schemes
that implement homomorphic tallying. In that approach, rather than decrypting individ-
ual votes in the tallying phase, first the encrypted sum of all encrypted votes is computed
and thereafter decrypted. Due to the homomorphism of the encryption scheme, the sum
of encrypted votes equals the encryption of the sum of votes, i.e. the encryption of the
election result. Thereby, neither the public, nor any service provider learn complete votes
as cast by voters.
In the simplest case of referendum (Yes/No election), homomorphic encryption schemes
can be implemented in a straightforward manner. First voter i makes her selection vi ∈
{0, 1} and encrypts her selection with the public election key pk distributively shared
between independent service providers. The voter thereafter binds her authentication
data to her encrypted vote, e.g. by posting her name together with {vi}ripk on the bulletin
board. The voter furthermore provides a ZK proof that her vote is a valid vote in order
to prevent malicious voters from over-voting (i.e., a proof showing that vi ∈ {0, 1}). The
voter can convince herself that her vote was stored in an unaltered way on the bulletin
board by checking if her name appears next to her encrypted vote and the corresponding
proof.
In the tallying phase, the public can calculate the encrypted result by multiplying the
encrypted individual votes.
R = {v1}r1pk · . . . · {vn}rnpk .
The result can be computed by decrypting the product R with the corresponding secret
key; hence
r = D (sk,R) .
Finally, the service providers prove that they properly decrypted, i.e. that they de-
crypted the product of encrypted votes with the proper secret shares by generating a ZK
proof of correct decryption based on a ZK proof of equality of discrete logarithms.
Iterative Cut-and-Choose Verification
If an homomorphic encryption scheme is in place to encrypt votes, malicious voting devices
might encrypt votes differently than intended by the voters. Assume a user intends to
encrypt message m with a public encryption key pk using the ElGamal encryption scheme
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in an arbitrary Internet voting scheme. Then, in accordance to the encryption algorithm,
the system draws randomly r ← {2, . . . , p− 2} and computes
(c1, c2) = (g
r,m · yr) mod p.
The question arises how the user can be sure that the system encrypted the right value,
anyway the output will be indistinguishable by definition for all input values. To counter
this threat, Benaloh [Ben06] proposed a concept to prove the integrity of probabilistic
vote encryptions in a ZK proof manner: After encrypting m, the system commits on the
encryption process by providing the user with a cryptographic hash H (c1, c2). The user
thereafter (unpredictably) decides if she audits or accepts the encryption process of the
device. If she decides to audit the process, the device returns the randomness r. The user
can verify the correct encryption by computing (c′1, c′2) = (gr,m · yr) mod p locally or
with the help of an external institution and checks whether H (c1, c2) = H (c
′
1, c
′
2). After
the verification process, the voter cannot use the audited ciphertext because, depending on
the scheme, the obtained randomization factor could serve as proof about her vote. The
voter might consequently become target of attacks or might sell her vote to vote buyers.
The voter can repeat the cut-and-choose verification process an arbitrary number of times.
Once, the voter is convinced about the fact that the voting device correctly encrypts the
actual vote, the voter does not audit the encryption process and casts the encrypted vote.
Code Voting
The concept of code voting goes back to Chaum’s SureVote [Cha01]. The goal of code
voting is to enforce vote secrecy against compromised voting devices. To deploy code
voting, in the pre-voting phase, unique code sheets for all eligible voters are generated: a
code sheet contains the code sheet ID and a two-column table, where each candidate has a
voting code assigned. A typical code sheet is shown in Figure 4.1. After their generation,
Code Sheet ID: 34255
Candidate Voting Code
Alice 51948
Bob 23766
Eve 41948
Figure 4.1: Code sheet for the application of code voting.
the code sheets are assigned and issued to voters and furthermore issued to the service
provider in charge of collecting votes. The voter must not receive her code sheet over her
voting device, to prevent the voting devices from learning valid voting codes. In the voting
phase, the voter casts her vote by sending the code sheet ID and the voting code next
to the preferred candidate to the service provider in charge of collecting votes. In case a
voter, who possesses the code sheet shown in Figure 4.1, intends to cast a vote for Alice,
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she would submit the ballot ID, namely 34255, and the voting code next to Alice, namely
51948. The service provider re-interprets the code, identifies the selected candidate and
stores a vote for that candidate. Because a compromised voting device does not know
which candidate is represented by the voting code, the voting device cannot break vote
secrecy.
Return Codes
Return codes represent the vote integrity-enhancing counterpart of code voting. Consider
again the code sheet shown in Figure 4.1. In the case of return codes, the voting codes
play the role of return codes, resulting in a sheet as shown in Figure 4.2. In order to
cast her vote, depending on the concrete scheme, the voter expresses her preference either
directly on her voting device via the user interface or via a voting code in the case of
code voting. After the voter has expressed her preference, the vote is transmitted to the
central system components which interpret the supposed voter intention and determine
the corresponding return code. This code is subsequently returned to the voter. Because
of the fact that the voting device does not know the voter’s return codes, the device might
only show the received return code, i.e. the return code associated to the cast intention.
In case the device tampered with the vote, the device is not able to provide the voter with
the expected return code.
Code Sheet ID: 34255
Candidate Return Code
Alice 71468
Bob 53286
Eve 35468
Figure 4.2: Code sheet for the application of return codes.
Independent Verification Devices
One further approach to prevent compromised voting devices from vote tampering is to
incorporate logically independent devices for verifying the correctness of the vote encryp-
tion process. Since 2013, this approach is implemented in the Estonian Internet voting
scheme [HW14]. We explain the use of independent verification devices on the Estonian
example. After the voter has expressed her intention over the user-interface, the voting
device encrypts the designated voter intention with a probabilistic encryption algorithm.
Analogously to the Benaloh challenge approach, the device temporarily stores the used
encryption randomness. The signed ciphertext is transmitted to the central components
of the voting system. The system assigns a unique identifier to the received ciphertext
and stores the signed ciphertext under the respective identifier. The unique identifier is
returned to the voting device which presents the identifier and the randomness in form of a
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quick response (QR) code to the voter. The voter has the possibility to read the QR code
with an application ran on an independent verification device, e.g. a smart phone. The
application decodes the QR code and queries the central system to release the signed ci-
phertext stored under the transmitted identifier and all voting options. Upon reception of
the data, the verification application on the independent verification device exploratively
encrypts all voting options with the randomness provided by the voting device and com-
pares the resulting ciphertexts with the ciphertext received from the central system. After
one voting option results in a match of ciphertexts, the respective voting option is shown
to the voter. The voter decides whether the output voting option corresponds to her
intention.
4.2. Probabilistic Adversaries
In preparation for the quantitative security evaluation within the following chapters, we
construct four probabilistic adversaries. A summary of the adversaries is provided in Table
4.110.
In the remainder of this work, we consider only adversaries that have full control over the
communication channel between voting devices and service providers and between service
providers. Hence, all adversaries have the capability CCH with a probability of 1 (U[1, 1]).
Furthermore, we do not consider adversaries that are computationally unrestricted, as this
mainly concerns the functions layer of Internet voting systems. Hence, adversaries have
the capability CR with a probability of 0 (U[0, 0]). Both capabilities are therefore not
explicitly outlined throughout the evaluation.
The first adversary compromises with relatively high probability (U[0.01, 0.1]) either one
voting device or is able to control the voter in any sense (sending objects/data to the voter,
receiving objects/data from the voter, or controlling the channel between voter and voter
device). With lower probability (U[0.001, 0.002]) the adversary is able to compromise an
online service provider and with the lowest probability (U[0.0001, 0.0002]) the adversary
succeeds in compromising an oﬄine service provider. Building upon the first adversary,
we define three adversaries with dedicated strengths.
The second adversary is a reinforcement of the first adversary with regard to voting
device corruption. As opposed to the distribution U[0.01, 0.1], the second adversary com-
promises voting devices with a probability between 0.1 and 0.2 (U[0.1, 0.2]).
The third adversary is particularly strong with regard to compromising either online ser-
vice providers (reinforced from U[0.001, 0.002] to U[0.01, 0.02]) or oﬄine service providers
(reinforced from U[0.0001, 0.0002] to U[0.001, 0.002]).
Furthermore, we define one adversary that is reinforced (from U[0.01, 0.1] to U[0.1, 0.2])
with regard to influencing voters, either in sending objects or data to the adversary,
receiving objects or data from the adversary, or controlling the channel between a voter
10U [a, b] refers to the uniform distribution with support a and b.
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and her voting device(s).
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E1 U[0.01, 0.1] U[0.001, 0.002] U[0.0001, 0.0002] U[0.01, 0.1] U[0.01, 0.1] U[0.01, 0.1]
E2 U[0.1, 0.2] U[0.001, 0.002] U[0.0001, 0.0002] U[0.01, 0.1] U[0.01, 0.1] U[0.01, 0.1]
E3 U[0.01, 0.1] U[0.01, 0.02] U[0.001, 0.002] U[0.01, 0.1] U[0.01, 0.1] U[0.01, 0.1]
E4 U[0.01, 0.1] U[0.001, 0.002] U[0.0001, 0.0002] U[0.1, 0.2] U[0.1, 0.2] U[0.1, 0.2]
Table 4.1: On the basis of one adversary model, we define three adversary models with dedicated strengths.
Chapter 5
The Polyas Internet Voting Scheme as
Applied for the GI 2011 Elections
The Polyas Internet voting scheme has been invented in 1996 and since then is provided
by the German companies Micromata Ltd.11 and Polyas Ltd.12 To date, the scheme has
been used to conduct numerous Internet-based elections in a variety of contexts [OSV11].
Among those, there are University elections, e.g. the elections of the council of the Grad-
uate Academy at the Friedrich-Schiller-Universita¨t Jena, elections in companies, e.g. the
Found Board elections of the SwissLife, and elections in private associations, e.g. the
Review Board elections of the German Science Foundation. With approximately 2,2 mil-
lions cast votes [NVS+15], the Polyas Internet voting scheme represents one of the most
established Internet voting schemes in the German-speaking world.
The first section of this chapter provides an overview about the Polyas scheme as applied
for the elections held by the Gesellschaft fu¨r Informatik e.V. (GI, engl. German Informat-
ics Society), in the year 2011. We determine qualitative security models of the original
scheme in the second section of this chapter. Based on the qualitative security models,
we propose an improvement of the scheme with regard to vote integrity in the third sec-
tion. Afterwards, we determine the qualitative security models of the extended scheme.
Subsequently, we first compare the qualitative security models of both schemes, before
the security of both schemes is quantitatively compared in different election settings. The
chapter is concluded with a summary of our findings.
Parts of this chapter have been published in the journal Datenschutz und Datensicherheit
[23].
5.1. Original Scheme
The components involved in the voting process are outlined in the first part of this section.
Afterwards, we describe the protocol underlying the voting scheme as applied for the GI
11https://www.micromata.de/en/home/
12https://www.polyas.de/
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2011 elections.
5.1.1. Components
The Polyas voting scheme comprises the following components:
Generation Server (GS). Due to the lack of publicly available information regarding
its implementation, we describe the GS as an abstract component. Given the abstract
interpretation, we do not consider the GS throughout the security evaluation. The GS
is in charge of generating voting credentials for all eligible voters and providing these
credentials to the printing service, the electoral registry server, and the validation server.
Printing Service (PS). The PS is in charge of printing and forwarding the voting cre-
dentials to the voters. The PS operates in an oﬄine manner.
Electoral Registry Server (ERS). In mutual control with the validation server (the VS ),
the ERS processes voters’ queries and provides voters with voting tokens upon successful
verification of their eligibility. The ERS operates in an online manner.
Validation Server (VS). In mutual control with the ERS, the VS processes voters’
queries and provides voters with voting tokens upon successful verification of their eli-
gibility. The VS operates in an oﬄine manner.
Ballot Box Server (BBS). The BBS provides voters with the digital ballot, collects filled
ballots, and stores these ballots throughout the voting phase. The BBS operates in an
online manner.
Tallying Component (TC). The TC is in charge of generating the cryptographic key
material for the election and decrypting encrypted votes in the tallying phase. The TC
operates in an oﬄine manner.
Voting Device (VD). Each voter has one voting device at her disposal over which she
fills the digital ballot and casts her vote.
5.1.2. Ballot of the GI 2011 Elections
In the GI 2011 elections, two races were held simultaneously13, namely the election of the
presiding council and the election of the management board.
Within the election of the presiding council, five candidates were available. Each voter
had the possibility to vote for at most three candidates. In addition, each voter had the
13Refer to the GI 2011 elections website: https://www.gi.de/index.php?id=4165
5.1. Original Scheme 87
possibility to spoil her ballot, either by over-voting or by explicitly selecting the spoil ballot
option.
Within the election of the management board, four candidates were available. Each
voter had the possibility to give a yes or no vote for each candidate, or not expressing
her preference for a candidate at all. Additionally, each voter had the option to spoil her
ballot, either by giving a yes and no vote for any candidate or by explicitly selecting the
spoil ballot option.
5.1.3. Protocol Description
We present the protocol conducted between the voter and different components of the
Internet voting scheme. Throughout the protocol description, we consider an extension
of the protocol proposed by Olembo et al. [OSV11], which improves the scheme towards
integrity by introducing partial verifiability into the scheme. For the ease of readability
and to delineate previous contributions from our own contributions, we will refer to this
adapted scheme as the original Polyas scheme. We consider components of the scheme
to operate in independent manner. To propagate this aspect to the system layer, the
components have to be implemented and hosted by independent providers.
Setup Phase. All involved service providers generate SSL/TLS and signature keys and
publish the respective public keys. Furthermore, the public keys of service providers that
interact with voters are provided to the voters14. The GS generates voting TANs (trans-
action numbers) for all eligible voters. Each voting TAN is subsequently cryptographically
hashed and assigned to one voter ID, i.e. the identification number over which the voter
is identifiable by the election holding association, implemented by the ERS. The voter IDs
and the respective hashed voting TANs are subsequently transmitted for further usage to
the ERS. Additionally, the hashed voting TANs are transmitted for further usage to the
VS. Together with voting TANs, the names and addresses of voters to which these TANs
are assigned, are forwarded to the PS. The PS prepares voting materials for all eligible
voters, packs those materials into sealed envelopes, and sends those envelopes to voters
via postal mail. The TC generates an asymmetric election key pair (pk, sk) and sends the
public election key to the BBS. The secret key is stored within the TC. Furthermore, the
digital ballot is stored within the BBS. The protocol steps of the Polyas setup phase are
depicted in Figure 5.1.
Voting Phase. Upon reception of the voting materials, the checks checks integrity of the
sealed envelopes. To start the voting process, the voter visits the website of the ERS.
The voter authenticates herself by providing her ID and her voting TAN to the ERS. The
ERS hashes the received voting TAN and matches the hash value against the entry for the
14For the ease of readability, we omit the key exchange in the sequence diagram. For the same reason, we
omit the fact that channels between voting device(s) and service providers are authentic and confidential.
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GS ERS VS PS TC BBS V
all i: Generate tan(i) 
 all i: Compute hash(tan(i))
all i: hash(tan(i))
all i: hash(tan(i))
all i: (addr(i), tan(i))
Generate (sk,pk)
pk
addr(i), tan(i)
Figure 5.1: Setup phase of the original Polyas Internet voting scheme.
respective voter in the internal database. If this match succeeds, the server forwards the
received voting TAN to the VS. Analogously to the ERS, the VS hashes the received voting
TAN and compares the hash value against the internal database. If this check succeeds,
the VS generates a random voting token for the respective voting TAN. The voting token
is subsequently forwarded to the BBS and the ERS. The latter forwards the voting token
to the voter and in turn forwards the voter to the BBS. The voter presents her voting
token. The BBS checks the voter’s eligibility by verifying whether the presented voting
token has previously been issued by the VS. If so, the BBS issues the ballot to the voter.
The voter fills the ballot according to her preferences and returns the filled ballot to the
BBS. For the sake of re-assurance, the BBS returns the filled ballot to the voter, encrypts
the ballot with the public election key, and caches the resulting ciphertext. If the voter
confirms her selection, the BBS deletes the voting token and stores the encrypted ballot
for the tallying phase.15 For the purpose of improving vote secrecy, the BBS stores the
ballot in a disassembled manner, as proposed by Olembo et al. [OKNV12]. The protocol
steps of the Polyas voting phase are depicted in Figure 5.2.
Tallying Phase. After the voting phase has been terminated, the encrypted ballots stored
within the BBS are transmitted to the TC. The authorities hosting the TC initiate the
decryption process for all encrypted votes that were confirmed and cast by eligible voters.
The TC decrypts these votes. Ultimately, the number of registered voters in the ERS
and the VS, the encrypted votes stored by the BBS, and the decryption key of the TC
are published. Any observer can use the tool developed by Olembo et al. to partially
verify the election. The tool decrypts the encrypted votes and provides the user with the
obtained election result. The user compares the result obtained from the verification tool
to the result announced by the TC. The protocol steps of the Polyas tallying phase are
depicted in Figure 5.3.
15The original Polyas definition foresees the incorporation of a hash chain mechanism. However, this
mechanism allows the ERS to violate vote secrecy. For a specific voter, the ERS can link that voter’s
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V VD ERS VS BBS
id(i), tan(i)
id(i), tan(i)
Verify hash(tan(i)) 
 against database
tan(i)
Verify hash(tan(i)) 
 against database
Generate token(i)
token(i)
token(i)
token(i)
token(i)
Verify whether token(i) is valid
ballot
ballot
cand(i)
cand(i)
Store Enc(cand(i),r(i),pk) in cache
cand(i)
cand(i)
ack
ack
Store Enc(cand(i),r(i),pk) for tallying
Figure 5.2: Voting phase of the original Polyas Internet voting scheme.
BBS TC ERS VS
Enc(cand(1),r(1),pk), ..., Enc(cand(n),r(n),pk)
Decrypt 
Enc(cand(1),r(1),pk), ..., Enc(cand(n),r(n),pk)
Publish election result 
and secret key sk
Publish number of 
registered voters
Publish number of 
registered voters
Figure 5.3: Tallying phase of the original Polyas Internet voting scheme.
vote to a set of 30 votes.
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5.2. Qualitative Security Models of the Original Scheme
On the foundation of Polyas scheme descriptions [RJ07, MR10, VG09, OSV11] and in-
formal protocol analysis, we take the role of system analysts and determine qualitative
security models of the Polyas Internet voting scheme. In the remainder of this section, we
outline which capabilities an adversary allow to cause impact on security requirements. An
overview of the result is given in Table 5.1. Recall that we make the general assumption
that anything that can be verified is verified.
Vote Secrecy. Corrupting or controlling the following components and/or channels al-
lows the adversary to violate vote secrecy.
Voting Device. The voting device knows the voter’s identity. Additionally, throughout
the voting phase, the voter enters her preference on her voting device. Hence, the voting
device is able to relate the voter’s identity to her preference. As a result, compromised
voting devices can violate vote secrecy of the vote cast over that devices.
Channel between Voter and her Voting Device. The Polyas scheme does not incorporate
measures upholding vote secrecy of voters that are observed during the vote casting pro-
cess. Consequently, an adversary observing the channel between the voter and her voting
device is able to violate vote secrecy of one vote.
Printing Service, Validation Server, and Ballot Box Server. Throughout the voting phase,
the VS learns the relation between a voter’s voting TAN and her voting token. On the one
side, the VS ’s knowledge can be combined with the PS ’s knowledge which assembles the
relation between voters’ identities and their respective voting TANs to establish the link
between the voter identity and the voting token. On the other side, the VS ’s knowledge
can be combined with the BBS ’s knowledge to incorporate the relation between the voting
token and the selected voting option. Consequently, the malicious collaboration of all three
components results in the violation of vote secrecy. The malicious collaboration of these
components results in a violation of vote secrecy of all votes.
Electoral Registry Server and Ballot Box Server. After the voter has been registered by
the ERS and obtained a voting token generated by the VS throughout the voting phase,
the ERS knows the relation between the voter’s identity and her voting token. The voter
uses that token to cast her vote to the BBS, thereby proving her eligibility to the BBS.
Consequently, maliciously combining the BBS ’s knowledge with knowledge of the ERS
would lead to the violation of vote secrecy of all votes.
Vote Integrity. Corrupting the following components allows the adversary to violate vote
integrity.
Voting Device. The original Polyas scheme does not incorporate mechanisms that prevent
or make the violation of vote integrity by compromised voting devices detectable. As a
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result, a compromised voting device can alter votes cast over that device undetectably.
Computationally unrestricted and Communication Channel. An adversary controlling
the channel between the voting device and the BBS and furthermore capable of breaking
cryptographic primitives can violate the security guarantees of authenticated and confi-
dential communication channels. Hence, the adversary is able to intercept and alter in an
undetectable manner the communication between the voting device and the BBS.
Ballot Box Server. The BBS is able to alter votes undetectably right after votes have
been submitted by voters and before storing them in the ballot box. Thereby, the BBS
can violate integrity of all votes.
Eligibility. Corrupting or controlling the following components and/or channels allows
the adversary to violate eligibility.
Voter Output. In the setup phase, each voter receives her voting credentials, i.e. the
voting TAN which she can use together with her voter ID to cast her vote. If voters
are under adversarial influence and try to forward their right to vote, they can do so by
forwarding their voting credentials. Hence, a voter forwarding her voting credentials to
the adversary enables the adversary to cast one ineligible vote.
Electoral Registry Server and Validation Server. The ERS and the VS control each other
to some extent. If the ERS does not forward a valid voting TAN to the VS, the VS does
not generate a voting token. If on the other side, the VS forwards a voting token to an
ineligible voter without that voter having presented a valid voting TAN to the ERS, the
ERS detects a discrepancy between the number of registered voter and the number of cast
votes which allows the ERS to pinpoint the voting token illegitimately generated by the
VS. However, if both components maliciously cooperate, they are able to cast votes for
abstaining voters, thereby violating eligibility of all voters abstaining from the election.
Electoral Registry Server and Printing Service. The ERS can circumvent the VS ’s col-
laboration to violate eligibility if it knows valid voting TANs for all abstaining voters. The
PS knows these voting TANs. Compromising the PS and the ERS allows an adversary
consequently to cast votes for abstaining voters, thereby violating eligibility.
Fairness. Corrupting or controlling the following components and/or channels allows the
adversary to violate fairness.
Voting Device. Analogously to the vote secrecy case, voting devices learn voters’ selection
throughout the voting phase. As a consequence, compromised voting devices are able to
learn partial election results, thereby violating fairness of the vote cast over that device.
Channel between Voter and her Voting Device. Analogously to the vote secrecy case, a
voter observed throughout the voting phase is not able to override her selection. Hence,
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an adversary observing the channel between the voter and her voting device is able to
violate fairness of one vote.
Ballot Box Server. Throughout the voting phase, the voter casts her vote via the BBS ’s
web-interface to the BBS. In spite of the fact that the connection between the voting device
and the BBS is secured, the BBS receives the plaintext vote. Hence, a compromised BBS
is able to deduce complete intermediate results, thereby violating fairness.
Computationally unrestricted and Communication Channel. If an adversary is capable
of controlling the communication channel between the voting device and the BBS and
is capable of breaking cryptographic primitives, then the adversary can determine the
content of encrypted messages, thereby violating fairness.
Data Access Protection. The following components are capable of causing violations of
data access protection.
Voting Device. Because of the fact that voting devices are generally used for a number of
purposes, voting devices know the voters’ identities. A compromised voting device might
consequently forward a voter’s identity to the adversary.
Electoral Registry Server. In advance to the election, the ERS stores the electoral register
including voters’ IDs and hashed voting TANs. In case of corruption, the ERS can provide
voter data to the adversary.
Printing Service. The PS is in charge of providing voters with voting materials. Hence,
the PS learns both voter identities and voting TANs. If the PS is compromised, it can
provide voter data to the adversary.
Discussion. The qualitative security models reveal a variety of shortcomings of the Polyas
scheme.
In its first version [RJ07], to enforce vote integrity, the Polyas scheme relies on the as-
sumption that the TC correctly decrypts votes throughout the tallying phase. Olembo et
al. [OSV11] addressed this limitation by incorporating verifiability mechanisms. In spite of
the fact that the measure proposed by Olembo et al. mitigates the risk of vote integrity vi-
olations, the enforcement of vote integrity builds upon the assumption that voting devices
are not compromised. In fact, it turns out that four out of five legally-founded security
requirements build upon the assumption that voting devices are not compromised. The
criticality of this assumption is more and more prevalent both from a technical and legal
perspective. According to the quarterly PandaLabs security report [Pan15], more than
32% of computers worldwide are infected by malware. The criticality of infected personal
voting devices has also been emphasized within a recent report by WebRoots Democracy
[Web16]. Legislators start taking this aspect into account and release corresponding legal
regulations. For instance, regulations released by the Swiss Federal Councillor put their
focus on the introduction of verifiable voting systems for the purpose of increasing vote
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integrity16. Primarily this focus refers to the voters’ possibility to detect manipulations
on their own vote, i.e. individual verifiability. Given the fact that the Polyas scheme is
currently under Common Criteria certification, the herein proposed extension shall main-
tain processes, and particularly voter processes, as much as possible. Due to this practical
constraint and the general tendency towards improving vote integrity with regard to com-
promised voting devices, our extension targets at enforcing vote integrity in the presence
of compromised voting devices. Hence, we incorporate a verifiability mechanism into the
Polyas voting scheme. The mechanism shall allow voters to detect vote manipulations by
compromised voting devices.
Requirement Qualitative Security Models Impact
Vote Integrity
(∨
I⊆{1,...,n},|I|≥l(
∧
i∈I V Di)
)
∨BBS ∨ (CR ∧ CCH) 1 ≤ l ≤ n
Eligibility
(∨
I⊆{1,...,n},|I|≥l(
∧
i∈I VOi)
)
∨ (ERS ∧ V S) ∨ (ERS ∧ PS) 1 ≤ l ≤ n
Fairness
(∨
I⊆{1,...,n},|I|≥l(
∧
i∈I V Di)
)
∨(∨
I⊆{1,...,n},|I|≥l(
∧
i∈I HCHi)
)
∨BBS ∨ (CR ∧ CCH) 1 ≤ l ≤ n
Vote Secrecy (ERS ∧BBS) ∨ (PS ∧ V S ∧BBS)∨(∨
I⊆{1,...,n},|I|≥l(
∧
i∈I V Di)
)
∨(∨
I⊆{1,...,n},|I|≥l(
∧
i∈I HCHi)
)
∨ 1 ≤ l ≤ n
Data Access
Protection
(∨
I⊆{1,...,n},|I|≥l(
∧
i∈I V Di)
)
∨ PS ∨ ERS 1 ≤ l ≤ n
Table 5.1: Qualitative security models of the original Polyas Internet voting scheme.
5.3. Addressing Vote Integrity Vulnerabilities Caused by
Compromised Voting Devices
The qualitative security models of the original Polyas scheme unveil that vote integrity is
threatened in the presence of compromised voting devices. This section is dedicated to the
improvement of the original Polyas voting scheme in that regard. We therefore first review
related works on the improvement of the Polyas Internet voting scheme. Subsequently,
we review approaches to prevent successful integrity violations caused by compromised
voting devices (refer to Section 4.1) and determine the most appropriate approach for the
Polyas scheme. Eventually, we show how the approach is embedded into the Polyas voting
scheme.
16Refer to https://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-compilation/20132343/index.html
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5.3.1. Related Work
In preparation of this work, all works that cite the original Polyas paper [RJ07] have been
sight. Three works propose an extension of the original Polyas system [MR10, OSV11,
OKNV12]. Menke and Reinhard [MR10] introduce one further component into the original
Polyas system, the Committee Tool. The tool fundamentally implements trust distribution
on the authority layer above Internet voting schemes. The extension is therefore not
relevant to our contribution. The extensions proposed by Olembo et al. [OSV11, OKNV12]
have been incorporated into our description of the original Polyas scheme.
5.3.2. Feasibility of Cast-as-Intended Verifiability Approaches for Polyas
To extend the Polyas Internet voting scheme towards the enforcement of vote integrity
in the presence of compromised voting devices, the feasibility of different approaches to
deploy cast-as-intended-verifiability (refer to Section 4.1) is investigated. Thereby, special
attention is given to the constraint that extending the Polyas scheme towards cast-as-
intended verifiability shall maintain processes and voter experiences as much as possible.
Independent verification devices. The application of independent verification devices re-
quires the voter to possess independent computing devices, e.g. a smartphone. This
extension would change the voter experience significantly. Furthermore, independent soft-
ware solutions for these devices have to be developed and provided to the voters. We
therefore do not consider the incorporation of independent verification devices into the
Polyas scheme.
Iterative cut-and-choose-verification. From a cryptographic perspective, the application of
iterative cut-and-choose verification is a promising approach and has found its application
in several elections running the Helios voting scheme. The advantage of this approach
is that besides vote integrity, the underlying encryption process by its very nature also
enforces vote secrecy to a high degree: a voter does neither obtain a receipt about her
vote nor do any central components learn the voter’s intention. In spite of the fact that
vote verification shall be conducted on an independent verification device, one further
substantial shortcoming of this approach is the significant involvement of voters in the
vote verification process; voters shall conduct vote verification an unpredictable number
of times to achieve reasonable integrity assurance. Because both facts fundamentally
change the vote casting process, cut-and-choose verification does not comply with the
constraint that processes and voter experiences shall largely remain untouched from the
extension.
Return codes. We opt for adapting return codes as means improve vote integrity with
regard to compromised voting devices. This decision is substantiated by the fact that on
the one hand, no special hardware or software is required on the voter-side, the scheme
adaption is relatively small, and the use of simple codes for the purpose of security is
relatively well-known, e.g. from the online banking context and the increasing application
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of two-factor authentication. Furthermore, this decision is justified by the fact that voters
in the GI setting authenticate themselves with TANs. Consequently, we expect the use of
short codes for the sake of vote verification a relatively small adaptation for voters.
5.3.3. Deployment of Cast-as-Intended Verifiability in Polyas
For the integration of return codes into the Polyas scheme, the setup and voting phases
are slightly modified.
Setup Phase. Prior to the election, the ERS generates for each voter an ordered list of
random codes, such that each code can be associated to one voting option. Additionally,
the ERS generates for each voter one oﬄine authentication code. All random codes are
encrypted with the public key of the BBS and stored for further processing throughout
the voting phase. The ERS forwards these codes to the PS which associates one list
of ordered codes plus oﬄine authentication code to each voter. The codes are printed,
while the oﬄine authentication code is printed under a scratch field. In addition to the
authentication material (see Section 5.1.3), the codes are issued to the voter. The revised
setup phase of the Polyas scheme is depicted in Figure 5.4.
GS ERS VS PS TC BBS V
all i: Generate tan(i) 
 all i: Compute hash(tan(i))
all i: hash(tan(i))
all i: hash(tan(i))
all i: (addr(i), tan(i))
all i,j: Generate return(i,j)
all i,j: return(i,j)
Generate (sk,pk)
pk
all j: addr(i), tan(i), return(i,j)
Figure 5.4: Setup phase of the extended Polyas voting scheme.
Voting Phase. After authenticating towards the ERS and the VS, in addition to a voting
token the voter receives the list of encrypted return codes and the oﬄine authentication
code generated by the ERS within the setup phase. In addition to her voting option, the
voter forwards the list of encrypted codes to the BBS. After interpreting the supposed
voter intention, the BBS decrypts the list of encrypted codes and returns the voter the
return code(s) assigned to the interpreted voting intentions. The return codes are shown
in editable text fields, such that voters can easily override these codes if necessary, e.g. if
an adversary requests them to prepare a screenshot with a specific return code. To support
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the cast-as-intended verification process, the ERS preserves the link between voter and
assigned voting token, the BBS preserves the link between voting token and the cast ballot.
Upon reception of the return code(s), the voter matches the code(s) against the return
code(s) assigned to her voting option(s) on her code sheet. In the case of the GI 2011
election, voters might distribute at most eight votes within the two ballots. Consequently,
the voter would receive at most eight return codes, one for each individual selected option.
If the codes match, the voter is convinced that her intention has not been tampered with
and arrived in an unaltered manner. The ERS and the BBS discard the preserved links
after a specified time and the BBS stores the encrypted ballot for the tallying phase. If
the codes do not match, the voter has the possibility to consult a service center of the
authority running the ERS. Therefore, the voter opens her oﬄine authentication code
(which is printed under a scratch field), authenticates towards the service center by means
of the authentication code and requests to remove the vote cast in her name. The ERS
identifies the voting token associated to the voter and sends a queries the BBS to remove
the vote assigned to the respective voting token. The ERS reactivates the voting process
to the voter. The revised voting phase of the Polyas scheme is depicted in Figure 5.5.
5.4. Qualitative Security Models of the Extended Scheme
In analogy to Section 5.2, we take the role of system analysts and investigate to which
extent the qualitative security models of the original Polyas scheme are affected by the
proposed extension. Recall that we make the general assumption that anything which can
be verified is verified.
A summary of the qualitative security models of the extended Polyas scheme is presented
in Table 5.2.
Vote Secrecy. The introduction of return codes provides voters with a receipt about
their vote. However, the scheme shows the receipt in an editable text field to the voter,
i.e. if the voter intends to forward that receipt to the adversary, the adversary would
not be convinced as the voter might manipulate the receipt before forwarding it. The
adversary would merely be convinced about the receipt if he either controls the voting
device, i.e. has the capability voting device, or observes the channel between a voter and
her device, i.e. observes the reception of the return code. In both cases, the adversary
could already violate vote secrecy in the original scheme.
Vote Integrity. The introduction of a cast-as-intended verification measure presented in
Section 5.3 prevents a compromised voting device from altering votes in an undetectable
manner. Consequently, in contrast to the original Polyas scheme, the capability voting
device does not allow an adversary to violate vote integrity. Furthermore, the adversary
controlling both the communication channel and being computationally unrestricted can
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V VD ERS VS BBS
id(i), tan(i)
id(i), tan(i)
Verify hash(tan(i)) 
 against database
tan(i)
Verify hash(tan(i)) 
 against database
Generate token(i)
token(i)
token(i)
Retain relation
all j: token(i), Enc(return(i,j),r(i,j),pk(BBS))
token(i)
Verify whether token(i) is valid
ballot
ballot
cand(i)
all j: cand(i), Enc(return(i,j),r(i,j),pk(BBS))
If index(cand(i)) = k 
 Decrypt Enc(return(i,k),r(i,k),pk(BBS)) 
 Store Enc(cand(i),r(i),pk) in cache
cand(i)
c(i)
ack
ack
Retain relation 
 token(i), Enc(cand(i),r(i),pk)
return(i,k)
return(i,k)
If no complaints after time t 
 remove relation token(i), cand(i) 
 and store Enc(cand(i),r(i),pk) for tallying
Figure 5.5: Voting phase of the extended Polyas voting scheme.
no longer undetectably alter votes. The only new possibility that the ERS obtains by its
duty of generating return codes is to forward different codes to the PS and to the voter
(throughout the voting phase). In that case, while the voter’s vote might be transmitted
correctly to the BBS, the match between the return code obtained from the BBS and the
code list would not succeed. Yet, the ERS would not be able to manipulate the vote cast
by the voter.
Eligibility. The authentication process is not affected by the improvement.
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Fairness. In analogy to the argumentation line for vote secrecy, the extended Polyas
scheme does not provide the adversary with new attack strategies with regard to fairness.
Data Access Protection. The extension does not provide any new component with voter
data. Consequently, the qualitative security model remains unchanged with regard to data
access protection.
Requirement Qualitative Security Models Impact
Vote Integrity
(∨
I⊆{1,...,n},|I|≥l(
∧
i∈I V Di)
)
∨ BBS ∨(CR ∧ CCH) 1 ≤ l ≤ n
Eligibility
(∨
I⊆{1,...,n},|I|≥l(
∧
i∈I VOi)
)
∨ (ERS ∧ V S) ∨ (ERS ∧ PS) 1 ≤ l ≤ n
Fairness
(∨
I⊆{1,...,n},|I|≥l(
∧
i∈I V Di)
)
∨(∨
I⊆{1,...,n},|I|≥l(
∧
i∈I HCHi)
)
∨BBS∨(CR ∧ CCH) 1 ≤ l ≤ n
Vote Secrecy (ERS ∧BBS) ∨ (PS ∧ V S ∧BBS)∨(∨
I⊆{1,...,n},|I|≥l(
∧
i∈I V Di)
)
∨(∨
I⊆{1,...,n},|I|≥l(
∧
i∈I HCHi)
)
∨ 1 ≤ l ≤ n
Data Access
Protection
(∨
I⊆{1,...,n},|I|≥l(
∧
i∈I V Di)
)
∨ PS ∨ ERS 1 ≤ l ≤ n
Table 5.2: Qualitative security models of the extended Polyas Internet voting scheme. Struck
through capabilities indicate that an adversary possessing those capabilities is no longer able of
violating the respective security requirement because of the presented extension.
5.5. Comparison of the Qualitative Security Models of the
Original and the Extended Scheme
The extended Polyas Internet voting scheme improves the original scheme by removing one
assumption about adversarial capabilities. This extension is not accompanied by new as-
sumptions with regard to any security requirement. Consequently, according to Definition
7, one can construct a simple identity mapping between both schemes, such that Pareto
dominance of the extended scheme over the original scheme is given. The qualitative domi-
nance of the extended scheme against the original scheme makes a quantitative comparison
between both schemes obsolete. It might nevertheless be of interest to quantitatively eval-
uate both schemes within different election settings: If election officials consider decision
criteria beyond security requirements, then election officials might consider the original
Polyas scheme, e.g. because the use of return codes might be inappropriate for the target
election. Then election officials might compare the satisfaction degree of the original and
the extended scheme in their specific election setting, and take the relative security degrees
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of both schemes as one out of several decision criteria. We therefore compare the security
of both schemes quantitatively within five election settings.
5.6. Comparison of the Quantitative Security Models of the
Original and the Extended Scheme
Election Settings. On the basis of the qualitative security models, the security of the
original and the extended Polyas scheme are quantitatively assessed against the four prob-
abilistic adversaries specified in Section 4.2.
Additionally, we construct a fifth adversary against which we expect the proposed ex-
tension to be irrelevant. The adversary corresponds to the adversary of election setting 1,
except that the fifth adversary possesses the capability VD with a probability of 0. The
probabilistic adversaries considered for the quantitative evaluation of the original and the
extended Polyas Internet voting scheme are shown in Table 5.3. Due to its Pareto domi-
nance, we expect the extended scheme to satisfy all security requirements in all election
settings at least as good as the original scheme.
Referring to the GI 2011 election, we consider a number of 20, 000 eligible voters and
3, 244 expected voters17.
Results. The results of the quantification process are provided in Tables 5.4, 5.5, 5.6 and
5.7, and are visualized in Figures 5.6, 5.7, 5.8, 5.9, 5.10. In addition to the satisfaction
degrees, the tables contain the minimum and maximum theoretically possible satisfac-
tion degrees for both schemes: a minimum (respectively maximum) satisfaction degree
corresponds to the quantitative evaluation of qualitative security models with the largest
(respectively smallest) probability value for all adversarial capabilities.
The obtained results confirm our expectation: The quantitative security evaluation
results of the extended scheme are at least as high as the results of the original scheme.
However, it turns out that the significance of the proposed extension varies with regard
to the election settings.
Consider the results of the first election setting as baseline.
One can notice a significant increase in the difference between the satisfaction degrees of
vote integrity once the adversary becomes stronger with regard to voting device corruption.
This significance stems from the fact that an adversary controlling the voters’ voting
devices cannot undetectably violate vote integrity in the extension.
In contrast to the baseline setting, an adversary particularly strong with regard to
service provider corruption impacts both schemes to approximately the same extent. This
observation indicates that the proposed extension does not address vulnerabilities caused
by service provider corruption. In fact, it can be noticed that the satisfaction degrees of
17Refer to https://www.gi.de/wir-ueber-uns/unsere-mitglieder.html and https://www.gi.de/
index.php?id=wahlen2011
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both schemes do not drop significantly, i.e. risks caused by compromised service providers
are not the most prevalent risks for both voting schemes.
If the adversary increases his capabilities with regard to influencing voters, one can
notice significant decreases in the satisfaction degrees of fairness, vote secrecy, and eligi-
bility in both schemes. These decreases indicate that voters that are to some extent under
adversarial control pose a serious security vulnerability to the scheme. On the other side,
one can notice that the difference between both schemes with regard to vote integrity
remains more or less unchanged in comparison to the baseline setting. This indicates that
the proposed extension does not address vulnerabilities caused by voters that are under
adversarial control.
Eventually, if the adversary does not have the capability to compromise voting devices,
the quantitative difference between the original and the extended Polyas scheme vanishes.
This observation is explained by the fact that the proposed extension targets specifically at
this capability. Hence, the absence of this capability results in the fact that the difference
in satisfaction degrees drops to 0.
5.7. Summary
With more than 2,2 millions cast online votes, the Polyas Internet voting scheme is one
of the most established Internet voting schemes. Yet, the scheme unveils numerous short-
comings.
To address the risk of vote integrity violations caused by compromised voting devices, we
reviewed existing technical solutions. Considering the constraints given by the Common
Criteria certification, we presented an extension of the Polyas Internet voting scheme. By
providing voters with code sheets, the ballot box server gains the possibility to confirm
a vote by returning the respective return codes to the voter. Given the fact that the
voting device only learns the return codes for the vote that has been received by the ballot
box server, the voting device can only obtain the return codes that the voter expects by
forwarding the voter’s vote in an unaltered manner.
The qualitative security models show that the extended scheme Pareto dominates the
original scheme. In the case of vote integrity, we were able to eliminate the need to trust
the voting device, without imposing new assumptions on the adversary’s capabilities.
The Pareto dominance of the extended Polyas scheme makes a quantitative security
evaluation for the comparison of the extended and the original scheme obsolete. In all
possible election settings, satisfaction degrees of the extended scheme are larger or equal
than the respective satisfaction degrees of the original scheme. Yet, when taking into
account decision criteria beyond legally-founded security requirements for Internet voting
schemes, the security improvements might become one among several criteria. We there-
fore quantitatively evaluated both schemes within five election settings. The evaluation
results show that the added value to the requirement vote integrity depends on the target
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Election Setting VD ONSP OFSP VO VI HCH
E1 U[0.01, 0.1] U[0.001, 0.002] U[0.0001, 0.0002] U[0.01, 0.1] U[0.01, 0.1] U[0.01, 0.1]
E2 U[0.1, 0.2] U[0.001, 0.002] U[0.0001, 0.0002] U[0.01, 0.1] U[0.01, 0.1] U[0.01, 0.1]
E3 U[0.01, 0.1] U[0.01, 0.02] U[0.001, 0.002] U[0.01, 0.1] U[0.01, 0.1] U[0.01, 0.1]
E4 U[0.01, 0.1] U[0.001, 0.002] U[0.0001, 0.0002] U[0.1, 0.2] U[0.1, 0.2] U[0.1, 0.2]
E5 U[0, 0] U[0.001, 0.002] U[0.0001, 0.0002] U[0.01, 0.1] U[0.01, 0.1] U[0.01, 0.1]
Table 5.3: Probabilistic adversaries considered for the quantitative evaluation of the original and extended Polyas scheme.
Requirement Ori. Polyas SD Ori. Polyas Min/Max SD Ext. Polyas SD Ext. Polyas Min/Max SD
Eligibility 0.955435709 [0.912297378316, 0.992843571063] 0.955435709 [0.912297378316, 0.992843571063]
Fairness 0.939280721 [0.907360601091, 0.991610302379] 0.939280721 [0.907360601091, 0.991610302379]
DA Protection 0.9532711 [0.912292977530, 0.992842627116] 0.9532711 [0.912292977530, 0.992842627116]
Vote Secrecy 0.939283299 [0.907363978273, 0.991610852262] 0.939283299 [0.907363978273, 0.991610852262]
Vote Integrity 0.953271423 [0.912293377019, 0.992842712867] 0.998502195 [0.998000000000, 0.999000000000]
Table 5.4: Results of the quantitative security evaluation of the original and extended Polyas scheme within election setting 1.
Requirement Ori. Polyas SD Ori. Polyas Min/Max SD Ext. Polyas SD Ext. Polyas Min/Max SD
Eligibility 0.953331026 [0.912297378316, 0.992843571063] 0.953331026 [0.912297378316, 0.992843571063]
Fairness 0.863296551 [0.817738026681, 0.912295378468] 0.863296551 [0.817738026681, 0.912295378468]
DA Protection 0.863308735 [0.817737487707, 0.912295178523] 0.863308735 [0.817737487707, 0.912295178523]
Vote Secrecy 0.863300222 [0.817743416421, 0.912297377915] 0.863300222 [0.817743416421, 0.912297377915]
Vote Integrity 0.851969229 [0.833560677883, 0.912295378468] 0.998487723 [0.998000000000, 0.999000000000]
Table 5.5: Results of the quantitative security evaluation of the original and extended Polyas scheme within election setting 2.
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Requirement Ori. Polyas SD Ori. Polyas Min/Max SD Ext. Polyas SD Ext. Polyas Min/Max SD
Eligibility 0.954865328 [0.912297219964, 0.992843554076] 0.954865328 [0.912297219964, 0.992843554076]
Fairness 0.938335715 [0.907330145537, 0.990000000000] 0.938335715 [0.907330145537, 0.990000000000]
DA Protection 0.952400304 [0.912252141433, 0.989010000000] 0.952400304 [0.912252141433, 0.989010000000]
Vote Secrecy 0.93837185 [0.907363308118, 0.991610797764] 0.93837185 [0.907363308118, 0.991610797764]
Vote Integrity 0.952556556 [0.912256679453, 0.990000000000] 0.984888738 [0.980000000000, 0.990000000000]
Table 5.6: Results of the quantitative security evaluation of the original and extended Polyas scheme within election setting 3.
Requirement Ori. Polyas SD Ori. Polyas Min/Max SD Ext. Polyas SD Ext. Polyas Min/Max SD
Eligibility 0.86435605 [0.817743425062, 0.912297379517] 0.86435605 [0.817743425062, 0.912297379517]
Fairness 0.865989764 [0.817738026681, 0.912295378468] 0.865989764 [0.817738026681, 0.912295378468]
DA Protection 0.951977457 [0.912292977530, 0.992842627116] 0.951977457 [0.912292977530, 0.992842627116]
Vote Secrecy 0.865993359 [0.817743416421, 0.912297377915] 0.865993359 [0.817743416421, 0.912297377915]
Vote Integrity 0.951977703 [0.912293377019, 0.992842712867] 0.998505387 [0.998000000000, 0.999000000000]
Table 5.7: Results of the quantitative security evaluation of the original and extended Polyas scheme within election setting 4.
Requirement Ori. Polyas SD Ori. Polyas Min/Max SD Ext. Polyas SD Ext. Polyas Min/Max SD
Eligibility 0.95384898 [0.912297378316, 0.992843571063] 0.95384898 [0.912297378316, 0.992843571063]
Fairness 0.952939981 [0.912293377019, 0.992842712867] 0.952939981 [0.912293377019, 0.992842712867]
DA Protection 0.998346268 [0.997800400000, 0.998900100000] 0.998346268 [0.997800400000, 0.998900100000]
Vote Secrecy 0.95294243 [0.912297371911, 0.994012368095] 0.95294243 [0.912297371911, 0.994012368095]
Vote Integrity 0.998496099 [0.998000000000, 0.999000000000] 0.998496099 [0.998000000000, 0.999000000000]
Table 5.8: Results of the quantitative security evaluation of the original and extended Polyas scheme within election setting 5.
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election setting. The higher the relative risk of voting device corruption (in relation to
other adversarial capabilities), the higher is the relevance of the proposed extension.
Chapter 6
The Estonian Internet Voting Scheme as
Applied for the Parliamentary Elections
2015
In 2005, Estonia became the first country world-wide to introduce Internet voting for
legally-binding elections [Kal09]. Since that time, Estonia has conducted a number of
legally-binding elections. It turns out that the Internet voting option is getting more and
more popular among Estonian citizens. For the European parliamentary election in 2014
and the Estonian parliamentary elections in 2015, more than 30% of all participating voters
have cast their vote over the Internet18. The Estonian Internet voting scheme has been
extensively described in public documents and academic literature, e.g. [MM06, Tre07,
SFD+14].
The first part of this chapter provides an overview about the Estonian Internet voting
scheme as applied for the Estonian parliamentary elections 2015. We thereafter quali-
tatively evaluate the security of the Estonian Internet voting scheme. Subsequently, we
address several shortcomings of the original scheme by the construction of an extended
scheme. The security of the extended scheme is qualitatively evaluated. We compare
the qualitative security models of the original and extended scheme. Subsequently, the
security of both schemes is quantitatively compared within different election settings. The
chapter is concluded with a summary section.
Parts of this chapter have been published at the Eighth International Conference on
Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES2013) [3].
6.1. Original Scheme
Before presenting the protocol underlying the Estonian Internet voting scheme, we describe
the involved components.
18Refer to http://www.vvk.ee/voting-methods-in-estonia/engindex/statistics
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6.1.1. Components
The Estonian Internet voting scheme is composed of the following components.
National Electoral Committee (NEC). The national electoral committee consists of
seven members. The members of the NEC are particularly in charge of activating the
hardware security module for vote tallying. The members of the NEC operate in an
oﬄine manner.
Vote Forwarding Server (VFS). The VFS is the Estonian Internet voting scheme’s
interface to the voters. The VFS provides voters with digital ballots and forwards filled
ballots to the vote storage server. The VFS is the only server in the Estonian Internet
voting scheme that operates in an online manner.
Vote Storage Server (VSS). The VSS collects filled ballots and anonymizes votes for
vote tallying. The VSS operates in an oﬄine manner.
Vote Counting Server (VCS). The VCS receives anonymized votes and by the use of
the hardware security module runs the tallying process. The VCS operates in an oﬄine
manner.
Log Server (LS). The LS is a server that is connected to the VFS and the VSS and
constantly receives log information from those servers. The LS operates in an oﬄine
manner.
Hardware Security Module (HSM1/HSM2). The HSM 1 is embedded into the vote
counting server and is in charge of generating the election key pair and decrypting en-
crypted votes after the module has been activated by the NEC. The HSM 1’s operation in
terms of vote tallying can only be initiated if at least four out of the seven NEC members
provide their authentication material; these are PIN-protected keycards. In addition to
the HSM 1, there exists a backup HSM 2. HSM 2 stores the same information and has the
same functionality as HSM 2. Both, HSM 1 and HSM 2 operate in an oﬄine manner.
Voting Device (VD1 / VD2). Each voter has two voting devices at her disposal. The
voter uses voting device VD1 to fill and encode her ballot and VD2 to audit the encoding
process conducted by VD1.
6.1.2. Ballot of the Estonian Parliamentary Elections 2015
The Estonian parliamentary (Riigikogu) election is held every four years within twelve
electoral districts. Each district has its own list of candidates. The district with the fewest
candidates has 49 candidates, the district with most candidates has 115 candidates.
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Each voter has the possibility to select one candidate from the ballot of her electoral
district. There is no option to cast an invalid vote.
6.1.3. Protocol Description
The following description builds upon upon the general system description by the Estonian
National Election Committee [Com10], Heiberg et al. [HLV12], Heiberg and Willemson
[HW14], and Springall et al. [SFD+14] which takes into account smartphone verifiability
measures introduced into the Internet voting scheme in 2013. In analogy to the Polyas
scheme, we consider components of the scheme to operate in independent manner. To
propagate this aspect to the system layer, the components have to be implemented and
hosted by independent providers.
Setup Phase
In advance to the election, all involved service providers generate SSL/TLS and signature
keys and publish the respective public keys. Furthermore, an asymmetric election key pair
(pk, sk) is generated within HSM 1. The public election key is implemented into the voting
application. The voting application is subsequently signed by the NEC and distributed
to the voters. The protocol steps of the Estonian setup phase are depicted in Figure 6.1.
HSM1/HSM1 HSM1/HSM2 NEC V
Generate (sk,pk)
pk
Embed pk into 
voting application
Sign voting 
application
Provide voting application
Figure 6.1: Setup phase of the original Estonian Internet voting scheme.
Voting Phase
Before starting the voting process, the voter visits the election website from which the vot-
ing application can be downloaded. To start the vote casting process, the voter launches
her voting application which establishes an encrypted and authenticated connection to-
wards the VFS. All knowledge the VFS obtains throughout the voting phase is synchro-
nized with the LS. The voter authenticates herself towards the VFS by the use of her eID
card (with her authentication PIN). The VFS determines whether the voter is eligible to
vote by looking up the voter’s identification number in the actual voter list and in which
district the voter resides to provide the respective candidate list. The VFS consults the
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VSS to determine whether the voter has already cast a vote. Analogously to VFS, all
knowledge the VSS obtains throughout the voting phase is synchronized with the LS.
The VFS returns the respective candidate list and the information whether she has al-
ready voted or not to the voter’s voting application. Once the voter obtained the list of
candidates from the VFS, she makes her selection and fills the ballot accordingly. The
voting application pads the voting option with a randomization factor r and encrypts the
ballot with the public election key stored in the voting application. The voter signs her
encrypted ballot with her signature key (with her signature PIN). Thereafter, the signed
and encrypted ballot is sent to the VFS. The VFS checks whether the signature relates
to the voter who authenticated in first place. If so, the VFS forwards the ballot to the
VSS. The VSS requests a validity certificate for the signed vote from the external validity
confirmation service. That service issues validity certificates for voter signatures on en-
crypted ballots19. The VSS stores the signed encrypted vote together with a time stamp
for the purpose of vote tallying. Furthermore, the VSS stores the validity certificate and
assigns a value x to the ballot. The value x is returned to the voter’s client and the voting
application presents the randomization factor r and value x in form of a QR code for the
purpose of verification. After receiving the vote confirmation and the value x, the voter
can optionally conduct a vote verification step, as outlined in Section 4.1 (Independent
Verification Devices). For the sake of preventing adversaries from influencing voters, voters
can arbitrarily often update their Internet vote in the remote voting phase. The protocol
steps of the Estonian voting phase are depicted in Figure 6.2.
Tallying Phase
At the end of the election, the signatures of valid encrypted ballots (last Internet votes
that have been cast by eligible voters) are removed and the unpersonalized ballots are
transmitted (via a burned DVD) to the VCS. The HSM 1 within the VCS is activated by
at least 4 out of 7 NEC members upon which the HSM 1 decrypts the anonymized ballots.
Eventually, the election result is announced. An overview about the tallying phase is
provided in Figure 6.3.
6.2. Qualitative Security Models of the Original Scheme
On the foundation of scientific literature [MV11, HLV12, HW14, SFD+14], particularly
focusing on the security analysis by Springall et al. [SFD+14] and informal protocol
analysis, we take the role of system analysts and determine qualitative security models of
the Estonian Internet voting scheme. In the remainder of this section, we outline which
capabilities allow an adversary to cause impact on security requirements. An overview
of the result is given in Table 6.1. Recall that we make the general assumption that
19The validity confirmation service is not considered a component of the Internet voting scheme as the
service is widely used for a variety of Estonian eID services.
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V VD1 VFS LS VSS VD2
eID(i)
eID(i)
Store all following logs
Verify eligibility of eID(i)
Request vote status
Store all following logs
vote status
ballot, vote status
ballot, vote status
cand(i)
Calculate 
enc(cand(i),r(i),pk)
Sign enc(cand(i),r(i),pk)
sign(enc(cand(i),r(i),pk),sk(i)
Match signature against eID(i)
sign(enc(cand(i),r(i),pk),sk(i))
Get validity certificate 
of Sign(Enc(cand(i),r(i),pk),sk(i))
Assign x(i) to 
sign(enc(cand(i),r(i),pk),sk(i))
x(i)
x(i)
Show (x(i),r(i)) as QR code
Request vote assigned to x(i)
Request vote assigned to x(i)
enc(cand(i),r(i),pk)
enc(cand(i),r(i),pk)
cand(i)
Figure 6.2: Voting phase of the original Estonian Internet voting scheme.
anything that can be verified is verified. Furthermore, the log server’s purpose is essentially
to monitor the election remotely and to detect external attacks launched at run-time.
Recall that adversarial capabilities represent static corruption, i.e. either an adversarial
capability is given or it is not given. Consequently, if either VFS or VSS are compromised,
external log files are adapted accordingly by the compromised components. Hence, in the
case of static adversaries, there is no benefit of the LS. We therefore do not consider LS
as dedicated component in the qualitative security models.
Vote Secrecy. The Estonian Internet voting scheme provides vote updating as measure
to counter conscious observation attacks. However, this measure is irrelevant if voters
are unconscious about being under observation, i.e. in the case their voting device is
compromised. Madise and Vinkel [MV11] show that in the parliamentary elections 2011,
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VSS VCS HSM1 NEC
all i: Remove signatures from 
sign(enc(cand(i),r(i),pk),sk(i))
all i: enc(cand(i),r(i),pk)
all i: enc(cand(i),r(i),pk)
Initiate decryption
all i: Decrypt enc(cand(i),r(i),pk)
all i: Return cand(i)
Provide election result
Announce election result
Figure 6.3: Tallying phase of the original Estonian Internet voting scheme.
only 3.1% of cast Internet votes were not tallied because of vote updating. Corrupting the
following components allows the adversary to violate vote secrecy.
Voting Device. In the Estonian Internet voting scheme, the voter selects her preferred
voting option within the client application on her device. Compromised voting devices
might consequently store this selection and relate it to the voter’s identity, thereby vi-
olating vote secrecy of the vote cast over that device. Given the fact that throughout
the parliamentary elections 2011, 3, 1% of voters updated their votes, we assume that
corrupting the voting device does only work up to an impact level of 97%20.
Vote Forwarding Server, Vote Counting Server, Hardware Security Modules, and the
NEC. There are components that know the relation between a ciphertext and the identity
of the voter who cast that ciphertext. Furthermore, there are components that know the
relation between a ciphertext and the respective plaintext vote. If at least one compo-
nent of each group maliciously collaborate by combining their respective knowledge, the
conspiracy is able to violate vote secrecy of all votes. Throughout the voting phase, the
VFS learns for all participating voters the former relation. The HSM 1, the HSM 2, the
VCS, and the threshold of NEC members (might) know the latter relation. Hence, the
conspiracy between VFS and either the HSM 1, the HSM 2, the VCS, and the threshold
of NEC members are able to violate vote secrecy of all votes.
Computationally unrestricted and Communication Channel. If an adversary is capable
of controlling the communication channel between the voting device and the VFS and is
capable of breaking cryptographic primitives, then the adversary can break vote secrecy,
because encrypted votes are signed by the voters who cast them.
20In the future, the security evaluation framework can be extended by parametrizing the percentage of
expected vote updates. In that case, election officials the estimated percentage of expected vote updates
might be provided by election officials as part of the election setting specification.
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Vote Integrity. Corrupting the following components allows the adversary to violate vote
integrity within the Estonian Internet voting scheme.
Voting Device. The Estonian Internet voting scheme has recently been improved towards
vote integrity with regard to compromised voting devices by providing a verification mech-
anism [HW14]. Yet, as shown by Springall et al. [SFD+14], compromised voting devices
might launch Ghost click attacks [SFD+14], thereby replacing voters’ cast and potentially
verified votes. In order to launch such an attack, the compromised device would re-use
the voter’s PIN once her eID is entered into the card reader. Given the fact that Estonian
citizens tend to use their eIDs frequently for different services [Rep14] and smart card
readers without PIN pad are mostly used by Estonian citizens21, such an attack could be
successfully launched on a large-scale. Yet, we exclude those voters that override their
Internet vote and those voters that would not use other services. We therefore assume the
maximum impact by 80% of all votes22. In spite of the good intention to improve vote
integrity, the implemented verification mechanism turns out to be of low effectivity.
Vote Forwarding Server and Vote Storage Server. By counting the number of cast votes,
the VFS controls the VSS ’s behaviour. If the VSS illegitimately drops valid ballots, a
discrepancy in the number of processed ballots between the VFS and the VSS would be
detected by the NEC. However, if both components, the VFS and the VSS, maliciously
collaborate, they might drop valid ballots undetectably, thereby violating integrity of all
cast votes.
Vote Storage Server and NEC. In the tallying phase, it is the duty of the VSS to separate
signatures from received votes and output only anonymized votes for the tallying process.
If VSS would alter votes after the signature has been stripped off, NEC would discover
this misbehaviour by the log files generated by the VFS and VSS. The log files generated
by the VFS and VSS are not publicly available, but remain under control of the NEC
[HPW15]. Hence, if the VSS maliciously collaborates with the NEC, the conspiracy might
alter votes undetectably.
Vote Counting Server. Throughout the tallying phase, the VCS might store votes dif-
ferently than it obtained these votes from the HSM 1. Thereby, the VCS is capable of
violating vote integrity of all stored votes.
Hardware Security Module 1. The HSM 1 might forward votes differently than decrypted,
thereby violating vote integrity of the stored votes.
Computationally unrestricted and Communication Channel. If the adversary is capable
of controlling the communication channel between the voting device and the VFS and is
capable of breaking cryptographic primitives, then the adversary can drop voters’ votes,
and replace them by other forged votes.
21Refer to the recommendations under http://www.id.ee/index.php?id=35612
22Analogously to the percentage of vote updates, the expected number of voters who override their Internet
vote or do not use other Internet services might be parametrized and provided by the election official.
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Eligibility. We assume that all citizens that use their eIDs for authentication and digital
signatures in Internet based services also cast their votes via the Internet voting channel.
Hence, if a compromised voting device learns the voter’s PIN and illegitimately casts a
vote, this corresponds to a violation of vote integrity rather than eligibility. In spite of
the strong authentication means and the external validity confirmation service, log files to
verify the eligibility of cast votes remain under control of the NEC. Consequently, eligibility
is not verifiable by the general public. Hence, corrupting the following components allows
the adversary to violate eligibility within the Estonian Internet voting scheme.
Vote Storage Server and the NEC. Analogously to the vote integrity case, if the VSS
is compromised and adds illegitimate votes and NEC is corrupt, the conspiracy could
undetectably add illegitimate votes, thereby violating eligibility.
Computationally unrestricted and Communication Channel. If the adversary is capable
of controlling the communication channel between the voting device and the VFS and
is capable of breaking cryptographic primitives, then he can determine which voters cast
votes. The adversary can subsequently cast forged votes on behalf of abstaining voters.
Fairness. Attack strategies against fairness closely resemble strategies against vote se-
crecy. Analogously to the vote secrecy case, we consider that 3.1% of all cast votes are
updated. Consequently, only votes not being updated may be revealed reliably by the
adversary before the end of the voting phase. Corrupting the following components allows
the adversary to violate fairness within the Estonian Internet voting scheme.
Voting Device. Analogously to the vote secrecy case, compromised voting devices might
leak the voter’s selection to the adversary, thereby violating the fairness requirement. One
compromised device might thereby reveal the selection cast over that device.
Hardware Security Module 1/2. In case of corruption, both HSM 1 and HSM 2 are able
to decrypt all cast votes before the voting phase ended, thereby violating fairness.
The NEC. Rather than breaking into hardware security modules, the adversary might
corrupt a threshold of election officials to launch the hardware security module to decrypt
all cast votes before the voting phase ended, thereby violating fairness.
Computationally unrestricted and Communication Channel. Analogously to the vote
secrecy, if the adversary is capable of controlling the communication channel between the
voting device and the VFS and is capable of breaking cryptographic primitives, he can
decrypt encrypted votes, thereby violating fairness.
Data Access Protection. As part of the protocol, the following components obtain voter
data. Hence, their corruption can result in violation of data access protection.
Voting Device. Because of the fact that voting devices are generally used for a number of
purposes, voting devices know the voters’ identities. A compromised voting device might
consequently forward a voter’s identity to the adversary.
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Vote Forwarding Server. Due to the double envelope method implemented by the Estonian
Internet voting scheme, the VFS receives signed ballots from the voters. A compromised
VFS might consequently forward identities of voters to the adversary.
Vote Storage Server. Analogously to the VFS, the VSS receives and additionally stores
signed ballots throughout the voting phase. Corrupting the VSS consequently allows an
adversary to violate data access protection.
Computationally unrestricted and Communication Channel. By controlling the com-
munication channel between the voting device and the VFS, and additionally breaking
cryptographic primitives, the adversary can determine the identities of voters who cast an
Internet vote.
Requirement Qualitative Security Models Impact
Vote Integrity
(∨
I⊆{1,...,n},|I|≥l(
∧
i∈I V D1i)
)
∨
(V FS ∧ V SS)∨
(V SS ∧ (7 out of NEC))
V CS ∨HSM1∨(CR ∧ CCH) 0 ≤ l ≤ 80100(∨
I⊆{1,...,n},|I|≥l(
∧
i∈I V D1i ∧ V D2i)
)
∨
(V FS ∧ V SS)∨
(V SS ∧ (7 out of NEC))
V CS ∨HSM1∨(CR ∧ CCH) 80100 < l ≤ 1
Eligibility (V SS ∧ (7 out of NEC))∨(CR ∧ CCH) 0 ≤ l ≤ 1
Fairness
(∨
I⊆{1,...,n},|I|≥l(
∧
i∈I V D1i)
)
∨
HSM1 ∨HSM2 ∨ (4 out of NEC)∨(CR ∧ CCH) 0 ≤ l ≤ 97100
Vote Secrecy
(∨
I⊆{1,...,n},|I|≥l(
∧
i∈I V D1i)
)
∨
(V FS ∧ (HSM1 ∨HSM2 ∨ V CS∨
(4 out of NEC)))∨(CR ∧ CCH) 0 ≤ l ≤ 97100
(V FS ∧ (HSM1 ∨HSM2 ∨ V CS∨
(4 out of NEC)))∨(CR ∧ CCH) 97100 < l ≤ 1
Data Access
Protection
(∨
I⊆{1,...,n},|I|≥l(
∧
i∈I V D1i)
)
∨
V FS ∨ V SS∨(CR ∧ CCH) 1 ≤ l ≤ n
Table 6.1: Qualitative security models of the original Estonian Internet voting scheme.
Discussion
It turns out that the Estonian Internet voting scheme reveals significant vulnerabilities
with regard to compromised voting devices. In fact, the security requirements vote in-
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tegrity, fairness, vote secrecy, and data access protection can be violated by compromised
voting devices.
As outlined earlier, this assumption is inadequate given the high infection rates of com-
puters worldwide [Pan15]. Similar to the Polyas scheme, we extend the Estonian scheme
by means of code voting. While the adaptations of the Polyas scheme were constrained by
the current Common Criteria certification of the scheme, the Estonian scheme is adapted
to a larger extent. In addition to return codes, we incorporate voting codes to improve
the scheme with regard to legally-founded security requirements beyond vote integrity.
To prevent single components from violating specific security requirements due to the in-
corporation of voting codes, we adapt the scheme further by rigorously separating duties
between different components.
6.3. Proposed Extensions
Before diving into the details of our extension, we review related works on the Estonian
Internet voting scheme and related works on code voting based schemes.
6.3.1. Related Work
The only efforts made to improve the Estonian scheme in the presence of compromised
voting devices has been presented and explained by Heiberg and Willemson [HW14]. To
counter vote integrity violations, the extension incorporates independent verification de-
vices. As discussed earlier, given the facts that a high percentage of voters use their eID
cards for other purposes and that vote updating is possible, malware on the voting device
can circumvent the verification mechanism [SFD+14].
Securely voting over untrustworthy platforms (voting devices) was initially addressed by
Chaum’s SureVote [Cha01], the first code voting scheme. Numerous code voting schemes
have been proposed later on, e.g. [JFR13], [JRF09], [JR07a, JR07b, JRF10], [Hel09, HS07,
HSS08] and [ZCC+13]. The schemes in [Cha01], [JFR13], [JRF09], and [ZCC+13] assume
the voter to be honest in order to ensure vote secrecy. Other extensions of code voting,
[JR07a, JR07b, JRF10] assume a trustworthy voting- and voter-specific smart card for
vote secrecy and integrity. Within all of these schemes, one component (either voter or
smart card as instantiation of a voting device) can violate vote secrecy or vote integrity.
6.3.2. Components
In contrast to the original Estonian scheme, the extended scheme does not incorporate
the vote counting server VCS, both hardware security modules HSM 1 and HSM 2. In
addition, voters only need one voting device VD, rather than two. On the other side,
the revised scheme incorporates three new components, namely a distribution authority
DA, and two voting authorities the VA1 and the VA2. While several components are
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maintained, the roles of these components have changed such that we provide an overview
about all components in the following.
National Electoral Committee (NEC). The national electoral committee is composed
out of seven members. Committee members are involved in the setup phase, in particular
in generating a threshold election key pair (pk, sk). Each committee member possesses a
share of the secret key. Committee members are also involved in the tallying phase. The
NEC operates in an oﬄine manner.
Distribution Authority (DA). The DA is involved in the setup phase; together with the
NEC, it anonymizes, audits and distributes code sheets. Thus, both know the election
register. DA operates in an oﬄine manner.
Vote Forwarding Server (VFS). The VFS, in the setup phase, generates the code sheet
parts containing the permuted list of candidates. The VFS is also involved in the voting
phase and knows the election register. VFS operates in an online manner.
Voting Authority (VA1). The VA1, in the setup phase, generates codes. The VA1 is
also involved in the voting phase. Furthermore the VA1 holds a signing key. The VA1
operates in an oﬄine manner.
Voting Authority (VA2). The VA2 has a similar functionality as the VA1. The VA2
operates in an oﬄine manner.
Vote Storage Server (VSS). The VSS is involved in all phases. Any component has
read access, all service providers (except DA) have write access. All data published on the
VSS are signed by the sending service providers23. The VSS provides different sectors for
all phases. The VSS operates in an online manner.
Voting Device (VD). As opposed to the original Estonian scheme, in the extended
scheme, each voter has one voting device at her disposal over which she casts her vote.
The second voting device is no longer necessary as cast-as-intended verifiability is provided
by the code voting approach.
6.3.3. Code Sheets in the Extended Estonian Scheme
The code sheets used in the proposed extension consist of three parts (i.e. three different
pieces of paper), two parts containing codes and one part containing a permuted list of
23Sending service providers compute one signature over all data in one protocol step. Note, in Figures 6.7
and 6.11 the signatures are not illustrated.
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candidates. Each code sheet part is generated by a different service provider. The three
code sheet parts are linked by their index to one code sheet.
An example of one part of the code sheet containing codes is depicted in Figure 6.4. This
part with accompanying index i is generated by the VA1, whose identity is also indicated,
next to the acknowledgment code. CodeVA1,i,1 . . . ,CodeVA1,i,n denote n random, unique
codes and AckVA1,i denotes a random, unique acknowledgment code. Similarly, the VA2
generates the second part of the code sheet containing codes for index i.
i
CodeVA1,i,1
...
CodeVA1,i,n
AckVA1,i
Figure 6.4: Code sheet part generated by the VA1 with index i.
The third part of the code sheet with index i is generated by the VFS and consists of
the list of n candidates, randomized according to a secret permutation φi. Recall that in
the case of the Estonian parliamentary elections 2015, the list contains between 49 and
115 candidates. The code sheet part containing the candidates is shown in Figure 6.5 and
a complete code sheet is illustrated in Figure 6.6.
i
φi(Candidate1)
...
φi(Candidaten)
–
Figure 6.5: Code sheet part with index i generated by the VFS.
i i i
CodeVA1,i,1 CodeVA2,i,1 φi(Candidate1)
...
...
...
CodeVA1,i,n CodeVA2,i,n φi(Candidaten)
A: AckVA1,i B: AckVA2,i –
Figure 6.6: Code sheet in extended Estonian scheme.
For a code sheet with index i, the voting code for the candidate in the p-th position is
the concatenation of the corresponding codes in the p-th position:
Codei,p = CodeVA1,i,p ‖ CodeVA2,i,p
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Accordingly, the voting acknowledgment code of this code sheet is the concatenation of
the acknowledgment codes:
Acki = AckVA1,i ‖ AckVA2,i
6.3.4. Revised Protocol Description
Analogously to the previously presented Internet voting schemes, we present the protocol
underlying the actual scheme.
Setup Phase
The setup phase consists of key generation as well as generating, committing on, auditing,
anonymizing and distributing code sheets.
Generating Keys. All involved service providers generate SSL/TLS and signature keys
and publish the respective public keys. The NEC generates a threshold election key pair
(pk, sk) in a distributed manner.
Generating Code Sheets. The VFS generates the part of each code sheet containing the
candidates (refer to Figure 6.5): It randomizes the canonical order of the candidate list for
each code sheet according to a secret permutation and prints the index and the randomized
candidate list on a sheet of paper (refer to Figure 6.5). The VFS inserts its sheets of
paper into privacy-protected sealed envelopes. The corresponding indexes are printed on
the envelopes and sent to the DA. The VA1 and the VA2 independently generate random,
unique codes for each candidate and each code sheet. They also independently generate
random unique acknowledgment codes for each code sheet. Note that the acknowledgment
codes must not match codes for candidates. The VA1 and the VA2 independently print this
information on a sheet of paper (refer to Figure 6.4). The VA1 and the VA2 also insert their
sheets of paper into privacy-protected sealed envelopes, print the corresponding indexes
on the envelopes and send them to the DA. Note that more code sheets than eligible voters
must be generated to make the auditing of code sheets possible.
Committing on Code Sheets. After generating the code sheet parts, the VFS, the VA1
and the VA2 commit on their respective parts: Committing is done by encrypting cor-
responding parts with the public election key pk and publishing the encryptions under
the accompanying index in the setup phase sector of the VSS, see Figure 6.7. Note that
committing is needed in order to detect a corrupt VFS, VA1, and VA2 distributing invalid
code sheets.
Auditing Code Sheets. Afterwards, the DA and the NEC start with the auditing pro-
cess, shown in Figure 6.8: The NEC randomly selects code sheets to be audited. The
corresponding data for each code sheet to be audited is downloaded from the setup phase
sector of the VSS. The downloaded data is decrypted by a threshold set of the NEC.
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Vote Storage Server Setup Phase Sector
...
i
{φi(Candidate1)}pk . . . φi(Candidaten)}pk
{Code1 . . .Coden; AckVA1}pk
{Code1 . . .Coden; AckVA2}pk
...
Figure 6.7: Content of the VSS at the end of the setup phase in the extended Estonian scheme.
The decrypted data is matched against the content of the corresponding envelopes. The
audited code sheets are then discarded. Note, this process can be observed by the general
public, e.g. by video-streaming the process over the Internet.
NEC DA VSS
Select random index(i)
Request envelopes with index(i)
Return envelopes with index(i)
Request data for index(i)
Return data for index(i)
Decrypt data for index(i)
Open envelopes with index(i)
Compare envelopes 
and data for index(i)
Figure 6.8: Auditing process of the extended Estonian Internet voting scheme.
Anonymizing and Distributing Code Sheets. After the auditing process, the DA in cooper-
ation with the NEC anonymize and distribute the remaining envelopes to eligible voters,
shown in Figure 6.9: All envelopes sharing the same index are placed into indistinguish-
able envelopes. These are put into a box and shuﬄed. After permuting, the DA and the
NEC take the anonymized neutral envelopes out of the box, print voters’ addresses on the
envelopes and send them to the corresponding addresses.
Voting
The voter receives an envelope and checks that it contains the three code sheet parts,
that the three code sheet parts are in privacy-protected sealed envelopes, and that the
envelopes share the same index. The voter opens the three envelopes and combines the
three code sheet parts in an order that is publicly known.
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NEC/DA V
Put envelopes with index(i) into neutral envelope
Put all neutral envelopes into box
Shuffle box
Take envelopes out of the box
Print voters' addresses on envelopes
Send random envelope
Figure 6.9: Anonymization and distribution process of the extended Estonian Internet voting
scheme.
The vote casting process is shown in Figure 6.10. In order to vote, the voter authenti-
cates herself by means of her eID to the voting website, which is hosted by the VFS. The
VFS verifies that the voter is eligible to vote. If so, the VFS allows the voter to cast her
vote. To cast a vote, the voter enters the voting code matching the candidate of her choice
on the voting website. Recall that in the case of the Estonian parliamentary elections
2015, voters are allowed to cast one voter for one candidate from the candidate list, i.e.
each voter enters exactly one voting code24. The voter signs the voting code with her eID
card and transmits the signed code to the VFS. The VFS requests a validity certificate
for the signed vote from the external validity confirmation service. The VFS stores the
signature, subsequently removes the signature from the voting code, and forwards the
first part of the voting code to the VA1 and the second part to the VA2. First, the VA1
and the VA2 deduce the index and the acknowledgment code of the code sheet (based on
the received code) and the corresponding position of the code. The VA1 and the VA2
cross-check that they obtained codes of the same index and the same position. In case
the code is invalid or a mismatch is detected, the VA1 and the VA2 inform the VFS that
informs the voter. If the check is positive, they request and obtain the encryption of the
candidate for the index and the position from the VSS (refer to Figure 6.7, first row after
the index i). The VA1 and the VA2 independently re-encrypt the received ciphertext to
{φi(Candidatep)}r1pk and {φi(Candidatep)}r2pk. After this, they send the re-encrypted cipher-
texts to the VSS. The VSS publishes the received data and sends a confirmation to the
VA1 and the VA2. The VA1 and the VA2 verify that the respective data has indeed been
published by the VSS. Figure 6.11 illustrates the information on the VSS. After having
received the confirmation, the VA1 and the VA2 store and/or update the request by the
VFS, the number of voters for which votes have been cast, and forward the previously
deduced acknowledgment codes to the VFS. The VFS concatenates these codes into the
voting acknowledgment code, which it sends to the voter.
24It shall be emphasized that Estonian voters have to enter a candidate number if they cast their vote by
paper ballot.
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V VD VFS VA1 VSS VA2
eID(i)
eID(i)
Sign code(i)
sign(code(i),sk(i))
Get validity certificate 
 of sign(code(i),sk(i))
Forward part 1 of code(i)
Identify part 1 
 of ack(i)
Request respective 
 candidate encryption
enc(cand(i),r(i,1),pk)
Calculate 
 enc(cand(i),r(i,2),pk)
enc(cand(i),r(i,2),pk)
Publish 
enc(cand(i),r(i,2),pk)
ack
Foward part 1 of ack(i)
Foward part 2 of code(i)
Respective protocol 
steps of VA2
Foward part 2 of ack(i)
Concatenate part 1 
and part 2 of ack(i)
ack(i)
ack(i)
Figure 6.10: Voting phase of the extended Estonian Internet voting scheme.
Tallying
After the voting phase, each row of the VSS corresponds to a successfully cast vote (refer
to Figure 6.11). The tallying process is shown in Figure 6.12. Before the process starts, the
VFS sends the total number of voters who have cast a vote to the VSS. Analogously, the
VA1 and the VA2 send the number of votes for which a re-encryption has been generated
and published to the VSS. The general public can check that these numbers match the
number of rows on the VSS. The committee members request the re-encrypted ciphertexts
and the VSS sends back the data re-encrypted by the VA1 and the VA2, corresponding to
column 1 and column 2 of the VSS ’s voting phase sector. The NEC sums up the content
of each individual column homomorphically. The encrypted sums are then decrypted by
a threshold set of the NEC. The NEC compares the decrypted sums, and if they match,
the election result is declared to be the matching sum. Finally, the committee members
publish the ZKPs for correct decryption and the election result on the VSS.
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Vote Storage Server Voting Phase Sector
Column 1 Column 2
...
{φi(Candidatep)}r1pk {φi(Candidatep)}r2pk
...
Figure 6.11: Content on VSS during the voting phase in the extended Estonian scheme.
VFS/VA1/VA2 VSS NEC
Provide number of processed votes
Request ciphertexts
Return ciphertexts column 1/2
Homomorphically sum up column 1/2
Decrypt sum of column 1/2
Compare if decrypted sums match
Provide proofs of correct 
decryption and election result
Publish proofs of correct 
 decryption and election result
Figure 6.12: Tallying phase of the extended Estonian Internet voting scheme.
6.4. Qualitative Security Models of the Extended Scheme
In analogy to the original Estonian scheme, we take the role of system analysts and
determine qualitative security models of the revised scheme. In the remainder of this
section, we outline which capabilities allow an adversary to cause impact on security
requirements. An overview of the result is given in Table 6.2. Recall that we make the
general assumption that anything that can be verified is verified.
Vote Secrecy. In analogy to Section 6.2, we assume that throughout an election 3.1% of
all votes are update votes and therefore not tallied. Corrupting the following components
allows the adversary to violate vote secrecy.
Voter Output, and Voting Device, or Vote Forwarding Server, or one Voting Authority. In
advance to the election, the voter receives her voting material in terms of code sheets. Code
sheets capture in an un-encoded manner the relation between voting options and voting
codes. If a voter forwards these code sheets to the adversary, the adversary might obtain
a proof about the voter’s vote if controls a component receiving at least half of the voter’s
voting codes. The components that are able to forward parts of the voter’s voting code to
the adversary are VD, the VFS, the VA1, and the VA2. Given the fact that voters might
update their votes from different devices, breaking vote secrecy by obtaining the voter’s
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code from the voter’s device VD might only work for those votes that are not updated.
As opposed to VD, the service providers, namely the VFS, the VA1, and the VA2, are
able to provide the adversary with the final voting code cast for each code sheet, thereby
violating vote secrecy of all cast votes.
Vote Forwarding Server and one Voting Authority. Throughout the voting phase, the VFS
learns the voter’s real identity due to the use of strong authentication means. Additionally,
the VFS learns the voter’s cast voting code. Because the VFS published the encrypted
voting options for the purpose of later re-encryption (by the VA1 and the VA2), the VFS
also knows the relation between voting options and the respective ciphertexts. Yet, the
VFS does not know at which position of the code sheet the cast voting code appears; this
information is only known to the VA1 and the VA2. Consequently, if the VFS and either
the VA1 or the VA2 maliciously collaborate, the conspiracy is able to violate vote secrecy
of all cast votes.
Voting Device, the NEC, and one Voting Authority. As outlined before, the VFS knows
the relation between voting options and their respective ciphertexts as well as voters’ iden-
tities and their cast voting codes. If the VFS is not compromised, the adversary might
gain the respective knowledge by corrupting voting devices and a threshold of commit-
tee members. Throughout the voting phase, voting devices learn the voters’ identities
and their cast voting codes, while a threshold of the NEC is able to decrypt published
ciphertexts, thereby constructing the link between voting options and their respective ci-
phertexts. If this knowledge is associated with either the VA1’s or the VA2’s knowledge,
the adversary is able to violate vote secrecy of all cast votes.
Vote Integrity. Corrupting the following components allows the adversary to violate vote
integrity.
Voting Authorities. Throughout the voting phase, the VFS separates the voting code
received from the voter and forwards the respective parts to the VA1 and the VA2. If
both authorities the VA1 and the VA2 agree on selecting the same encryption of a different
candidate from the VSS, they can undetectably manipulate the voter’s cast vote before
storing it25.
Eligibility. Corrupting or controlling the following components allows the adversary to
violate eligibility.
Voter, Vote Forwarding Server, and NEC. The first group involves the voter, the VFS,
and the NEC . If the voter forwards her code sheet to the VFS, then the VFS can cast
one voting code from that voter’s code sheet. As the VFS is not in possession of a valid
25Because the VA1 and the VA2 are not aware of the content they re-encryt, both authorities could merely
alter the vote into a random vote, rather than a specific vote.
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voter query, the committee members must agree on the eligibility violation. Hence, if one
voter collaborates, the adversary can cause the maximum impact on eligibility.
Vote Forwarding Server, Voting Authorities, and NEC. The second group consists of the
VFS, the VA1, the VA2, and the committee members. Rather than receiving code sheets
from the voters, the VFS might receive valid voting codes from the VA1 and the VA2. In
malicious agreement with a threshold subset of the committee members, the group would
succeed in violating eligibility for all abstaining voters.
Fairness. Analogously to the Estonian case, only votes not being updated may reliably
be revealed by the adversary before the end of the voting phase. Hence, corrupting the
following components allows the adversary to violate fairness.
Vote Forwarding Server and one Voting Authority. In accordance to the vote secrecy
case, in addition to the VFS, the adversary has to corrupt either one of the two voting
authorities VA1 or VA2 in order to calculate intermediate results, thereby violating fairness
of all votes that are not updated.
Voting Device, NEC, and Voting Authorities. In analogy to the vote secrecy case, the
adversary might corrupt voting devices to determine voting codes have been cast by the
voters. If the adversary additionally controls either one of the voting authorities VA1 or
VA2, he is able to relate the cast voting codes to ciphertexts. If the adversary in addition
controls a threshold of committee members, these are able to decrypt obtained ciphertexts.
The conspiracy is consequently capable of determining votes for those voters that vote over
compromised voting devices.
Data Access Protection. According to the specification, the following components learn
voter identities and can therefore violate data access protection.
Voting Device. Because of the fact that voting devices are generally known for a number of
purposes, voting devices know the voters’ identities. A compromised voting device might
consequently forward a voter’s identity to the adversary.
Distribution Authority. In the setup phase, DA provides voters with their code sheets.
Therefore, the DA knows voters’ identities and their postal addresses. In case of corrup-
tion, the DA might forward these information to the adversary.
Vote Forwarding Server. In analogy to the original Estonian scheme, the voter casts
signed ballots, i.e. signed voting codes, to the VFS. In case of corruption, the VFS might
abuse its role and forward voter data to the adversary.
Computationally unrestricted and Communication Channel. Analogously to the case of
the original Estonian scheme, if the adversary controls the communication channel between
the voting device and the VFS and additionally is capable of breaking cryptographic
primitives, the adversary can determine the identities of voters who cast an Internet vote.
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6.5. Comparison of the Qualitative Security Models of the
Original and the Extended Scheme
The original Estonian scheme allows an adversary to violate four security requirements
by means of compromised voting devices. In contrast, the proposed extension allows an
adversary to violate only one security requirement by only controlling voting devices.
In spite of the fact that processes were largely maintained, the extended scheme does
not Pareto dominate the original Estonian scheme. Consider the following facts:
If an adversary obtains a voter’s code sheet, the adversary can violate vote secrecy by
verifying that exactly one of the voting codes have been arrived at a central component
of the scheme. In the original Estonian scheme, a voter cannot support the generation of
such a proof.
Furthermore, the original scheme requires the collaboration of eight components, namely
the members of the NEC and the VSS. Hence, eligibility in the original scheme depends
only on the correct behaviour of oﬄine service providers. On the other side, in the case
of full corruption of online service providers (namely RA) and the total control of voters
(namely VO), the extended scheme does only need the corruption of seven components,
namely the NEC.
The adequacy of the original and the extended Estonian scheme therefore depends on
election-specific quantitative security evaluation.
6.6. Comparison of the Quantitative Security Models of the
Original and the Extended Scheme
Election Settings. On the basis of the qualitative security evaluation, the security of
the original and the extended Estonian scheme is quantitatively assessed against the four
probabilistic adversaries specified in Section 4.2.
In addition to these adversaries, we construct two additional probabilistic adversaries.
The first constructed adversary possesses the capability VO with certainty (U[1, 1]). The
adversary does not possess the capabilities VD, OFSP, VI, and HCH (U[0, 0]). Further-
more, the adversary possesses the capability ONSP with a uniform probability distribution
between 0.1 and 0.2 (U[0.1, 0.2]). Given the qualitative security models of the original and
extended Estonian scheme, we expect the original scheme to outperform the extended
scheme with regard to vote secrecy against that adversary.
The second constructed adversary possesses the capabilities ONSP, VO with certainty
(U[1, 1]), and does not possess the capabilities VD, VI, and HCH (U[0, 0]). Furthermore,
the adversary possesses the capability OFSP with a probability of 0.5 (U[0.5, 0.5]). Given
the qualitative security models of both schemes, we expect the original scheme to outper-
form the extended scheme with regard to eligibility against that adversary.
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The probabilistic adversaries considered for the quantitative evaluation of the original
and the extended Estonian Internet voting scheme are shown in Table 6.3.
Referring to the Estonian parliamentary elections 2015, we consider a number of 899, 793
eligible voters and 176, 491 expected voters.
Results. The results of the quantitative security evaluation of both schemes are provided
in Tables 6.4, 6.5, 6.6, 6.7, 6.8 and 6.9, and are visualized in Figures 6.13, 6.14, 6.15,
6.16, 6.17, 6.18. In addition to the satisfaction degrees, the tables contain the minimum
and maximum theoretically possible satisfaction degrees for both schemes: a minimum
(respectively maximum) satisfaction degree corresponds to the quantitative evaluation of
qualitative security models with the largest (respectively smallest) probability value for
all adversarial capabilities.
In spite of the fact that the extended scheme does not Pareto dominate the original
scheme, the security of the extended scheme is at least as good as the original scheme
against all adversaries defined in Section 4.2 with regard to all security requirements.
We first investigate the significance of the achieved improvements with regard to the
different election settings. Subsequently, we discuss the evaluation results within the two
constructed election settings.
Consider the results of the first election setting as baseline.
It can be noticed that the dominance of the extended scheme becomes more severe with
regard to vote integrity, vote secrecy, and fairness if an adversary increases his capabilities
with regard to voting device corruption26. This observation is explained by the fact that in
the original scheme, compromised voting devices are a single point of failure with regard to
these requirements. In contrast, the extended scheme prevents an adversary from violating
these requirements when only compromising voting devices.
An adversary increasing his capabilities with regard to service provider corruption does
impact the original and the extended scheme to a similar extent. In spite of the fact
that the scheme extension addresses several single points of failures with regard to service
providers, the quantitative result indicates that service provider corruption is not the
prevalent threat to security requirements in the considered election setting.
The satisfaction degrees of both the original and the extended schemes remain largely
identical if the adversary increases his capabilities to interact with voters. However, it turns
out that the difference between the original and extended Estonian scheme significantly
decreases with regard to vote secrecy in that setting. This stems from the fact that voters
possess code sheets in the extended scheme, which they can forward to the adversary. In
collaboration with several other components, this code sheet can serve as a proof about a
voter’s vote. In contrast, the voter does not receive any receipt that serves as proof about
her vote in the original scheme.
In fact, the previous observation is emphasized within our first constructed election
26Notice that this severity becomes visible because of the scale differences in the respective Kiviat diagrams.
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setting. If the voter forwards any objects/data they have (with a probability of 1) and the
probability that an online service provider is compromised is above 0, then, in the original
Estonian scheme, vote secrecy can be enforced to a higher degree than in the extended
Estonian scheme.
In the case of an absolute corruption of online service providers and absolute voter
control in terms of receiving output from voters, the original Estonian scheme enforces
eligibility to a slightly higher degree than the extended scheme. This is explained by the
fact that in the extended scheme only seven oﬄine service providers might undetectably
cast votes for abstaining voters as opposed to eight oﬄine service providers in the case of
the original Estonian scheme.
6.7. Summary
The Estonian Internet voting scheme looks back on a long history. Since 2005, Estonians
are able to cast their votes for political elections over the Internet. On the foundation of
available literature and reviews of the Estonian Internet scheme, we determined qualita-
tive security models of the original Estonian scheme and identified several shortcomings.
Among the most prevalent shortcomings, we identified the fact that four out of five secu-
rity requirements can be violated by an adversary having the capability of compromising
voting devices. We consequently addressed this shortcoming of the scheme and proposed
an extension. To eliminate the risks caused by compromised voting devices, our proposal
implements the concept of code voting, as introduced by Chaum [Cha01]. The proposed
extensions did not result result in a Pareto dominating extension of the original Estonian
scheme. We therefore conducted a quantitative security evaluation within six election
settings. The findings indicate that in the four previously specified election settings, the
extended scheme outperforms the original Estonian scheme with regard to four out of
five security requirements. Solely, with regard to data access protection, both schemes
rely on the trustworthiness of several single components. However, there are specific set-
tings in which the original Estonian outperforms the proposed extension with regard to
single security requirements. In conclusion, while the proposed extension is valuable for
most election settings, when comparing the original and the extended scheme, the deci-
sion finally depends on the concrete target election setting and the relative importance of
legally-founded security requirements.
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Requirement Qualitative Security Models Impact
Vote
Integrity (VA1 ∧VA2) 0 ≤ l ≤ 1
Eligibility
((∨
I⊆{1,...,n},|I|≥l(
∧
i∈I V Oi)
)
∧ V FS∧(7 out of NEC)
)
∨
(V FS ∧VA1 ∧VA2∧(7 out of NEC)) 0 ≤ l ≤ 1
Fairness (V FS ∧VA1) ∨ (V FS ∧VA2)∨((∨
I⊆{1,...,n},|I|≥l(
∧
i∈I V Di)
)
∧VA1 ∧ (4 out of NEC)
)
∨((∨
I⊆{1,...,n},|I|≥l(
∧
i∈I V Di)
)
∧VA2 ∧ (4 out of NEC)
)
0 ≤ l ≤ 97100
Vote
((∨
I⊆{1,...,n},|I|≥l(
∧
i∈I V Oi)
)
∧
Secrecy
(∨
I⊆{1,...,n},|I|≥l(
∧
i∈I V Di)
)
∨((∨
I⊆{1,...,n},|I|≥l(
∧
i∈I V Oi)
)
∧ V FS
)
∨((∨
I⊆{1,...,n},|I|≥l(
∧
i∈I V Oi)
)
∧VA1
)
∨((∨
I⊆{1,...,n},|I|≥l(
∧
i∈I V Oi)
)
∧VA2
)
∨
(V FS ∧VA1) ∨ (V FS ∧VA2)∨((∨
I⊆{1,...,n},|I|≥l(
∧
i∈I V Di)
)
∧VA1 ∧ (4 out of NEC)
)
∨((∨
I⊆{1,...,n},|I|≥l(
∧
i∈I V Di)
)
∧VA2 ∧ (4 out of NEC)
)
0 ≤ l ≤ 97100((∨
I⊆{1,...,n},|I|≥l(
∧
i∈I V Oi)
)
∧ V FS
)
∨((∨
I⊆{1,...,n},|I|≥l(
∧
i∈I V Oi)
)
∧VA1
)
∨((∨
I⊆{1,...,n},|I|≥l(
∧
i∈I V Oi)
)
∧VA2
)
∨
(V FS ∧VA1) ∨ (V FS ∧VA2)∨((∨
I⊆{1,...,n},|I|≥l(
∧
i∈I V Di)
)
∧VA1 ∧ (4 out of NEC)
)
∨((∨
I⊆{1,...,n},|I|≥l(
∧
i∈I V Di)
)
∧VA2 ∧ (4 out of NEC)
)
97
100 < l ≤ 1
Data
Access
Protection
(∨
I⊆{1,...,n},|I|≥l(
∧
i∈I V Di)
)
∨DA ∨ V FS∨(CR ∧ CCH) 1 ≤ l ≤ n
Table 6.2: Qualitative security models of the extended Estonian Internet voting scheme.
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Election Setting VD ONSP OFSP VO VI HCH
E1 U[0.01, 0.1] U[0.001, 0.002] U[0.0001, 0.0002] U[0.01, 0.1] U[0.01, 0.1] U[0.01, 0.1]
E2 U[0.1, 0.2] U[0.001, 0.002] U[0.0001, 0.0002] U[0.01, 0.1] U[0.01, 0.1] U[0.01, 0.1]
E3 U[0.01, 0.1] U[0.01, 0.02] U[0.001, 0.002] U[0.01, 0.1] U[0.01, 0.1] U[0.01, 0.1]
E4 U[0.01, 0.1] U[0.001, 0.002] U[0.0001, 0.0002] U[0.1, 0.2] U[0.1, 0.2] U[0.1, 0.2]
E6 U[0, 0] U[0.01, 0.02] U[0, 0] U[1, 1] U[0, 0] U[0, 0]
E7 U[0, 0] U[1, 1] U[0.5, 0.5] U[1, 1] U[0, 0] U[0, 0]
Table 6.3: Probabilistic adversaries considered for the quantitative evaluation of the original and extended Estonian scheme.
Requirement Ori. Estonia SD Ori. Estonia Min/Max SD Ext. Estonia SD Ext. Estonia Min/Max SD
Eligibility 1.0000000 [1.000000000000, 1.000000000000] 1.0000000 [1.000000000000, 1.000000000000]
Fairness 0.9478738 [0.902240731417, 0.990638176928] 0.999984613 [0.999960900080, 0.999998127716]
DA Protection 0.94787357 [0.902240319619, 0.990638101845] 0.94787357 [0.902240319619, 0.990638101845]
Vote Secrecy 0.94787385 [0.902240822662, 0.990638193589] 0.961904013 [0.902431490663, 0.990696305644]
Vote Integrity 0.9478738 [0.902240731326, 0.990638176920] 0.999999977 [0.999999960000, 0.999999990000]
Table 6.4: Results of the quantitative security evaluation of the original and extended Estonian scheme within election setting 1.
Requirement Ori. Estonia SD Ori. Estonia Min/Max SD Ext. Estonia SD Ext. Estonia Min/Max SD
Eligibility 1.0000000 [1.000000000000, 1.000000000000] 1.0000000 [1.000000000000, 1.000000000000]
Fairness 0.851969229 [0.803114033376, 0.902240777175] 0.999955522 [0.999921253350, 0.999980449099]
DA Protection 0.851968874 [0.803113509064, 0.902240571255] 0.851968874 [0.803113509064, 0.902240571255]
Vote Secrecy 0.851969308 [0.803114149553, 0.902240822868] 0.945994925 [0.902280241805, 0.990640059026]
Vote Integrity 0.851969229 [0.803114033260, 0.902240777152] 0.999999977 [0.999999960000, 0.999999990000]
Table 6.5: Results of the quantitative security evaluation of the original and extended Estonian scheme within election setting 2.
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Requirement Ori. Estonia SD Ori. Estonia Min/Max SD Ext. Estonia SD Ext. Estonia Min/Max SD
Eligibility 1.0000000 [1.000000000000, 1.000000000000] 1.0000000 [1.000000000000, 1.000000000000]
Fairness 0.947137063 [0.902239908563, 0.990638026829] 0.999839651 [0.999609359503, 0.999980609731]
DA Protection 0.946794479 [0.902235790545, 0.989010000000] 0.946794479 [0.902235790545, 0.989010000000]
Vote Secrecy 0.947137568 [0.902240795533, 0.990638191114] 0.961984641 [0.902820440441, 0.990713529096]
Vote Integrity 0.947137059 [0.902239899447, 0.990638025996] 0.999997641 [0.999996000000, 0.999999000000]
Table 6.6: Results of the quantitative security evaluation of the original and extended Estonian scheme within election setting 3.
Requirement Ori. Estonia SD Ori. Estonia Min/Max SD Ext. Estonia SD Ext. Estonia Min/Max SD
Eligibility 1.0000000 [1.000000000000, 1.000000000000] 1.0000000 [1.000000000000, 1.000000000000]
Fairness 0.947234111 [0.90224073141, 0.990638176928] 0.999984079 [0.999960900080, 0.999998127716]
DA Protection 0.94723388 [0.902240319619, 0.990638101845] 0.94723388 [0.902240319619, 0.990638101845]
Vote Secrecy 0.947234163 [0.902240822662, 0.990638193589] 0.947249901 [0.902279784527, 0.990639975625]
Vote Integrity 0.947234111 [0.902240731326, 0.990638176920] 0.999999976 [0.999999960000, 0.999999990000]
Table 6.7: Results of the quantitative security evaluation of the original and extended Estonian scheme within election setting 4.
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Requirement Ori. Estonia SD Ori. Estonia Min/Max SD Ext. Estonia SD Ext. Estonia Min/Max SD
Eligibility 1.0000000 [1.000000000000, 1.000000000000] 1.0000000 [1.000000000000, 1.000000000000]
Fairness 1.0000000 [1.000000000000, 1.000000000000] 1.0000000 [1.000000000000, 1.000000000000]
DA Protection 0.984987414 [0.980000000000, 0.990000000000] 0.984987414 [0.980000000000, 0.990000000000]
Vote Secrecy 1.0000000 [1.000000000000, 1.000000000000] 0.984987414 [0.980000000000, 0.990000000000]
Vote Integrity 1.0000000 [1.000000000000, 1.000000000000] 1.0000000 [1.000000000000, 1.000000000000]
Table 6.8: Results of the quantitative security evaluation of the original and extended Estonian scheme within election setting 6.
Requirement Ori. Estonia SD Ori. Estonia Min/Max SD Ext. Estonia SD Ext. Estonia Min/Max SD
Eligibility 0.996093 [0.996093750000, 0.996093750000] 0.9921875 [0.992187500000, 0.992187500000]
Fairness 0.2175598 [0.217559827767, 0.217559827767] 0.2725011 [0.272501147367, 0.272501147367]
DA Protection 0.0000000 [0.000000000000, 0.000000000000] 0.0000000 [0.000000000000, 0.000000000000]
Vote Secrecy 0.0966797 [0.096679687500, 0.096679687500] 1.0000000 [1.000000000000, 1.000000000000]
Vote Integrity 0.1250000 [0.125000000000, 0.125000000000] 0.7500000 [0.750000000000, 0.750000000000]
Table 6.9: Results of the quantitative security evaluation of the original and extended Estonian scheme within election setting 7.

Chapter 7
Conclusion, Limitations, and Future
Work
The final chapter summarizes the contributions and limitations of the thesis. Furthermore,
we guide future research into several directions.
7.1. Conclusion
This thesis concerned itself with the evaluation of Internet voting schemes and their im-
provement with regard to legally-founded security requirements. To that end, the thesis
sought to answer two research questions.
Research Question 1. How can the satisfaction of legally-founded security requirements
in Internet voting schemes be measured?
On the basis of previous interdisciplinary work by Bra¨unlich et al. [BGRR13], we re-
fined 13 legal criteria for Internet voting systems into 16 technical requirements at which
the implementation of Internet voting systems shall target. On the foundation of the le-
gal instrumental criterion assurance, we separated these technical requirements into eight
security requirements and eight non-security requirements. The determined technical re-
quirements overcome one shortcoming of Bra¨unlich et al.’s work in reference to our research
question: the fact that legal criteria overlap insofar that they capture requirements, mea-
sures supporting the satisfaction of requirements, and descriptive refinements. While this
distinction is not required in a constructive approach (the designated goal of Bra¨unlich et
al.), an overlap in evaluation criteria might result in the fact that certain requirements un-
intentionally obtain more weight than others which ultimately would lead to questionable
evaluation results.
Given the fact that not all legal provisions, and analogously not all deduced technical
requirements, can be enforced to their full extent, the German Constitution opens legal
latitude to the legislator within which non-ideal voting systems might achieve constitu-
tional compliance. According to the legal latitude, a security evaluation framework for
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Internet voting systems, taking the application environment into account, was needed.
To construct such a framework for Internet voting schemes (as core building block of In-
ternet voting systems), we determined a set of adversarial capabilities. On the one side,
these capabilities serve system analysts to specify election-independent qualitative security
models of Internet voting schemes with regard to different security requirements. Further-
more, qualitative security models allow one to capture whether one Internet voting scheme
dominates another scheme with regard to security requirements independent of the con-
crete election setting. On the other side, adversarial capabilities serve election officials to
specify election settings in terms of expected adversaries. Because of the non-linearity of
qualitative security models and election officials’ potential lack of knowledge, election offi-
cials might specify these adversaries with uncertainty. The constructed security evaluation
framework therefore provides election officials with the possibility to specify adversaries
in a probabilistic manner, i.e. by assigning probability distributions for the different ad-
versarial capabilities. Upon the specification of qualitative security models of Internet
voting schemes and an election setting, the framework evaluates qualitative security mod-
els within the election setting by running a large number of Monte-Carlo simulations. The
result of this process are satisfaction degrees for Internet voting schemes with regard to
legally-founded security requirements, taking the election environment into account.
Research Question 2. Can established Internet voting schemes be improved with regard
to legally-founded security requirements for Internet voting schemes?
We addressed the second research question by selecting two well-established Internet
voting schemes, namely the Polyas Internet voting scheme and the Estonian Internet vot-
ing scheme. Both schemes have been used to run a variety of elections and more than two
million votes have been cast over both schemes. The qualitative security evaluation of both
schemes revealed several shortcomings. The Polyas Internet voting scheme did not main-
tain vote integrity against compromised voting devices. We addressed this shortcoming by
incorporating out of band return codes as means to detect voting devices’ misbehaviour
throughout the voting process. Upon receipt of the alleged voter intention, the voting
service providers return the respective return code(s) to the voting device. Given the fact
that a compromised voting device does not learn return codes in advance, the device can
only return the return code(s) received from the service providers. The qualitative security
models of both schemes demonstrate the Pareto dominance of the extended Polyas scheme
over the original scheme. We quantitatively evaluated the security of both schemes in five
election settings to evaluate the relevance of the proposed extension in different settings.
The results showed that the higher the relative risk of voting device corruption (in relation
to other adversarial capabilities), the higher is the relevance of the proposed extension.
The Estonian scheme suffered qualitative shortcomings insofar that four out of five
security requirements could be violated by compromised voting devices. We addressed
this shortcoming by incorporating out of band voting codes and acknowledgement codes
into the original scheme. To prevent single components from violating specific security
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requirements due to the incorporation of voting codes, we extended the scheme further
towards separation of duties. The extended scheme maintains security against single
malicious components (be they voting devices or other components) with regard to four
out of five security requirements. In spite of these gains, the proposed scheme does not
Pareto dominate the Estonian scheme. Hence, we quantitatively evaluated the security
of both schemes in six election settings. In four out of six election settings, the extended
scheme performs equally or better than the original Estonian scheme with regard to all
security requirements. In two out of six election settings, the original scheme slightly
outperforms the extended scheme with regard to one security requirement. These findings
indicate that the extended scheme might be the more appropriate scheme from a security
perspective in most election settings. However, the selection might also depend on the
weighting of different security requirements, which might lead to seldom cases in which
the original Estonian Internet voting scheme could be more appropriate in specific election
settings.
7.2. Limitations and Future Work
The contributions of this thesis are limited by several assumptions that have been outlined
throughout the work. We summarize these limitations in this section and provide thoughts
on how these assumptions might be relaxed in the future.
The focus of this thesis are federal elections in the German context. While the legal
regulations of this work might indicate a general direction also for other elections, the
exact legal regulations might vary from case to case. The investigation of different types
of elections would require an interdisciplinary revision of the herein derived technical
requirements.
The security evaluation framework targets at the evaluation of Internet voting schemes
rather than implemented and running Internet voting systems. From a legal perspective,
such a distinction is not made and the elections as a whole have to be conducted in a
legally-compliant way. Consequently, when evaluating Internet-based elections, from a
technical perspective additional dimensions have to be evaluated, namely the functions,
hard-/software, and authorities dimension according to Schryen’s reference framework for
electronic voting systems [Sch04]. The evaluation of Internet voting systems comes with
a further challenge: it has to be determined whether the independence of the scheme
layer holds true on the system layer. For instance, the Vote Forwarding Server and the
Vote Storage Server of the Estonian Internet voting scheme are developed and maintained
by the same vendor, which practically reduces the security of the scheme’s real-world
implementation.
The security evaluation framework allows one to evaluate the security of Internet voting
schemes, yet, legal regulations prescribe the enforcement of further aspects of Internet
voting systems, e.g. system accessibility, system usability, and data transparency. Anal-
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ogously to the constructed security evaluation framework for Internet voting schemes,
similar frameworks for the evaluation with regard to further technical requirements are
needed. Of particular importance is the consolidation of scales, i.e. differences in the
enforcement of security requirements have to be compared against differences in the en-
forcement of non-security requirements. The evaluation of Internet voting systems with
regard to specific requirements, e.g. usability and accessibility, is widely built upon es-
tablished evaluation methods, see for instance the survey on e-voting system usability by
Olembo and Volkamer [OV13], and the recommendations by Laskowski et al. [LAC+04].
The evaluation of Internet voting systems with regard to other non-security requirements,
e.g. data transparency, might require further interdisciplinary research.
Given the partially contradicting nature of legal provisions, Internet voting systems –as
any other voting method– cannot enforce those provisions to their full extent. The legal
latitude provides a means to evaluate the legal compliance of non-ideal voting systems.
To evaluate the legal compliance of Internet voting schemes in reference to other voting
modes, e.g. postal voting, analogous evaluation frameworks for other voting modes are
needed.
The security evaluation framework for Internet voting schemes is based on the assump-
tion that voters and the general public verify anything that they can verify (refer to
Section 3.1.2). This includes also the fact that voters will use independent verification
devices if the scheme foresees their use. In the Polyas scheme, this assumption does also
cover that voters check whether they received their election material and whether the seal
on the envelope has not been manipulated. Such an assumption does not generally hold
true as studies show [KOKV11, KKO+11, OBV13, HW14, AKBW14]. Previous research
[NORV14] has shown that people do only take the effort of conducting verification steps,
if they are motivated and capable to conduct these steps. We consider it therefore of
fundamental importance to facilitate verification processes and advance scientific research
towards voter education. On the other side, we assume that anything that cannot be de-
tected within the scheme, remains undetected. Also this assumptions does not generally
hold true. For instance, certain attack patterns might cause suspicion and lead to further
investigation. For instance, if exceptionally many votes are cast at the end of the voting
phase, it might be an indication for the fact that malicious conspiracies violate eligibility.
The constructed framework allows system analysts and election officials to specify their
respective views in a unique manner in terms of eight adversarial capabilities. While
these capabilities form a solid starting point for the security evaluation of Internet vot-
ing schemes, depending on the application scenario, capabilities might be refined. For
instance, operating systems running on voting devices might become part of the evalu-
ation. To that end, system analysts might estimate the relative corruption probabilities
for distinct operating systems. Election officials might ultimately only specify the ex-
pected number of voters that use different operating systems. Furthermore, the security
evaluation framework might be extended by distinguishing central servers from the au-
7.2. Limitations and Future Work 137
thorities managing these servers. Election officials would consequently assign corruption
probabilities both for servers and authorities.
Currently, the constructed framework considers the presence of adversarial capabilities
in a probabilistic manner and the impact caused by different adversaries in a quantitative
manner. However, the framework does not consider probabilistic attack strategies, i.e.
either an adversary is capable of causing certain impact or it is not. However, fine-grained
differences in attack strategies become apparent. For instance, certain anonymization
techniques allow an adversary to assign certain votes to a subset of all participating voters,
see for instance the vulnerabilities outlined by Demirel et al. [DJV12]. The framework
could be extended by incorporating probabilistic attack strategies.
The constructed framework allows election officials to assess the satisfaction degree
of legally-founded security requirements in different Internet voting schemes within the
specified election settings. The election official might specify these settings with high
uncertainty. In that case, also the computed satisfaction degrees might become highly un-
certain. We have addressed this concern by providing minimum and maximum satisfaction
degrees for all security requirements within the specified election setting. This direction
can be explored further in the future. We currently assume a static adversary model, i.e.
adversaries have specific capabilities according to specific probability distribution. We
do, however, not consider cases in which distributions change over time, e.g. adversaries
might only gain certain capabilities within a specific time frame. Extending the framework
towards dynamic adversaries could potentially lead to higher specification certainty and
tighter evaluation results. The underlying Monte-Carlo simulations build a profound basis
for uncertainty analysis. The framework could, for instance, provide output distributions,
rather than a compressed satisfaction degree. Furthermore, the framework could provide
election officials with feedback about the security gains by reducing uncertain capability
probabilities or reducing the probabilities of specific capabilities. If the probability that an
adversary causes a specific impact with regard to a specific security requirement is linear in
all capability probabilities and probabilities are distributed uniformly, then Monte-Carlo
simulations can be omitted for the sake of performance. In that case, one can calculate the
statistical mean of the uniform distribution and evaluate the probability that an adversary
causes a specific impact with regard to a specific security requirement deterministically.
We make the assumption that adversaries gain two different instantiated capabilities
with the same probability. This assumption might not always hold true. For instance, de-
veloping successful attack strategies – thereby increasing corruption probabilities – against
one online/oﬄine service provider or voting device might also influence the corruption
probabilities of corrupting other online/oﬄine service providers or compromising other
voting devices.
We make the assumption that election officials are capable of providing probabilities
for adversaries possessing different assumptions at least with some uncertainty. On an
abstract level, there might, however, be further factors influencing those probabilities for
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adversarial capabilities, e.g. cost-benefit trade offs, funding and expertise.
Within this work, election-specific knowledge has been partially incorporated in the de-
termination of qualitative security models. For instance throughout the evaluation of the
Estonian scheme, an estimated number of updated votes and the fact that all citizens using
their eIDs for authentication and digital signatures also cast their votes via the Internet,
have been used to determine qualitative security models with regard to vote secrecy, fair-
ness, and eligibility. Therefore, in the future, further election-specific knowledge provided
by election officials might be used to determine more precise qualitative security models.
The constructed framework supports election officials in identifying the most adequate
Internet voting scheme for their election setting from a security perspective. From a prac-
tical perspective, decision criteria beyond legally-founded technical requirements might be
of relevance, e.g. cost considerations, time considerations and trust-enabling measures of
Internet voting systems. We therefore recommend to incorporate the security evaluation
framework into a larger decision support system for election officials.
The quantitative security evaluation of the Polyas scheme, the Estonian scheme, and
their respective improvements are based on the correctness of the determined qualitative
security models. To deduce these models, we have reviewed scientific literature, experience
reports, and have been in touch with system developers other researchers. Yet, for the
future, we recommend a variety of Internet voting schemes to be evaluated by system
analysts, e.g. JCJ/Civitas [JCJ05, CCM08] and Remotegrity [ZCC+13].
In spite of their qualitative improvements, both the Polyas and the Estonian Internet
voting schemes suffer further (and potentially more critical) security shortcomings. For in-
stance, one fundamental problem of the Polyas scheme is the ballot box server’s capability
to manipulate votes between receiving and storing them. For the future, the herein de-
termined qualitative security models can serve system developers to improve the schemes
further towards the enforcements of legally-founded security requirements.
Bibliography
[ABdO76] Ronald N. Allan, Roy Billinton, and Mauricio Figueiredo de Oliveira. An
efficient algorithm for deducing the minimal cuts and reliability indices of a
general network configuration. IEEE Transactions on Reliability, 25(4):226–
233, 1976.
[ADMPQ09] Ben Adida, Olivier De Marneffe, Olivier Pereira, and Jean-Jacques
Quisquater. Electing a university president using open-audit voting: analysis
of real-world use of helios. In 2009 Electronic Voting Technology Workshop /
Workshop on Trustworthy Elections (EVT/WOTE), pages 10–10. USENIX
Association, 2009.
[AKBW14] Claudia Z. Acemyan, Philip Kortum, Michael D. Byrne, and Dan S. Wallach.
Usability of voter verifiable, end-to-end voting systems: baseline data for
Helios, Preˆt a` Voter, and scantegrity II. In 2014 Electronic Voting Technology
Workshop / Workshop on Trustworthy Elections (EVT/WOTE). USENIX
Association, 2014.
[Ave85] Terje Aven. Reliability/availability evaluations of coherent systems based on
minimal cut sets. Reliability Engineering, 13(2):93–104, 1985.
[BC07] Frank Bannister and Regina Connolly. A risk assessment framework for elec-
tronic voting. International Journal of Technology, Policy and Management,
7(2):190–208, 2007.
[BC14] David Basin and Cas Cremers. Know your enemy: Compromising adver-
saries in protocol analysis. ACM Transactions on Information and System
Security (TISSEC), 17(2):7, 2014.
[Ben06] Josh Benaloh. Simple verifiable elections. In Electronic Voting Technology
Workshop (EVT), pages 5–5, 2006.
[BGRR13] Katharina Bra¨unlich, Ru¨diger Grimm, Philipp Richter, and Alexander Roß-
nagel. Sichere Internetwahlen: Ein rechtswissenschaftlich-informatisches
Modell. Nomos, 2013.
140 Bibliography
[BM07] Ahto Buldas and Triinu Ma¨gi. Practical security analysis of e-voting systems.
In Advances in Information and Computer Security, pages 320–335. Springer,
2007.
[BPM02] Giampaolo Bella, Lawrence C. Paulson, and Fabio Massacci. The verification
of an industrial payment protocol: The set purchase phase. In Proceedings of
the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security, pages
12–20. ACM, 2002.
[BR93] Mihir Bellare and Phillip Rogaway. Random oracles are practical: A
paradigm for designing efficient protocols. In Proceedings of the 1st ACM
conference on Computer and communications security, pages 62–73. ACM,
1993.
[Bun09] Bundesamt fu¨r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik. BSI-CC-PP-0061:
Electronic Identity Card (ID Card PP). Technical report, 2009.
[BWV14] Jurlind Budurushi, Marcel Woide, and Melanie Volkamer. Introducing pre-
cautionary behavior by temporal diversion of voter attention from casting
to verifying their vote. In Workshop on Usable Security (USEC), 2014.
[CCM08] Michael R. Clarkson, Stephen Chong, and Andrew C. Myers. Civitas: To-
ward a Secure Voting System. In 2008 Symposium on Security and Privacy
(S & P), pages 354–368, 2008.
[CGS97] Ronald Cramer, Rosario Gennaro, and Berry Schoenmakers. A secure and
optimally efficient multi-authority election scheme. In 16th annual inter-
national conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques,
pages 103–118. Springer-Verlag, 1997.
[Cha01] David Chaum. Sure vote: Technical overview. In Workshop on Trustworthy
Elections (WOTE), 2001.
[Che06] Ye Chen. Multiple criteria decision analysis: classification problems and
solutions. 2006.
[CL12] Teodor G. Crainic and Gilbert Laporte. Fleet management and logistics.
Springer Science & Business Media, 2012.
[CMPC13] Marcelo Carlomagno Carlos, Jean Everson Martina, Geraint Price, and Ri-
cardo Felipe Custo´dio. An updated threat model for security ceremonies. In
2013 Annual ACM Symposium on Applied Computing (SAC), pages 1836–
1843. ACM, 2013.
Bibliography 141
[Com07] Technical Guidelines Development Committee. Voluntary voting system
guidelines recommendations to the election assistance commission. Election
Assistance Commission, 2007.
[Com10] Estonian National Electoral Committee. E-voting system. General Overview,
2010.
[Cou04] Council of Europe. Legal, Operational and Technical Standards for E-Voting.
Recommendation Rec(2004)11 adopted by the Committee of Ministers of
the Council of Europe and explanatory memorandum. Council of europe
publishing, 2004.
[CPP13] Edouard Cuvelier, Olivier Pereira, and Thomas Peters. Election verifiability
or ballot privacy: Do we need to choose? In 18th European Symposium on
Research in Computer Security (ESORICS), pages 481–498. Springer, 2013.
[DJV12] Denise Demirel, Hugo Jonker, and Melanie Volkamer. Random block ver-
ification: Improving the Norwegian electoral mix-net. In 5th International
Conference on Electronic Voting (EVOTE), volume 205 of LNI - Lecture
Notes in Informatics, pages 65–78. GI, 2012.
[Dre06] Horst Dreier. Grundgesetz-Kommentar. Morlok Siebeck Verlag, 2006.
[DS04] Morris R. Driels and Young S. Shin. Determining the number of iterations
for monte carlo simulations of weapon effectiveness. Technical report, DTIC
Document, 2004.
[DY83] Danny Dolev and Andrew C. Yao. On the security of public key protocols.
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 29(2):198–208, 1983.
[EAC09] EAC Advisory Board and Standards Board. Threat trees and matrices and
threat instance risk analyzer (TIRA), 2009.
[Ell07] Carl M. Ellison. Ceremony design and analysis. IACR Cryptology ePrint
Archive, 2007:399, 2007.
[FC05] Eric A. Fischer and Kevin J. Coleman. The direct recording electronic vot-
ing machine (DRE) controversy: FAQs and misperceptions. Congressional
Research Service, Library of Congress, 2005.
[Fed] Federal Constitutional Court. Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court
(BVerfGE) referred to in this work.
[Fed01] Federal Election Commission. Voting system standards. Technical report,
2001.
142 Bibliography
[Fel87] Paul Feldman. A practical scheme for non-interactive verifiable secret
sharing. In 28th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
(FOCS), pages 427–437. IEEE Computer Society, 1987.
[FTLB01] Olov Forsgren, Ulrich Tucholke, Se´bastien Levy, and Ste´phan Brunessaux.
D4 Volume 3 Report on electronic democracy projects, legal issues of Internet
voting and users (i.e. voters and authorities representatives) requirements
analysis. CYBERVOTE:WP2:D4V3:2001, EU CyberVote Project. Technical
report, 2001.
[Fuq87] Norman Fuqua. Reliability engineering for electronic design, volume 34. CRC
Press, 1987.
[Gam85] Taher El Gamal. A public key cryptosystem and a signature scheme based on
discrete logarithms. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 31(4):469–
472, 1985.
[Ges05] Gesellschaft fu¨r Informatik. Anforderungen an internetbasierte Verein-
swahlen, 2005.
[GJ13] Leonard Gillman and Meyer Jerison. Rings of continuous functions. Springer
Science & Business Media, 2013.
[GJKR07] Rosario Gennaro, Stanislaw Jarecki, Hugo Krawczyk, and Tal Rabin. Secure
distributed key generation for discrete-log based cryptosystems. Journal of
Cryptology, 20(1):51–83, 2007.
[GKM+06] Ru¨diger Grimm, Robert Krimmer, Nils Meißner, Kai Reinhard, Melanie
Volkamer, and Marcel Weinand. Security requirements for non-political in-
ternet voting. Electronic Voting 2006: 2nd International Workshop, 86:203–
212, 2006.
[Gri02] Dimitris A Gritzalis. Principles and requirements for a secure e-voting sys-
tem. Computers & Security, 21(6):539–556, 2002.
[Haz01] Michiel Hazewinkel. Encyclopedia of Mathematics. Springer, 2001.
[Hel09] Jo¨rg Helbach. Code Voting mit pru¨fbaren Code Sheets. In Informatik 2009:
Im Focus das Leben, volume 154, pages 1856–1862. GI, 2009.
[HJHL11] Axel Hoffmann, Silke Jandt, Holger Hoffmann, and Jan Marco Leimeister.
Integration rechtlicher Anforderungen an soziotechnische Systeme in fru¨he
Phasen der Systementwicklung. In Mobile und ubiquita¨re Informationssys-
teme (MMS), volume 185 of LNI, pages 72–76. GI, 2011.
Bibliography 143
[HLV12] Sven Heiberg, Peeter Laud, and Jan Villemson. The Application of I-voting
for Estonian Parliamentary Elections of 2011. In 3rd International Confer-
ence on E-Voting and Identity (Vote-ID), volume 7187 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, pages 208 – 223. Springer, 2012.
[HPR93] Volker Hammer, Ulrich Pordesch, and Alexander Roßnagel. Betriebliche
Telefon- und ISDN-Anlagen rechtsgema¨ß gestaltet. Springer, 1993.
[HPW15] Sven Heiberg, Arnis Parsovs, and Jan Willemson. Log analysis of estonian
internet voting 2013-2014. In 5th International Conference on E-Voting and
Identity (Vote-ID), volume 9269 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages
19–34. Springer, 2015.
[HS07] Jo¨rg Helbach and Jo¨rg Schwenk. Secure Internet Voting with Code Sheets.
In 1st International Conference on E-Voting and Identity (Vote-ID), volume
4896 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 166–177. Springer, 2007.
[HSS08] Jo¨rg Helbach, Jo¨rg Schwenk, and Sven Scha¨ge. Code Voting with Linkable
Group Signatures. In 3rd International Conference on Electronic Voting
(EVOTE), volume 131, pages 209–208, 2008.
[HW14] Sven Heiberg and Jan Willemson. Verifiable Internet voting in Estonia.
In 6th International Conference on Electronic Voting (EVOTE), pages 1–8.
IEEE Computer Society, 2014.
[IEE05] IEEE. EEE P1583TM/D5.0 Draft Standard for the Evaluation of Voting
Equipment, 2005.
[IL00] Sabrina Idecke-Lux. Der Einsatz von multimedialen Dokumenten bei
der Genehmigung von neuen Anlagen nach dem Bundesimmissionsschutz-
Gesetz, Reihe
”
Der elektronische Rechtsverkehr“, 2000.
[IW89] Y Iida and H Wakabayashi. An approximation method of terminal reliability
of road network using partial minimal path and cut sets. In Transport Policy,
Management & Technology Towards 2001: Selected Proceedings of the Fifth
World Conference on Transport Research, volume 4, 1989.
[JBR+99] Ivar Jacobson, Grady Booch, James Rumbaugh, James Rumbaugh, and
Grady Booch. The unified software development process, volume 1. Addison-
wesley Reading, 1999.
[JCJ05] Ari Juels, Dario Catalano, and Markus Jakobsson. Coercion-resistant Elec-
tronic Elections. In ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society
(WPES), pages 61–70. ACM, 2005.
144 Bibliography
[JFR13] Rui Joaquim, Paulo Ferreira, and Carlos Ribeiro. EVIV: An End-to-end
Verifiable Internet Voting System. Computers & Security, 32:170–191, 2013.
[JMP09] Hugo Jonker, Sjouke Mauw, and Jun Pang. A formal framework for quanti-
fying voter-controlled privacy. Journal of Algorithms, 64(2):89–105, 2009.
[Joa14] Rui Joaquim. How to prove the validity of a complex ballot encryption to
the voter and the public. Journal of Information Security and Applications,
19(2):130–142, 2014.
[JR07a] Rui Joaquim and Carlos Ribeiro. CodeVoting: Protecting Against Malicious
Vote Manipulation at the Voter’s PC. In Frontiers of Electronic Voting,
volume 07311 of Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings. Internationales Begegnungs-
und Forschungszentrum fu¨r Informatik (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl, Germany,
2007.
[JR07b] Rui Joaquim and Carlos Ribeiro. CodeVoting Protection Against Auto-
matic Vote Manipulation in an Uncontrolled Environment. In 1st Inter-
national Conference on E-Voting and Identity (Vote-ID), volume 4896 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 178–188. Springer, 2007.
[JRF09] Rui Joaquim, Carlos Ribeiro, and Paulo Ferreira. VeryVote: A Voter Ver-
ifiable Code Voting System. In 2nd International Conference on E-Voting
and Identity (Vote-ID), volume 5767 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
pages 106–121. Springer, 2009.
[JRF10] Rui Joaquim, Carlos Ribeiro, and Paulo Ferreira. Improving Remote Vot-
ing Security with CodeVoting. volume 6000 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pages 310–329. Springer, 2010.
[Kal09] Tarmo Kalvet. Management of technology: The case of e-voting in esto-
nia. In International Conference on Computer Technology and Development
(ICCTD), volume 2, pages 512–515. IEEE Computer Society, 2009.
[KGK09] Wolfgang Killmann, Alla Gnedina, and Jens Kroder. Health Professional
Card (PP-HPC) with SSCD Functionality. Technical Report BSI-PP-0018-
V2, 2009. Common Criteria Protection Profile.
[KKO+11] Fatih Karayumak, Michaela Kauer, Maina M. Olembo, Tobias Volk, and
Melanie Volkamer. User study of the improved Helios voting system interface.
In 1st Workshop on Socio-Technical Aspects in Security and Trust (STAST),
pages 37–44. IEEE Computer Society, 2011.
[KKY12] Geoffrey Karokola, Stewart Kowalski, and Louise Yngstro¨m. Secure e-
government services: Protection profile for electronic voting–a case of tan-
zania. In Proceedings of the IST-Africa 2012 Conference, 2012.
Bibliography 145
[KLP+01] Wolfgang Killmann, Herbert Leitold, Reinhard Posch, Patrick Salle´, and
Bruno Baronnet. Secure Signature-Creation Device Type3. Technical report,
2001. Common Criteria Protection Profile.
[KLS96] Jeff Kahn, Nathan Linial, and Alex Samorodnitsky. Inclusion-exclusion:
Exact and approximate. Combinatorica, 16(4):465–477, 1996.
[KN08] Henry M. Kim and Saggi Nevo. Development and application of a framework
for evaluating multi-mode voting risks. Internet Research, 18(1):121–135,
2008.
[KOKV11] Fatih Karayumak, Maina M. Olembo, Michaela Kauer, and Melanie Volka-
mer. Usability analysis of Helios: an open source verifiable remote electronic
voting system. In 2011 Electronic Voting Technology Workshop / Workshop
on Trustworthy Elections (EVT/WOTE), pages 5–5. USENIX Association,
2011.
[Kru04] Philippe Kruchten. The rational unified process: an introduction. Addison-
Wesley Professional, 2004.
[KTV11] Ralf Ku¨sters, Tomasz Truderung, and Andreas Vogt. Verifiability, privacy,
and coercion-resistance: New insights from a case study. In Security and
Privacy (SP), 2011 IEEE Symposium on, pages 538–553. IEEE, 2011.
[KTV12] Ralf Ku¨sters, Tomasz Truderung, and Andreas Vogt. Clash attacks on the
verifiability of e-voting systems. In 2012 Symposium on Security and Privacy
(S & P), pages 395–409. IEEE Computer Society, 2012.
[LAC+04] Sharon J. Laskowski, Marguerite Autry, John Cugini, William Killam, and
James Yen. Improving the usability and accessibility of voting systems and
products. US Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and
Technology, 2004.
[Lan10] Lucie Langer. Privacy and verifiability in electronic voting. PhD thesis, TU
Darmstadt, 2010.
[Lau04] Thomas W. Lauer. The risk of e-voting. Electronic Journal of e-Government,
2:177–186, 2004.
[LDEH11] Eric L. Lazarus, David L. Dill, Jeremy Epstein, and Joseph Lorenzo Hall.
Applying a reusable election threat model at the county level. In 2011 Elec-
tronic Voting Technology Workshop / Workshop on Trustworthy Elections
(EVT/WOTE), pages 12–12. USENIX Association, 2011.
146 Bibliography
[LGTL85] Wen-Shing Lee, Doris L. Grosh, Frank A. Tillman, and Chang H. Lie. Fault
tree analysis, methods, and applications: A review. IEEE Transactions on
Reliability, 34(3):194–203, 1985.
[LKZ14] Huian Li, Abhishek Reddy Kankanala, and Xukai Zou. A taxonomy and
comparison of remote voting schemes. In 2014 International Conference on
Computer Communication and Networks (ICCCN), pages 1–8. IEEE Com-
puter Society, 2014.
[LLWK10] Kwangwoo Lee, Yunho Lee, Dongho Won, and Seungjoo Kim. Protection
profile for secure e-voting systems. In Information Security, Practice and
Experience, pages 386–397. Springer, 2010.
[LSK12] Jesus Luna, Neeraj Suri, and Ioannis Krontiris. Privacy-by-design based
on quantitative threat modeling. In 2012 International Conference on Risk
and Security of Internet and Systems (CRiSIS), pages 1–8. IEEE Computer
Society, 2012.
[Lun10] David Lundin. Component based electronic voting systems. Springer, 2010.
[LWW04] Joseph K Liu, Victor K Wei, and Duncan S Wong. Linkable spontaneous
anonymous group signature for ad hoc groups. In Information Security and
Privacy, pages 325–335. Springer, 2004.
[Mat16] Mathematics Stack Exchange. Is the probability of the union of events non-
decreasing in the probability of the events? Mathematics Stack Exchange,
2016. URL:http://math.stackexchange.com/q/1636424 (version: 2016-02-
02).
[MBT14] Anh Tien Mai, Fabian Bastin, and Michel Toulouse. On optimization al-
gorithms for maximum likelihood estimation. Technical report, CIRRELT
Technical Report, 2014.
[McG08] Margaret McGaley. E-voting: an Immature Technology in a Critical Context.
PhD thesis, National University of Ireland Maynooth, 2008.
[MD13] Theodor Maunz and Gu¨nter Du¨rig. Grundgesetz: Kommentar. C.H. Beck,
2013.
[MdSO+15] Taciane Martimiano, Eduardo dos Santos, Maina Olembo, Jean Everson
Martina, and Ricardo Alexandre Reinaldo de Moraes. Ceremony analysis
meets verifiable voting: Individual verifiability in Helios. In International
Conference on Emerging Security Information, Systems and Technologies
(SECURWARE), pages 105 – 111. IARIA, 2015.
Bibliography 147
[Mer01] Rebecca T. Mercuri. Electronic vote tabulation checks and balances. 2001.
[MGK02] Lilian Mitrou, Dimitris Gritzalis, and Sokratis Katsikas. Revisiting Legal and
Regulatory Requirements for Secure E-Voting. In International Conference
on Information Security (SEC), volume 214 of IFIP Conference Proceedings,
pages 469–480. Kluwer, 2002.
[MM06] U¨lle Madise and Tarvi Martens. E-voting in Estonia 2005. The first practice
of country-wide binding internet voting in the world. In 2nd International
Conference on Electronic Voting (EVOTE), volume 86 of LNI. GI, 2006.
[MN06] Tal Moran and Moni Naor. Receipt-free universally-verifiable voting with
everlasting privacy. In Advances in Cryptology (CRYPTO), volume 4117 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 373–392. Springer, 2006.
[MR10] Niels Menke and Kai Reinhard. Compliance of POLYAS with the Common
Criteria Protection Profile-A 2010 Outlook on Certified Remote Electronic
Voting. In 4th International Conference on Electronic Voting (EVOTE),
volume 167 of LNI, pages 109–118. GI, 2010.
[MSK+11] Daniel J. Mundform, Jay Schaffer, Myoung-Jin Kim, Dale Shaw, Ampai
Thongteeraparp, and Pornsin Supawan. Number of replications required
in monte carlo simulation studies: a synthesis of four studies. Journal of
Modern Applied Statistical Methods, 10(1):4, 2011.
[MU49] Nicholas Metropolis and Stanislaw Ulam. The monte carlo method. Journal
of the American statistical association, 44(247):335–341, 1949.
[MV11] U¨lle Madise and Priit Vinkel. Constitutionality of remote internet voting:
The Estonian perspective. Juridica International, 18:4–16, 2011.
[Mye90] Raymond H. Myers. Classical and modern regression with applications, vol-
ume 2. Duxbury Press Belmont, CA, 1990.
[Myu03] In Jae Myung. Tutorial on maximum likelihood estimation. Journal of
mathematical Psychology, 47(1):90–100, 2003.
[NJWS10] Steven Noel, Sushil Jajodia, Lingyu Wang, and Anoop Singhal. Measuring
security risk of networks using attack graphs. International Journal of Next-
Generation Computing, 1(1):135–147, 2010.
[NK06] Saggi Nevo and Henry M. Kim. How to compare and analyse risks of internet
voting versus other modes of voting. EG, 3(1):105–112, 2006.
[NORV14] Stephan Neumann, Maina M. Olembo, Karen Renaud, and Melanie Volka-
mer. Helios verification: To alleviate, or to nominate: Is that the question, or
148 Bibliography
shall we have both? In International Conference on Electronic Government
and the Information Systems Perspective, volume 8650 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, pages 246–260. Springer, September 2014.
[NV12] Stephan Neumann and Melanie Volkamer. Formal treatment of distributed
trust in electronic voting. In International Conference on Internet Monitor-
ing and Protection (ICIMP), pages 30–39. IARIA, 2012.
[NVS+15] Stephan Neumann, Melanie Volkamer, Moritz Strube, Wolfgang Jung,
and Achim Brelle. Cast-as-intended-Verifizierbarkeit fu¨r das Polyas-
Internetwahlsystem. Datenschutz und Datensicherheit, 39(11):747–752,
2015.
[OBV13] Maina M. Olembo, Steffen Bartsch, and Melanie Volkamer. Mental models
of verifiability in voting. In 4th International Conference on E-Voting and
Identity (Vote-ID), volume 7985 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages
142–155. Springer, 2013.
[Off11] Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. Estonia Parliamen-
tary Elections, 6 March 2011: OSCE/ODIHR Election Assessment Mission
Report. ODIHR.GAL: Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights.
ODIHR, 2011.
[OJM11] Samir Ouchani, Yosr Jarraya, and Otmane Aı¨t Mohamed. Model-based
systems security quantification. In 2011 Annual International Conference on
Privacy, Security and Trust (PST), pages 142–149. IEEE Computer Society,
2011.
[OKNV12] Maina M. Olembo, Anna Kahlert, Stephan Neumann, and Melanie Volka-
mer. Partial Verifiability in POLYAS for the GI Elections. In 5th Inter-
national Conference on Electronic Voting (EVOTE), volume 205 of LNI -
Lecture Notes in Informatics, pages 95–109. GI, 2012.
[ORBV14] Maina M. Olembo, Karen Renaud, Steffen Bartsch, and Melanie Volkamer.
Voter, what message will motivate you to verify your vote. In Workshop on
Usable Security (USEC), 2014.
[OSC12] OSCE/ODIHR. Norway: Internet Voting Pilot Project / Local Govern-
ment Election - 12 September 2011: OSCE/ODIHR Election Expert Team
Report., 2012.
[OSV11] Maina M. Olembo, Patrick Schmidt, and Melanie Volkamer. Introducing
verifiability in the polyas remote electronic voting system. In 2011 Inter-
national Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES), pages
127–134. IEEE Computer Society, 2011.
Bibliography 149
[OV13] Maina M. Olembo and Melanie Volkamer. E-Voting System Usability:
Lessons for Interface Design, User Studies, and Usability Criteria, chap-
ter 11, pages 172 – 201. IGI Global, February 2013.
[Pai99] Pascal Paillier. Public-key cryptosystems based on composite degree resid-
uosity classes. In Advances in Cryptology (EUROCRYPT), volume 1592 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 223–238. Springer, 1999.
[Pan15] Panda Security. PandaLabs Report Q3 2015 (July - September)
2015. http://www.pandasecurity.com/mediacenter/src/uploads/2014/
07/Pandalabs-2015-T3-EN1.pdf, 2015.
[Phy04] Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt. Online voting systems for nonpar-
liamentary elections: Catalogue of requirements, 2004.
[PLY10] Harold Pardue, Jeffrey P. Landry, and Alec Yasinsac. A risk assessment
model for voting systems using threat trees and monte carlo simulation.
In 2009 International Workshop on Requirements Engineering for e-Voting
Systems (RE-VOTE), pages 55–60. IEEE Computer Society, 2010.
[PLY11] Harold Pardue, Jeffrey P. Landry, and Alec Yasinsac. E-voting risk assess-
ment: A threat tree for direct recording electronic systems. International
Journal of Information Security and Privacy (IJISP), 5(3):19–35, 2011.
[PR94] Ulrich Pordesch and Alexander Roßnagel. Elektronisches Signaturverfahren
rechtsgema¨ß gestalten. Datenschutz und Datensicherheit, pages 82–91, 1994.
[PYL10] Harold Pardue, Alec Yasinsac, and Jeffrey Landry. Towards internet voting
security: A threat tree for risk assessment. In 2010 International Conference
on Risk and Security of Internet and Systems (CRiSIS), pages 1–7. IEEE
Computer Society, 2010.
[Ray08] Samik Raychaudhuri. Introduction to monte carlo simulation. In Winter
Simulation Conference (WSC), pages 91–100. IEEE Computer Society, 2008.
[Rep14] Republic of Estonia: Information System Authority. Facts about e-estonia.
https://www.ria.ee/facts-about-e-estonia/, 2014.
[Ric12] Philipp Richter. Wahlen im Internet rechtsgema¨ß gestalten. Nomos, 2012.
[RJ07] Kai Reinhard and Wolfgang Jung. Compliance of POLYAS with the BSI
protection profile - basic requirements for remote electronic voting systems.
volume 4896 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 62–75. Springer,
2007.
150 Bibliography
[RSA78] Ronald L. Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Len Adleman. A method for obtaining
digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems. Communications of the
ACM, 21(2):120–126, 1978.
[RT13] Peter Y.A. Ryan and Vanessa Teague. Pretty good democracy. In 2013
International Workshop on Security Protocols, volume 7028 of Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, pages 111–130. Springer, 2013.
[Sal16] Dietmar A. Salamon. Measure and Integration. 2016. To appear in the EMS
Textbook series.
[Sch90] Claus-Peter Schnorr. Efficient identification and signatures for smart cards.
In Advances in cryptology (CRYPTO), volume 435 of Lecture Notes in Com-
puter Science, pages 239–252. Springer, 1990.
[Sch04] Guido Schryen. Security aspects of internet voting. In Hawaii International
Conference on System Sciences (HICSS), pages 9–pp. IEEE Computer So-
ciety, 2004.
[Sch09] Wolfgang Schreiber. Bundeswahlgesetz-Kommentar. Carl Heymanns, 2009.
[Sec06] Secretariat general de la defense et de la securite nationale. Protection Pro-
file: Machine a voter (PP-CIVIS), 2006.
[SFD+14] Drew Springall, Travis Finkenauer, Zakir Durumeric, Jason Kitcat, Harri
Hursti, Margaret MacAlpine, and J. Alex Halderman. Security analysis of
the Estonian internet voting system. In 2014 ACM SIGSAC Conference on
Computer and Communications Security (CCS), pages 703–715. ACM, 2014.
[SGF02] Gary Stoneburner, Alice Goguen, and Alexis Feringa. Risk management
guide for information technology systems. Technical report, National Insti-
tute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-30, 2002.
[Sha79] Adi Shamir. How to share a secret. Communications of the ACM, 22:612–
613, 1979.
[Sha93] Michael I. Shamos. Electronic voting-evaluating the threat. In Conference
on Computers, Freedom and Privacy (CPSR), 1993.
[Smi05] Warren D. Smith. Cryptography meets voting. 2005.
[Ste46] Stanley Smith Stevens. On the theory of scales of measurement. Science,
103(2684):677–680, 1946.
[Str00] Robert S. Strichartz. The way of analysis. Jones & Bartlett Learning, 2000.
Bibliography 151
[SVRH11] Guido Schryen, Melanie Volkamer, Sebastian Ries, and Sheikh Mahbub
Habib. A formal approach towards measuring trust in distributed systems.
In 2011 Annual ACM Symposium on Applied Computing (SAC), pages 1739–
1745. ACM, 2011.
[Tre07] Alexander H. Trechsel. Internet voting in the March 2007 parliamentary
elections in Estonia. PhD thesis, University of Utah, 2007.
[Uni48] United Nations. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, December 1948.
[Vau98] Jussi K. Vaurio. An implicit method for incorporating common-cause failures
in system analysis. IEEE Transactions on Reliability, 47(2):173–180, 1998.
[Vej13] Martin Vejacˇka. Evaluation of internet voting systems based on require-
ments satisfaction. International Review of Social Sciences and Humanities,
6(2):41–52, 2013.
[VG09] Melanie Volkamer and Ru¨diger Grimm. Determine the Resilience of Evalu-
ated Internet Voting Systems. In 2009 International Workshop on Require-
ments Engineering for e-Voting Systems (RE-VOTE), pages 47–54. IEEE
Computer Society, 2009.
[VH04] Melanie Volkamer and Dieter Hutter. From legal principles to an internet
voting system. volume 47 of LNI, pages 111–120. GI, 2004.
[vMK12] Ingo von Mu¨nch and Philip Kunig. Grundgesetz-Kommentar. C.H. Beck,
2012.
[Vol09] Melanie Volkamer. Evaluation of Electronic Voting - Requirements and Eval-
uation Procedures to Support Responsible Election Authorities, volume 30 of
LNBIP. Springer, 2009.
[Vot02] Vote Here. Network Voting System Standards (NVSS). Public Draft 2, 2002.
[VV08] Melanie Volkamer and Roland Vogt. Basic set of security requirements for
Online Voting Products. Technical Report BSI-PP-0037, 2008. Common
Criteria Protection Profile.
[Web16] WebRoots Democracy. Secure voting: A guide to secure #onlinevoting in
elections, 2016.
[ZCC+13] Filip Zago´rski, Richard T. Carback, David Chaum, Jeremy Clark, Alek-
sander Essex, and Poorvi L. Vora. Remotegrity: Design and use of an
end-to-end verifiable remote voting system. In Applied Cryptography and
Network Security (ACNS), volume 7954 of Lecture Notes in Computer Sci-
ence, pages 441–457. Springer, 2013.

Bibliography 153

Appendices
A. KORA Results Derived by Bra¨unlich et al. [BGRR13]
We outline the results obtained by Bra¨unlich et al. [BGRR13] after execting KORA
steps 1-3. Given the fact that KORA steps 1 and 2 are in legal jargon, we provide
the results of both steps in the original language German. Given their technical jargon,
the technical design goals have been translated to English. We emphasize that legal
requirements (KORA step 1), legal criteria (KORA step 2), and technical design goals
(KORA step 3) are the result of Bra¨unlich et al. [BGRR13] and are not a contribution of
this thesis.
A.1. Legal Requirements
Selbstbestimmung. Fu¨r ein Internetwahlverfahren la¨sst sich aus der allgemeinen, unmit-
telbaren und freien Wahl die Anforderung der Selbstbestimmung ableiten. Jeder Wahl-
berechtigte muss die Stimmabgabe selbst in Ha¨nden halten und sie ohne Hindernisse
durchfu¨hren ko¨nnen. Dies umfasst zuna¨chst das Recht auf Teilnahme an der Wahl. Fu¨r eine
obligatorische Internetwahl bedeutet dies, dass jedem Wahlberechtigten ein Zugang zum
Verfahren zur Verfu¨gung stehen muss. Das Wahlverfahren muss auch von jedem Wahl-
berechtigten bedient werden ko¨nnen. Jeder Wa¨hler muss die Mo¨glichkeit haben, durch
perso¨nliche Einwirkung im Rahmen seines Wahlrechts seinem Willen gema¨ßauf das Wahl-
ergebnis Einfluss nehmen zu ko¨nnen. Die ho¨chstperso¨nliche Stimmabgabe muss auch bei
der Internetfernwahl sichergestellt sein, soweit keine Ausnahme fu¨r den jeweiligen Wa¨hler
besteht. Im Ausnahmefall muss die Mo¨glichkeit gegeben sein, die Stimmabgabe durch ei-
ne Vertrauensperson ausu¨ben zu lassen. Der Wa¨hler muss wa¨hrend der Stimmabgabe von
unzula¨ssiger Beeinflussung durch das Wahlverfahren frei bleiben. Angesichts tragbarer Mi-
nikameras und -computer erscheint es kaum mo¨glich, jegliche mediale Beeinflussung des
Wa¨hlers wa¨hrend der Stimmabgabe auszuschließen. Entscheidend ist aber, dass durch das
Wahlverfahren, das mit dem Ansehen einer staatlichen Einrichtung ausgestattet ist, die
Entscheidung des Wa¨hlers nicht beeinflusst wird. Dies betrifft auch mediale Beeinflussun-
gen, die in unzula¨ssiger Weise in das Wahlverfahren eingebracht werden. Die zwingende
Beeinflussung durch andere Personen wird von der Anforderung Unbestimmbarkeit (A3)
adressiert.
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Gleichwertigkeit. Fu¨r Internetwahlverfahren la¨sst sich aus der gleichen Wahl die Anfor-
derung der Gleichwertigkeit ableiten. Diese bezieht sich auf das aktive und das passive
Wahlrecht. Jeder Wahlberechtigte muss seine Stimme wie jeder andere abgeben ko¨nnen.
Jeder Wahlberechtigte darf nur eine wirksame Stimme abgeben, 14 Abs. 4 BWG. Jede
gu¨ltig abgegebene Stimme muss mit dem gleichen Za¨hlwert in das Ergebnis einfließen. Je-
der Wahlbewerber muss in gleicher Weise auf dem elektronischen Stimmzettel dargestellt
werden.
Unbestimmbarkeit. Aus der geheimen Wahl la¨sst sich die Anforderung der Unbestimm-
barkeit des Wahlverhaltens ableiten. Kein Wa¨hler darf mit dem Inhalt seiner Stimme
in Verbindung gebracht werden. Der Wahlvorgang muss technisch so gestaltet sein, dass
es nicht mo¨glich ist, die Wahlentscheidung eines bestimmten Wa¨hlers zu erkennen. Ei-
ne mu¨ndliche Offenbarung durch den Wa¨hler selbst beeintra¨chtigt die geheime Wahl
nicht, soweit der Wahrheitsgehalt einer solchen Aussage nicht u¨berpru¨ft werden kann.
Das Wahlergebnis darf nur als Gesamtergebnis nach Ablauf der Wahlzeit bekannt werden.
Zwischensta¨nde du¨rfen nicht bekannt werden, solange noch gewa¨hlt werden kann. Der
Grundsatz der geheimen Wahl verpflichtet aufgrund seines auch den Wa¨hler verpflichten-
den Charakters zu verfahrensrechtlichen und materiellen Vorkehrungen fu¨r den Schutz des
Wahlgeheimnisses.
Laienkontrolle. Fu¨r Internetwahlverfahren la¨sst sich aus dem Grundsatz der O¨ffentlichkeit
der Wahl die Anforderung der Laienkontrolle ableiten. Die wesentlichen Schritte der Wahl
mu¨ssen von den Wa¨hlern selbst, den Wahlorganen und von allen interessierten Bu¨rgern
nachvollzogen und kontrolliert werden ko¨nnen. Dies bedeutet, dass der einzelne Wa¨hler
die inhaltlich korrekte Behandlung seiner eigenen Stimme nachvollziehen und kontrollie-
ren ko¨nnen muss. Der verfassungsgema¨ße Ablauf aller Stimmabgaben muss fu¨r alle Bu¨rger
nachvollziehbar und kontrollierbar sein. Die Nachvollziehbarkeit darf gerade nicht auf be-
sonderer technischer Sachkenntnis beruhen. Sie muss dem technischen Laien gleichermaßen
mo¨glich sein. Es reicht nicht aus, dass die Wa¨hler auf die die generelle Funktionsfa¨higkeit
eines Systems verwiesen sind. Auch eine elektronische Anzeige daru¨ber, dass die abgege-
bene Stimme korrekt erfasst wurde und in die Ausza¨hlung eingegangen ist, genu¨gt nicht.
Datenschutz. Aus der informationellen Selbstbestimmung und dem Fernmeldegeheimnis
la¨sst sich die Anforderung Datenschutz ableiten. Nur solche personenbezogenen Daten
du¨rfen erhoben und verarbeitet werden, die zur Wahldurchfu¨hrung erforderlich sind. Ihre
Verwendung muss auf diesen Zweck beschra¨nkt bleiben. Den Wahlberechtigten muss die
u¨bersicht und Kontrolle u¨ber ihre erhobenen und verarbeiteten personenbezogenen Daten
erhalten bleiben.
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A.2. Legal Criteria
Nutzbarkeit (engl. Usability). Die selbstbestimmte Wahl ist nur dann gewa¨hrleistet,
wenn jeder Wahlberechtigte das Wahlverfahren seinem Willen gema¨ß bedienen kann. Dem
Wa¨hler muss zur Verwirklichung der Selbstbestimmung (A1) die Mo¨glichkeit gegeben sein,
seinem Willen gema¨ß zu wa¨hlen, nicht zu wa¨hlen oder ungu¨ltig zu wa¨hlen. Nur dann
kann von Gleichwertigkeit (A2) gesprochen werden, wenn alle Wa¨hler durch die Nutzung
des Wahlverfahrens das Gleiche erreichen ko¨nnen. Grundsa¨tzlich muss jeder Wa¨hler sei-
ne Stimme ho¨chstperso¨nlich und ohne Hilfe abgeben. Die ho¨chstperso¨nliche Stimmabgabe
muss durch wirksame Maßnahmen auch bei der Stimmabgabe aus dem nichto¨ffentlichen
Bereich sichergestellt werden. Die ho¨chstperso¨nliche Stimmabgabe muss auch behinderten
Wa¨hlern mo¨glichst weitreichend durch eine barrierefreie Gestaltung des Wahlverfahrens
ermo¨glicht werden. Es muss jedoch in technisch nicht lo¨sbaren Fa¨llen Wahlberechtigten
und ihren Hilfspersonen mo¨glich sein, eine verbleibende Hilfsbedu¨rftigkeit geltend zu ma-
chen und die Wahl mittels menschlicher Hilfestellung durchzufu¨hren. U¨berdies muss die
Bedienung der no¨tigen Anwendungen entweder vo¨llig selbsterkla¨rend sein oder den Wahl-
berechtigten wa¨hrend des Wahlvorgangs in geeigneter Weise nahegebracht werden. Hierbei
muss auch die unterschiedliche Erfahrung der Wahlberechtigten im Umgang mit Rechnern
und dem Internet Beru¨cksichtigung finden. Der Schwierigkeitsgrad der Bedienung ist an
den Unerfahrensten auszurichten.
Erreichbarkeit (engl. Reachibility). Fu¨r eine obligatorische Internetfernwahl muss zu-
na¨chst sichergestellt sein, dass alle Wahlberechtigten rein physisch die Mo¨glichkeit haben,
auf das Verfahren zuzugreifen. Ihnen muss also ein Rechner mit Internetanschluss und den
no¨tigen Anwendungen zur Verfu¨gung stehen. Insofern dies allein durch private Endgera¨te
nicht gewa¨hrleistet ist, mu¨ssen o¨ffentliche Gera¨te zur Verfu¨gung gestellt werden, um die
Selbstbestimmung (A1) aller Wahlberechtigten zu ermo¨glichen. Daru¨berhinaus mu¨ssen die
notwendigen Wahldaten wie Zugangsdaten der Wahlberechtigten,
Wa¨hlerregister und die Liste der Wahlkandidaten wa¨hrend des Wahlzeitraums in aktuell-
ster Form zur Verfu¨gung stehen, damit jeder selbstbestimmt (A1) und gleichwertig (A2)
an der Wahl teilnehmen kann. Jeder Wahlberechtigte muss in die Lage versetzt sein, sich
gegenu¨ber dem Wahlverfahren zu identifizieren und sein bestehendes Wahlrecht zu bewei-
sen. Letztlich bezieht sich Erreichbarkeit auf das Wahlverfahren selbst. Es muss wa¨hrend
des Wahlzeitraums ohne erhebliche Ausfa¨lle erreichbar sein, um eine selbstbestimmte (A1)
Wahlausu¨bung aller Wahlberechtigten zu ermo¨glichen. Das Verfahren muss daher stabil
genug sein, um fu¨r den Zeitraum des Wahlvorganges bereitzustehen und die anfallenden
Zugriffe der Wa¨hler zu verarbeiten. Es muss die abgegebenen Stimmen so speichern, dass
sie auch im Fall von Ausfa¨llen nicht verloren gehen.
Stimmengleichheit (engl. Equality of votes). Die Mo¨glichkeit der wirksamen Stimmab-
gabe darf nur Wahlberechtigten zur Verfu¨gung stehen, die noch keine verbindliche Stimme
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abgegeben haben. Alle Stimmen mu¨ssen mit dem gleichen Za¨hlwert in das Ergebnis ein-
fließen. Das Wahlverfahren muss demnach so eingerichtet sein, dass es nur Stimmen von
Wahlberechtigten akzeptiert und jede Stimme mit der gleichen Gewichtung und auch nur
einmal geza¨hlt wird.
Neutralita¨t (engl. Neutrality). Aus der Selbstbestimmung (A1) und der Gleichwertigkeit
(A2) ergibt sich das Kriterium der Neutralita¨t. Eine inhaltliche Beeinflussung der Wa¨hler
durch das Wahlverfahren ist auszuschließen. Wahlwerbung oder Aufrufe zu bestimmtem
Wahlverhalten du¨rfen durch das Wahlverfahren oder vermittels des Wahlverfahrens nicht
stattfinden. Die Wahlkandidaten sind formal gleich zu behandeln. Niemand ist bei ord-
nungsgema¨ßem Verfahrensablauf zu bevorteilen oder zu benachteiligen. Die Darstellung
und Menu¨fu¨hrung des Wahlverfahrens du¨rfen nicht die Wahl bestimmter Kandidaten er-
leichtern oder nahe legen, andere verbergen oder als minderwertig erscheinen lassen.
Unerkennbarkeit (engl. Unknowableness). Aus der Unbestimmbarkeit (A3) und dem
Datenschutz (A5) ergibt sich, dass der Inhalt der verbindlich abgegebenen Stimmen von
der Stimmabgabe bis zum Ende der Wahlzeit vor Kenntnisnahme geschu¨tzt werden muss.
Der Inhalt der abgegebenen Stimmen muss zwar zum Ausza¨hlen der Stimmen verarbei-
tet werden. Vorher darf der Inhalt der Stimmen aber niemandem außer dem jeweiligen
Wa¨hler selbst zur sicheren Kenntnis gelangen. Zu diesem Zweck bleiben die Stimmzettel
bei der Papierpra¨senzwahl bis zur Feststellung des Ergebnisses jeglicher Kenntnisnahme
entzogen. Ein fu¨r die informationstechnische Spha¨re vergleichbarer Schutz des Inhalts der
Stimme muss auch fu¨r ein Internetwahlverfahren eingerichtet werden. Es darf niemandem
außer dem einzelnen Wa¨hler in Bezug auf seine eigene Stimme mo¨glich sein, vor Ende
des Wahlzeitraums den Inhalt abgegebener Stimmen auszulesen oder auf anderem Weg
zur Kenntnis zu nehmen. Bei einer Wahlausu¨bung aus dem privaten, beruflichen oder
gesellschaftlichen Bereich muss die individuelle Wahlentscheidung davor geschu¨tzt wer-
den, dass Dritte sie ausspa¨hen, sei es durch einfachen Blick auf die Anzeige wa¨hrend der
Wahldurchfu¨hrung, sei es durch lesenden Zugriff auf das Endgera¨t, sei es durch Mitlesen
wa¨hrend der u¨bertragung. Es mu¨ssen wirksame Maßnahmen geschaffen werden, um das
Wahlgeheimnis auch bei der Wahl aus der privaten Spha¨re heraus zu schu¨tzen. Unerkenn-
barkeit schu¨tzt gleichzeitig vor unzula¨ssiger Beeinflussung bei der Stimmabgabe, als auch
vor der Berechnung und Vero¨ffentlichung von Zwischenergebnissen.
Unverknu¨pfbarkeit (engl. Unlinkability). Das Kriterium Unverknu¨pfbarkeit konkreti-
siert einen weiteren Abschnitt der rechtlichen Anforderung Unbestimmbarkeit (A3) und
entspricht dem Datenschutz (A5). Der Inhalt wirksam abgegebener Stimmen darf zu kei-
nem Zeitpunkt, weder wa¨hrend der Stimmabgabe noch im Nachhinein, der bu¨rgerlichen
Identita¨t des Wa¨hlers zugeordnet werden ko¨nnen. Bis zum Ende der Wahlzeit ist dies
durch die Unerkennbarkeit gewa¨hrleistet, da der Inhalt der Wahlentscheidung gar nicht
von anderen Personen als dem Wa¨hler wahrgenommen werden darf. Unverknu¨pfbarkeit
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setzt mit der Stimmausza¨hlung ein, wenn hierzu die Unerkennbarkeit aufgehoben werden
muss. Der nun zu vero¨ffentlichende Inhalt der Wahlentscheidungen darf fu¨r niemanden als
den Wa¨hler mit den im Wahlverfahren gespeicherten personenbezogenen Daten in Ver-
bindung gebracht werden ko¨nnen. Auch eine Wahrnehmungsmo¨glichkeit fu¨r den einzelnen
Wa¨hler selbst darf es nicht erlauben, Dritten die eigene Wahlentscheidung zu beweisen.
Auch wenn Unverknu¨pfbarkeit wirkungsma¨ßig erst mit der Stimmausza¨hlung einsetzt, ist
es wahrscheinlich, dass die Voraussetzungen hierfu¨r bereits weit vorher geschaffen werden
mu¨ssen. Der Wa¨hler darf den Inhalt seiner abgegebenen Stimme gegenu¨ber Dritten nicht
beweisen ko¨nnen. Der Wa¨hler muss auch davor geschu¨tzt werden, dass er versehentlich in
beweisbarer Form preisgibt, welche Stimme er abgegeben hat. Die Zuordnung von Wahlent-
scheidung und Wa¨hler wird bei papierbasierten Wahlverfahren grundsa¨tzlich dauerhaft ge-
heimgehalten. Nach Einwurf des Stimmzettels in die Urne ist eine Zuordnung zum Wa¨hler
kaum noch mo¨glich. Die Wahlunterlagen mu¨ssen gema¨ß 73 Abs. 2, 89 BWO sicher ver-
wahrt und schließlich gema¨ß 90 Abs. 3 BWO vernichtet werden. Bezu¨glich elektronischer
Wahlen wird ha¨ufig bezweifelt, dass eine solche endgu¨ltige Geheimhaltung gewa¨hrleistet
werden kann, da informationstechnische Daten nur schwer restlos zu lo¨schen sind, die
Verbindung zum Wa¨hler nicht so leicht zu trennen ist, wie beim Einwurf in die Papier-
wahlurne und Verschlu¨sselungen durch neuere, leistungsfa¨higere Rechner mo¨glicherweise in
kurzer Zeit geknackt werden ko¨nnten. Die Verbindung zwischen einem Wa¨hler und seiner
Stimme schon bei der Stimmabgabe endgu¨ltig zu kappen wu¨rde u¨berdies die Mo¨glichkeit
des jeweiligen Wa¨hlers, eine nachtra¨gliche Kontrolle der ordnungsgema¨ßen Verarbeitung
seiner Stimme durchzufu¨hren (siehe hierzu Individualkontrolle K7), erheblich verku¨rzen.
Eine endgu¨ltige Geheimhaltung ist allerdings, auch wenn sie die sicherste Lo¨sung darstellt,
nicht notwendig. Die Unverknu¨pfbarkeit als Konkretisierung der geheimen Wahl dient dem
Schutz der freien und gleichen Wahl. Die Schutzfunktion bezu¨glich der gleichen Wahl erle-
digt sich mit dem Ende der Wahlzeit. Unzula¨ssiger Zwang aufgrund sicherer Kenntnis der
Wahlentscheidung muss aber sowohl bezu¨glich der aktuellen als auch zuku¨nftiger Wahlen
ausgeschlossen werden. Die Unverknu¨pfbarkeit muss daher so lange gewa¨hrleistet werden,
wie ein Wa¨hler lebt und an Wahlen teilnehmen kann. Es wa¨re also mo¨glich, die Verbin-
dung zwischen Wa¨hler und Stimme fu¨r die Wahlkontrolle aufrecht zu erhalten. Damit diese
Verbindung jedoch von anderen Personen als dem Wa¨hler selbst nicht aufgedeckt werden
kann, sollte eine Anonymisierung mit solchen Mitteln durchgefu¨hrt werden, die zumin-
dest fu¨r die Zeitspanne eines wahlberechtigten Lebens (hier die Zeitspanne zwischen dem
vollendeten 18. Lebensjahr und dem Tod) lesenden Angriffen standhalten. Mit Hilfe homo-
morpher Verschlu¨sselungsverfahren ko¨nnte das Wahlergebnis berechnet werden, ohne die
einzelnen Stimmen zu entschlu¨sseln. In diesem Fall wa¨re eine fehlende Unverknu¨pfbarkeit
nicht scha¨dlich, da die Unerkennbarkeit weiter gewa¨hrleistet bliebe. Unerkennbarkeit und
Unverknu¨pfbarkeit du¨rfen aber niemals gleichzeitig gebrochen werden. Die Ausfu¨hrungen
u¨ber die Dauer der Unverknu¨pfbarkeit wu¨rden sich in diesem Fall auf die Unerkennbarkeit
beziehen.
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Individualkontrolle (engl. Individual control). Anhand der vom Bundesverfassungsge-
richt vorgegebenen Adressaten von O¨ffentlichkeit, dem Einzelnen in Bezug auf die Verar-
beitung seiner eigenen Stimme, allen Bu¨rgern in Bezug auf den korrekten Ablauf der Wahl,
wird die Anforderung Laienkontrolle (A4) zu den rechtlichen Kriterien Individualkontrolle
(K7) und Publikumskontrolle (K8) weiter konkretisiert. Die Individualkontrolle steht dem
einzelnen Wa¨hler zu. Er muss kontrollieren ko¨nnen, ob seine Stimme vom Wahlverfahren
mit dem von ihm gewollten Inhalt gespeichert und geza¨hlt wird. Zu diesem Zweck kann
das Wahlverfahren so eingerichtet sein, dass der einzelne Wa¨hler den Inhalt seiner eige-
nen Stimme jederzeit, auch nach der verbindlichen Abgabe, einsehen kann. Hierdurch darf
nicht die Unverknu¨pfbarkeit (K6) gebrochen werden.
Publikumskontrolle (engl. Public control). Die Publikumskontrolle richtet sich nicht
bloß an die einzelnen Wahlberechtigten, sondern an die gesamte O¨ffentlichkeit, also auch
nicht Wahlberechtigte. Allen Bu¨rgern muss es mo¨glich sein, den verfassungsgema¨ßen Ab-
lauf jeder Stimmabgabe nachzuvollziehen, also die Einhaltung der Wahlrechtsgrundsa¨tze
des Art. 38 Abs. 1. Satz 1 GG. Dabei darf jedoch das Wahlgeheimnis nicht gebrochen,
der Inhalt fremder Stimmen also vor dem Ende der Wahl nicht wahrgenommen, nach dem
Ende der Wahl nicht mit dem jeweiligen Wa¨hler verknu¨pft werden (K6).
Datensparsamkeit (engl. Data economy). Aus der Anforderung Datenschutz (A5) und
der Anforderung Unbestimmbarkeit (A3) ergibt sich das Kriterium Datensparsamkeit.
Menschen ko¨nnen hinsichtlich ihrer personenbezogenen Daten in effektivster Weise geschu¨tzt
werden, wenn die Daten erst gar nicht erhoben und verarbeitet werden. Der Grundsatz der
Datensparsamkeit findet sich zum Beispiel in §3a BDSG. Ein Internetwahlverfahren muss
so eingerichtet werden, dass es nur solche personenbezogenen Daten erhebt und verarbeitet,
ohne die es nicht funktionieren kann. Die mo¨glichst geringe Verarbeitung personenbezo-
gener Daten entspricht gleichzeitig in hohem Maße der Anforderung Unbestimmbarkeit
(A3), denn je mehr personenbezogene Daten verarbeitet werden, desto leichter wird es,
das Wahlgeheimnis zu brechen.
Datentransparenz (engl. Data transparency). Als Konkretisierung der Anforderun-
gen Datenschutz (A5) und Unbestimmbarkeit (A3) ergibt sich das Kriterium der Da-
tensparsamkeit. Der Grundsatz der Datensparsamkeit findet sich zum Beispiel in §3a
BDSG. Ein Internetwahlverfahren ist so einzurichten, dass es nur solche personenbezo-
genen Daten erhebt und verarbeitet, ohne die es nicht funktionieren kann. Der bereits
im Volksza¨hlungsurteil angelegte Grundsatz der Datensparsamkeit zielt auf eine Vorsor-
ge zur Minimierung der Risiken fu¨r die informationelle Selbstbestimmung. Da einmal
erhobene personenbezogene Daten unter den Umsta¨nden der modernen Datenverarbei-
tung ha¨ufig kaum noch zu kontrollieren sind, wird Datensparsamkeit teilweise sogar zur
einzigen Mo¨glichkeit, um informationelle Selbstbestimmung u¨berhaupt noch ausu¨ben zu
ko¨nnen. Das Prinzip der Datensparsamkeit dient nicht wie das Erforderlichkeitsprinzip
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der Begrenzung von Grundrechtseingriffen im Einzelfall, sondern leistet Vorsorge, indem
es eine technisch-organisatorische Gestaltung von Datenverarbeitungsanlagen verlangt, die
mo¨glichst keine oder mo¨glichst wenig personenbezogene Datenverarbeitung ermo¨glicht. In-
dem mo¨glichst wenige personenbezogene Daten u¨ber die Teilnahme an der Internetwahl
verarbeitet werden, wird auch der Unbestimmbarkeit (A3), die sich auf das Wahlgeheim-
nis bezieht, in hohem Maße Rechnung getragen. Je weniger personenbezogene Daten im
Zusammenhang mit der Wahl erhoben werden, desto schwieriger wird es, eine abgegebe-
ne Stimme einem Wa¨hler zuzuordnen. Die Datensparsamkeit weist also einen erheblichen
Bezug zur Unverknu¨pfbarkeit (K6) auf und ist daher ein sehr wichtiges Kriterium fu¨r den
Schutz des Wahlgeheimnisses.
Zweckbindung (engl. Appropriation). Zur Verwirklichung des Datenschutzes (A5) ist
die Zweckbindung notwendig. Die personenbezogenen Daten du¨rfen ohne die Einwilligung
des Betroffenen vom Wahlverfahren nicht zu anderen Zwecken als zur Wahldurchfu¨hrung
gespeichert oder sonst verarbeitet werden. Nach Erreichung des spezifischen Zwecks in-
nerhalb des Wahlverfahrens sind die personenbezogenen Daten umgehend zu lo¨schen. Das
Kriterium Zweckbindung ist verschra¨nkt mit dem Kriterium der Datentransparenz. Den
Wahlberechtigten muss ersichtlich sein, zu welchen Zwecken die u¨ber sie erhobenen Daten
genutzt werden ko¨nnen. Dieses Prinzip des Datenschutzrechts findet sich zum Beispiel in
§§4 Abs. 3 Nr. 2, 14 Abs. 1 Satz 1 BDSG und §12 Abs. 2 TMG. Es entha¨lt das Verbot
der Datensammlung auf Vorrat54 und der Bildung von Perso¨nlichkeitsprofilen. Die Zweck-
bestimmung muss konkret und eng gefasst sein, um sicherzustellen, dass sie nicht durch
einen zu weit gefassten Zweck umgangen werden kann. Personenbezogene Daten du¨rfen
vom Wahlverfahren nur verarbeitet werden, soweit dies zur Durchfu¨hrung der Wahl er-
forderlich ist. Die Verarbeitung darf ohne Einwilligung des jeweiligen Wa¨hlers nicht im
Nachhinein fu¨r andere Zwecke ermo¨glicht werden.
Datenbeherrschbarkeit (engl. Data controllability). Zur Verwirklichung des Datenschut-
zes (A5) muss jeder Wa¨hler Einfluss auf die im Rahmen der Internetwahl u¨ber ihn gespei-
cherten personenbezogenen Daten nehmen ko¨nnen. Dies ist durch Lo¨schungs-, Berichti-
gungs- und Sperrungsrechte zu verwirklichen, wie etwa §20 BDSG. Das Internetwahlver-
fahren muss dem Wa¨hler eine Mo¨glichkeit bieten, diese Rechte effizient auszuu¨ben.
Sicherung (engl. Assurance). Die Sicherung ist ein Instrumentalkriterium. Sie gewa¨hr-
leistet die Verwirklichung der u¨brigen Kriterien im Angesicht von Angriffen und Funkti-
onsfehlern. Das Internetwahlverfahren muss nicht lediglich im Normalbetrieb die u¨brigen
zwo¨lf Kriterien erfu¨llen. Es muss auch so gesichert werden, dass es nicht durch unbefugte
Einwirkungen oder Fehler ihnen zuwiderlaufend funktioniert. Zum Schutz der Wahlrechts-
grundsa¨tze sind technische und organisatorische Sicherungsmaßnahmen gegen unbefugte
Einwirkungen und Funktionsfehler einzurichten. Rechtliche Sicherungsmaßnahmen, wie
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das Wahlpru¨fungsverfahren, sind mo¨glichst zu unterstu¨tzen. Hierzu ist ein das Internet-
wahlverfahren in seiner Gesamtheit sicherndes Konzept notwendig. Aufgrund der darge-
stellten erheblichen Risiken, die vom Einsatz der Internetwahltechnik fu¨r die Erfu¨llung
des Wahlrechts ausgehen, kommt der systematischen Sicherung der Internetwahl beson-
dere Bedeutung zu. Das Wahlverfahren muss in unangefochtenem und in angefochtenem
Zustand den Wahlrechtsgrundsa¨tzen entsprechen. Aufgrund der dargestellten Risiken, die
teilweise gleich mehrere Wahlrechtsgrundsa¨tze bedrohen, teilweise erst im Zusammenspiel
ihre besondere Gefa¨hrlichkeit entwickeln, reicht es aber nicht aus, jeden Wahlrechtsgrund-
satz, jede rechtliche Anforderung und jedes Kriterium einzeln zu sichern. Vielmehr be-
darf es einer Sicherung, die das ganze Verfahren, alle Risiken sowie alle Unterschiede und
u¨berschneidungen im Sicherungsbedarf insgesamt in den Blick nimmt. Bezu¨glich der per-
sonenbezogenen Daten wurde dieser Schutzbedarf bereits in Rechtsnormen ausgestaltet.
§9 Satz 1 BDSG schreibt vor, dass im Verha¨ltnis stehende technische und organisatorische
Maßnahmen zum Schutz personenbezogener Daten von der verantwortlichen Stelle getrof-
fen werden mu¨ssen. In der Anlage zu §9 BDSG sind spezifische Maßnahmen zum Schutz
der Daten vorgegeben. Diese ko¨nnen auf Ebene der technischen Gestaltungsziele oder
Gestaltungsvorschla¨ge eingebracht werden. Fu¨r das Wahlpru¨fungsverfahren wird u¨berdies
eine nachvollziehbare und beweissichere Aufbewahrung der abgegebenen Stimmen und
der u¨brigen erheblichen Wahldaten, sowie eine Dokumentation des Wahlablaufs beno¨tigt.
Fu¨r die Bundestagswahl als Papierwahl findet sich dieser Anteil des Sicherungskriteriums
bisher in den §§72 und 73 BWO konkretisiert.
A.3. Technical Design Goals
Bra¨unlich et al. [BGRR13] derived the following technical design goals for Internet voting
systems as result of their interdisciplinary research.
TDG 1: Unauthorized parties must not have the possibility to view voter data.
TDG 2: Unauthorized parties must not have the possibility to manipulate voter data.
TDG 3: Only data required shall be stored.
TDG 4: Any voter must have the possibility to view and influence both extent and purpose
of stored her personal data.
TDG 5: The ballot must be neutral.
TDG 6: Unauthorized parties must not have the possibility to change the ballot data.
TDG 7: The election committee must start the election at the predetermined time.
TDG 8: After a system failure, it must be possible to resume the election.
TDG 9: The election committee must stop the election at the predetermined time.
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TDG 10: The calculation of intermediate results must not be possible.
TDG 11: The calculation of the election result must be started after the official voting
phase by members of the election committee.
TDG 12: Only eligible voters may access successfully the Internet voVting system.
TDG 13: Eligible voters may cast only one binding vote.
TDG 14: The essential steps of the vote casting process must be understandable to any
voter.
TDG 15: Any voter must be able to conduct the vote casting process.
TDG 16: All voters must obtain the same result with equal usage.
TDG 17: Eligible voters must have the possibility to cast votes at any time of the voting
phase.
TDG 18: The vote may only be cast and stored after a confirmation by the voter.
TDG 19: It must be ensured that the vote is correctly transmitted.
TDG 20: Any voter must receive a message regarding the (non-)success of her voting
process.
TDG 21: A voting note must only be taken after a binding vote has been cast.
TDG 22: Third parties must not be capable of linking a vote to the voter who cast the
respective vote.
TDG 23: The voter must not be capable of proving her vote to any third party.
TDG 24: It must not be possible to manipulate the stored binding votes.
TDG 25: The system must compute the correct result.
TDG 26: It must not be possible to manipulate the election result.
TDG 27: Any voter must be able to verify that her vote has been included in the election
result.
TDG 28: The public must be able to verify that the election result has been derived
correctly.
TDG 29: The election must be protocolled.
TDG 30: The election data must be archived in a traceable and evidence-proven manner.
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B. Implementation and Graphical User Interface of the Security
Evaluation Framework
The security evaluation framework has been implemented by a student assistant at the
Technische Universita¨t Darmstadt. The framework has been implemented as JavaFX
FXML application version 8 using the build manager Apache Maven. The graphical user
interface has been implemented with the Java Layout Manager MigLayout and using
Cascading Style Sheets. The backend of the application contains a MySQL database. The
EclipseLink ORM framework is used to map objects in the database.
The graphical user interface of the implemented security evaluation framework is shown
in Figures 1 and 2. The interface shown in Figure 1 allows an election official to specify
her election setting: Therefore, the election official provides distributions with which the
adversary has different capabilities. In the current implementation, the election official
specifies uniform distributions. Additionally, the election officials indicates the number of
expected voters and the number of eligible voters. Optionally, the election official indicates
the number of Monte-Carlo iterations to be run and the target confidence level for the
resulting satisfaction degree. If the election official does not specify these values, 10, 000
Monte-Carlo iterations are run with a confidence value of ≈ 95, 5%.
A typical security evaluation result for two Internet voting schemes is shown in Fig-
ure 2. The results are visualized within chart and additionally provided in tabular for-
mat. In addition to the satisfaction degrees, the election official obtains further statistical
information regarding the information including the confidence value for the computed
satisfaction degree and the minimal and maximal possible satisfaction degrees within the
specified election setting.
B. Implementation and Graphical User Interface of the Security Evaluation Framework165
Figure 1: Interface for the election setting specification in the security evaluation framework.
Figure 2: Result interface of the security evaluation framework.
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